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This thesis is on the law of implied warranties in the sale of goods in the United
Kingdom and Malaysia. The first chapter discusses the history of the law of sale which
dated back to the Roman law. It was received into Europe and England through the
law merchant. The law merchant and the common law then developed the law on
implied warranties
Chapter two consists of a discussion on the codification of the law of sale in the
United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and also the problems that were created by
the Sale ofGoods Act 1893, in particular in relation to implied warranties.
The subsequent three chapters, three, four and five, are on implied warranties of
conformity with description, merchantable quality and fitness for purpose, respectively.
Elements in the relevant provisions are discussed in relation to decided cases. A
comparison is made with the Uniform Commercial Code and the Vienna Convention
on the International Sale of Goods.
The law on exemption clauses is discussed in chapter six. Chapter seven is a review
of the implied warranties in the contracts of sale of goods in other common law
countries like the United States ofAmerica, Australia and New Zealand.
Finally, in chapter eight, the study turns to consider the Malaysian experience on
the subject, highlighting the problems and possible solutions.
INTRODUCTION
This is a thesis on the implied warranties in the sale of goods in the United
Kingdom and Malaysia. Its purpose is to examine whether they provide sufficient
safeguards to consumers. The study is primarily about English law because this is the
basis of Malaysian law. This English legal tradition dates back to the early
nineteenth century when a Charter of Justice was granted to Penang, thus introducing
English law into the colony. Comparison is also made with other laws, such as the
Uniform Commercial Code of the United States of America, the Vienna Convention
on the International Sale of Goods, and the laws of other Commonwealth countries
like Australia and New Zealand. The approach is by way of a historical narrative to
identify the origin and development of the law of implied warranty. This shows that
the law took shape against a social and commercial background very different from
that of today, and in particular from that ofMalaysia.
The first chapter discusses the history of the law of sale, showing that it is basically
of Roman origin, mediated through the law merchant to become part of the English
law. A brief historical survey shows the relationship between the law merchant and
the common law itself, the two strands that went into the making of the English law of
implied warranties. This was finally codified in the Sale ofGoods Act 1893.
Chapter two begins with an examination of the law in Scotland prior to 1893
because Scotland had a different law compared to England. It proceeds to discuss the
codification of the law of sale in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century.
Discussion is made of the Mercantile Law (Amendment) Act 1856, and the Sale of
Goods Act 1893. The latest effort at reforming the law is the Sale and Supply of
Goods Act 1994. For a period of a decade, the law of implied warranties had
undergone so many changes and these are traced in this chapter.
Chapters three, four and five take a detailed look at the implied conditions of
conformity with description, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose
respectively. These chapters analyse the elements of the relevant provisions and their
application through the cases, identifying the problem to which the 1893 Act gave
rise. A comparative study is made with the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods, the most recent international
instrument on the subject.
The sixth chapter contains a discussion of exemption clauses and their significance
in the law of sale. The main theme of this chapter is the effectiveness and the
limitations of such clauses. A comprehensive study is made of the British Law
Commissions' Reports on the subject, their proposals and the amendments made to
the law regarding exemption clauses. This chapter also highlights the 1993 EC
Directive on unfair terms in consumer sales.
The seventh chapter is a review of the treatment of contracts of sale in other
common law countries like the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand.
The focus is on the problems encountered by them in developing their law of sales
from the model provided by the Sale of Goods Act 1893. How far do these
developments provide a model for reform ofMalaysian law?
The final chapter takes a look at the implied conditions in Malaysia under the Sale
of Goods Act 1957. This Act is modeled on the United Kingdom Act of 1893, and is
therefore archaic and obsolete. In this chapter some changes to the Malaysian Act are
proposed.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE OF GOODS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter takes a look at the historical origin of the contract of sale and the
development of the implied warranties. The aim and objective of this chapter is to trace
the influence that helped to shape up the common law of implied warranties. The
historical survey shows that the influence was the Roman law, mediated through the law
merchant to become part of the English law. This chapter will briefly discuss the history
of the Roman law of sale, which is a species of consensual contract, and how it was
received in Europe and in England via the law merchant. The relationship between the
law merchant and the common law itself had helped in the development of the English
law of implied warranties which was later codified into the Sale of Goods 1893.
(I) MEANING
In Roman law, sale is basically an exchange of something for money, leading to a
transfer of ownership of the thing from the seller to the buyer. It is a contract whereby
one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another a thing and to procure for him the
undisturbed and permanent possession of it, and the other, on his part, promises to pay
the price.1 According to Sohm2 sale is a contract whereby one party, the vendor, binds
1
Lee, R.W., The Elements of Roman Law, p. 308.
2 Sohm's Institutes of Roman Law, translated by J. C. Ledlie. p.379.
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himself to make over a thing; the other, the purchaser, binds himself to pay a sum of
money called the price. No formalities are needed in sale. The contract is valid the
moment the parties agreed as to the thing to be sold and the price to be paid. It requires
neither form nor one-sided performance. The agreement can either be oral or written.
Usually it is put in writing or made before witnesses so that there would be evidence of
its existence.
(i) ELEMENTS OF A SALE
The essential elements of a sale are:-
(i) consent or agreement;
(ii) the thing or subject-matter; and
(iii) price.
(i) Consent or Agreement
Consent or agreement is the first key element in a contract of sale. Its absence or defect
is fatal to the existence or validity of the contract. Consent can be negatived by mistake
or error. There are maxims in Roman law which provide that, "the will of the one who is
mistaken has no force" and "persons who are in error cannot be considered as
consenting".3
3
Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Roman Law, p. 59.
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(ii) Subject-matter or Thing
The next essential element in a contract is the subject-matter or thing. It must be in
existence or capable of existing. There is a universal rule that an agreement to sell a
specific thing which at the time of the agreement had ceased to exist is a void contract.4
The seller, under this circumstances, is unable to fulfill what he has promised. Thus, if a
house has burnt down before it was sold, the contract is void. Secondly, the thing sold
must be capable of being owned. Anything belonging to the public or public property
cannot be the subject-matter of sale. Finally, the thing sold must be something in which
the buyer acquires an interest under the contract. The buyer cannot buy something which
is already his. Such sale is void because the seller has nothing to sell and the buyer has
nothing to buy.
Anything corporeal or incorporeal can be the subject-matter of sale, such as a
right to an inheritance, a thing belonging to the seller or to a third party, and a thing
already in existence or which will come into existence. Future things could be sold, such
as next year's harvest. Such a contract could take two forms: purchase of a hope or
purchase of a hoped-for thing. As to the first, what is bought is a chance and for the
sale's validity it does not matter that nothing materialises. In the second instance, the
future thing itself is sold and the sale is void if the thing sold does not materialise.5 The
sale is taken to be subject to a condition.
4
Zulueta, The Roman Law of Sale, p. 12.
5
Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law. p. 28.
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(iii) Price
The third element in sale is price. Price must consist ofmoney. It must be certain in that
the contract must fix a definite price. The certainty of the price is important as an
assurance that the bargain was the work of both parties and also to ensure that the
contract would not break down due to lack of or an unascertainable price. Price can be
fixed by a third person but if he fails to do so, the contract will fail.
(H) HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE
The contract for the sale of goods originated from the Roman law as one form of the
consensual contract. The consensual contract is one of the most remarkable
achievements ofRoman jurisprudence. It is characterised by its consensuality, bilaterality
and the necessity of good faith. By consensuality is meant that only the agreement of the
parties is necessary for a valid contract. Writing is not needed nor is it necessary that
something should be given for the obligation to come into being; it is enough that the
persons dealing should consent. By bilaterality is meant that the obligations of the parties
are reciprocal. This means to say that duties exist for both parties from the moment of
the conclusion of the contract; the seller is bound to deliver the goods or the subject-
matter and the buyer is bound to pay the price. Therefore, a plaintiff would not succeed
in his claim unless he could show that he had performed or is ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. Liability of one party depends on the other having
4
discharged or being ready and willing to discharge his own liability. This characteristic
of sale might however be modified and varied by the terms of the contract.6
The principle of good faith or bona fides required both parties not merely to do
what they expressly undertook to do, but also to do all that was involved in a requirement
of good faith7, in particular, to avoid fraud. Under Roman law buyers did not rely
entirely on the implication of good faith, however. They often took express warranties or
stipulations from the sellers, and these were usually in relation to quality, eviction and
quiet possession. The express undertaking by the seller made him liable for whatever
defects found in the goods. Soon the law began to imply these warranties and
stipulations in every contract of sale and from this the law of implied warranty
developed.8
The importance of good faith was two-fold: (1) to enforce the formless consensual
contract; (2) to prevent fraud. If either of the parties refused to perform his part of the
bargain, the law would regard it as against the ethical tenet that promises should be kept.
Therefore, the requirement of good faith would ensure that a purely promissory contract
would be performed and the expectations of the parties would be met. If the seller
fraudulently claimed that his wares were of a certain quality when he knew that they were
6
Zulueta, The Roman Law of Sale, p.20.
7
Sohm's Institutes of Roman Law, translated by J.C.Ledlie. p.379.
8 Zulueta, op. cit., p. 49.
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not, he would be liable for what he had affirmed. Good faith required the seller to be
truthful in his words and actions.
(a) DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES
(i) Duties and Obligations of the Seller
Under the Roman law of sale these were the duties imposed on the seller:-
(1) To deliver the thing or subject-matter and to give vacant possession.
(2) To take care of it until delivery.
(3) To guarantee against eviction.
(4) To guarantee against latent defects.
(1) Duty to Deliver and Give Vacant Possession
The seller was bound to take all necessary steps to deliver to the buyer whatever right he
had in the thing sold, together with accessories. Things that could be physically delivered
were delivered by giving actual physical possession to the buyer. Things which could not
be delivered physically, for example land, were delivered through a formal process
known as mancipatio. The seller was not bound to make the buyer owner immediately
and directly. He need not give good title, but he must guarantee the buyer success in any
possessory action.9 He must warrant the buyer against eviction during the period
necessary for usucapio, i.e a period defined by law whereby a person in possession of




seller's duty was satisfied if, without contrary intention, he gave vacant possession to the
buyer. This proposition may be split into two; firstly, he must put the buyer in physical
possession (which he cannot do if somebody else is in possession). Secondly, he must
give vacant possession, i.e. exclusive possession not defeasible by interdict and free from
burdens interfering with it except such as had been agreed upon.10
(2) Duty to Take Care Until Delivery
In Roman law ownership was not transferred until the thing was actually handed over,
but the risk of the thing being destroyed or damaged was on the buyer from the moment
the contract was made perfect, (i.e from the moment of the agreement). The seller who
had possession of the thing sold was under a duty to make sure that the thing was safe
while still in his control. His position was similar to a borrower of the thing. If the thing
perished due to his fault or negligence he would be liable to pay damages to the buyer.
The standard of his duty was to exercise reasonable diligence. If he was not at fault and
loss was due to an event which could not have been prevented, then the buyer had to
suffer the loss. He had to pay the price without getting anything in return.11
(3) Duty to Guarantee Against Eviction
The seller was not under a duty to transfer good title to the buyer. He was only bound to
do what would transfer ownership, and this was to give possession of the thing to the
10
Lee, op. Cit., p. 312.
11 Zimmermaim, Law of Obligations, p.287.
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buyer. The seller's chief liability was to supply the thing itself, that is, to deliver it.12 If
the seller was owner, delivery made the buyer owner in his turn; if he was not, it would
make the seller liable for eviction only, provided that the price had been paid or security
given for it.
Historically, Roman law imposed no contractual liability on the seller on account
of eviction. Contractual liability first arose out of a voluntary verbal promise, a
stipulation, given by the seller to the buyer which was actionable in its form.13 The seller
might either promise to pay a definite sum ofmoney, usually double the price (stipulatio
duplae), in the event of the buyer being evicted, or to pay unliquidated damages if the
warranty for peaceable possession (stipulatio habere licere) was breached. In the course
of time these stipulations came to be implied in every sale.
When the seller did not own or have title to the property which he delivered to the
buyer, he could not make the latter owner of that property. The law provided that no one
could give a better title than he himself possessed. This is the principle of nemo quod
non habet. When the seller had no title, a third party, usually the true owner, could evict
the buyer and sustain his claim over the property. But if the buyer had acquired a good
title for himself before being evicted, his title would over-ride that of the true owner. The






conditions were satisfied. These conditions were that he must have acted honestly, and
that he must not have been evicted within the time necessary to acquire good title. It
followed from this that the seller's guarantee against eviction lasted for the period of time
necessary for the buyer to obtain a title of his own. If within the crucial period the
buyer's possession was disturbed, he could not acquire a good title and he would be liable
to be evicted by the true owner. Not only that, the buyer might be liable for theft or for
receiving stolen property in cases of movables14. If and when the charge of theft or of
receiving stolen property was brought against the buyer he could raise the defence that he
was a bona fide buyer and had acted honestly. And by virtue of the warranty he could
also bring in the seller, not merely as a witness but as a substitute in the proceedings15.
The seller would then be under an obligation to defend the buyer by proving that he had
had a good title to the property which he could pass to the buyer. If he failed to defend
the buyer, and in that event the buyer was evicted, the latter had a cause of action against
the seller.
The seller had to deliver the property into the buyer's possession but mere
delivery was not enough. He did not fulfil his duty unless he put the buyer into such a
position that he could maintain his possession against all comers.16 If the buyer was
evicted and the seller had not effectually defended the title the buyer had the following
actions.




Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Roman Law, p. 81.
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First, there was the actio auctoritatis, whereby the seller was liable to pay double
the price should the buyer be evicted by a third person within the period of usucapio.17
This action was limited to sales of a certain class of property, i.e. those transferred by
mancipatio.18 A further requirement was that the buyer must give notice to the seller of
the action to enable him to defend it.19
The second action was the actio stipulationes. Because of the limited application
of the actio auctoritatis to property transferred by mancipatio, it became customary to
stipulate in all contracts of sale a warranty against eviction. By a stipulatio duplae the
seller usually promised to pay double the price in the event that the buyer should be
evicted. This liability was incurred at the moment when the thing had been given up to
the claimant, or when the buyer had been burdened in its assessed value or when
judgement had gone in favour of a third party in possession in a suit brought by a buyer.20
(4) Duty to Guarantee Against Latent Defects
Initially under Roman law, the seller had no liability for hidden defects in the thing he




Baldwin, "Warranty Against Eviction in the Civil Law: Extent of the Vendee's Recovery", Tulane Law





let the buyer beware. Express warranty was not recognised unless given with a certain
formality, in the form of a stipulation. The express stipulation was the first step to
making the seller liable for defects which were latent. It was common to combine a
stipulation against latent defects with a stipulation against eviction. The distinct verbal
contract was an effective guarantee of the seller's liability. Later, the stipulation was
made compulsory in every contract and it became a usual course to imply such
undertaking.21
The other influence on the development of the law was the aedilician edict. The
aediles were given a sort of police jurisdiction over the public markets and they issued an
edict in the second century B.C that sellers of slaves and cattle had to declare certain
faults, mainly physical defects, and gave action against them when the defects became
apparent whether the sellers knew about them or not. The action against them was either
for actio redhibitoria or actio quanti minoris.
The actio redhibitoria was an action given to the buyer to cancel the sale within
six months from the time of the sale or from the time the defects were discovered.22 It
could be taken when:-
(1) the seller failed to declare the diseases and defects referred to in the edict;
or
(2) the seller had given a stipulatory promise but was in breach of it; or
21




(3) the seller had been fraudulent.
The underlying principle of this action was to restore both parties as far as
possible to the position in which they would have been had the contract never been made.
In other words, this was a restitutio in integrum. When redhibition took place the buyer
had to return the slave and make good to the seller any physical or non-physical
deterioration of the slave caused by him.23 The seller on the other hand had to return the
purchase price paid by the buyer, with interest24; indemnify the buyer for any damage
caused by the slave25; and reimburse the buyer for such cost and expenses as the seller
would have incurred on the slave.26
An alternative to the actio redhibitoria was the actio quanti minoris which
could be brought within twelve months of the sale. It was a claim whereby the buyer was
allowed to keep the slave and obtain a reduction of the price proportionate to the defects
that had become apparent. In some cases this cause of action was not worthwhile








Digest 21.1.27; Digest 21.1.29.3.
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(ii) Duties and Obligations of the Buyer
(1) To Pay the Price
The buyer's duty towards the seller was to pay the price on time. If payment was
delayed, he had to pay interest on the price as well as the seller's expenses. The duty of
the buyer was subject to the seller's readiness and willingness to discharge his own duty.
Thus, if the seller failed to deliver, the buyer might refuse to pay.
(2) Duty to Take Delivery
The buyer was under a duty to take delivery as soon as the seller tendered it or at the time
agreed. In the absence of other agreement, it was the buyer's duty to remove the goods,
not the seller's to send them. Any cost properly incurred by the seller between the date of
the contract and delivery was charged to the buyer.27
(Ill) RECEPTION OF ROMAN LAW IN EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES
The Roman law of consensual contract spread and was received in Europe through trade.
The period between the eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed a rapid increase in trade
in countries like Italy, Spain, France and Germany. The presence of the seaport cities and
international fairs in some other cities further accelerated this growth. These fairs were
periodic markets which were held at regular intervals and among the most important of





The merchants formed their own organisations and associations which were
mainly concerned with the welfare of their members and with the control of mercantile
and maritime affairs. In Italy the merchants were amongst the most influencial people in
society and they enjoyed substantial self-government. They were able to develop their
own set of laws which were made up of elaborate rules formulated by the merchants
themselves to ensure proper conduct of trade. Then there were also treaties entered
between the commercial organisations with foreign countries to secure protection,
privilege and redress for their own members. There were also statutes and rules laid
down by the commercial bodies in performing their juridicial function. All these
developed to form a body of law which was known as the law merchant. The ideas of the
Italian law merchant began to spread to Europe through the international fairs. The
Italian merchants present at these fairs familiarised merchants from other parts ofEurope
with their commercial ideas.
Through trade and through the evolution of the law merchant the Roman law of
sale was spread and received in Europe. One might ask, how did law merchant help to
spread Roman law? The law merchant originated in Italy which was the centre of legal
and commercial life in Europe in the Middle Ages. Having its origin in Italy, the law
merchant would possess a similar characteristic to the Roman law. The law merchant
recognised as binding the Roman consensual contract of sale and hire which could be
entered into by a simple unwitnessed agreement on the subject-matter and the price. This
form of simple contract was convenient to the merchants. They could enter into a
binding contract even though they were apart, and payment and delivery could be
14
postponed because consensual contract of sale is an executory contract not dependent
upon immediate performance for enforceability. They could rest assured that their
commercial expectations would be fulfilled. In furtherance of that, the Roman law, in
particular the jus gentium and the edict of the aediles, had developed the implied
warranty against eviction and latent defects which would guarantee the rights of the
buyer.
(a) LAW MERCHANT
The law merchant is an obscure concept and no precise definition can be given to it It
was basically a law made by merchants for merchants because "no technical
jurisprudence peculiar to any country would have been satisfactory to traders coming
from many different countries."28
The law merchant comprised rules to ensure the proper conduct of trade. It also
included treaties, statutes and rules laid down by commercial bodies in performing their
judicial functions. All these developed around Europe to form a body of law known as
the law merchant. It is pertinent to consider this matter as it contributed a great deal to
the development of the English law of sale. The most important contribution was the
introduction of the consensual contract through the mercantile courts, which were the
borough courts, the fair or the piepowder courts and the staple courts. Their main
concern was to give protection to, and to enforce, the legitimate commercial expectations
of the contracting parties. Most cases before these courts concerned contracts for the sale
28
Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. (1) p. 543.
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of goods, with the specific problems of quality of the goods, goods which did not
conform to sample, and defective title. If a buyer was faced with any of these problems,
damages could only be claimed if there was fraud on the part of the seller or the seller
had given an express warranty to that effect. No special form of words was necessary to
constitute warranty, but in the absence of such warranty, the seller could not be held
liable.29
The procedure observed in these mercantile courts was not subject to the same
procedure and technicalities at the common law courts. Since speed was the essence,
procedure was summary in nature. One of the first demands of the merchants was for a
court with jurisdiction to deal with their disputes swiftly so that they could carry on with
their real and ever-pressing business.30
(IV) SALE OF GOODS IN ENGLAND
In the middle ages, while Roman law and the law merchant had long enforced consensual
contracts, the English common law was still insisting that the contract be wholly or partly
executed, i.e. the price paid or delivery made, before it could be enforced. If the price
had been paid bur delivery was withheld, the buyer could sue the seller in detinue, i.e. for
the delivery of the goods. If, however, delivery had been made to the buyer but payment
29
Borough Customs, Sel. Soc., ii, p. 153.
30 Cornish.W.R. and Clark, G. de N., Law and Society in England: 1750-1950, p 197.
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of the price was withheld, the seller could sue the buyer for debt. But in both these
actions there had to be proof of a quid pro quo or benefit conferred upon the party before
he could be liable for price or delivery. This rule followed the rigid concepts of property
law which dominated English thinking about sale. Thus, in a sale of goods, property or
ownership must have passed to the buyer before he could be made to pay the price and
for him to demand delivery of it. As such, the contract of sale of goods was perceived in
England as a conveyance of property rather than as a contractual imposition of future
obligations.31 This was a fundamental difference from the Roman law.
However, well before the middle of the fourteenth century the common law
recognised the binding quality of executory contracts for sale of goods as long as earnest
money had been given and received.32 By the fifteenth century a simple agreement in
itself was generative of liability. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the buyer
immediately became the owner of the goods and could bring his action of detinue for
them even if he had not paid any part of the price, while the seller could sue for the price
without delivering the goods to the buyer.33 The common law was on the road to
recognising the consensual contract of sale.
31
Ibbetson, "From Property to Contract: Transformation of Sale in the Middle Ages", Journal of Legal
History, vol. 13, 1992, p. 1-22.
32
Ibbetson, "Sale of Goods in the Fourteenth Century'" Law Quarterly Review, 1991, p.490.
33 id p.490.
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(a) THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
Caveat emptor simply means "let the buyer beware". It is a fundamental principle of
English law. The maxim requires that before agreeing to buy a thing buyers must check
its defects for themselves or, if that was not enough, protect themselves by taking express
warranties from the seller.34 This maxim emerged at a time when sale of goods took place
in the open market where buyers had the opportunity to examine them. This explains
why the maxim is concerned only with goods which are specific, i.e, identified at the time
of sale, and a buyer of such goods must take them as they are. He has got to make
himself aware ofwhatever defects the goods may have, apparent or latent. In the case of
the latter, the buyer could insist upon a warranty from the seller as a safeguard.
The medieval judges adhered strictly to the maxim of caveat emptor, and this
probably discouraged many litigants from going to court. Even if they did bring their
case to court, they had to prove that there was fraud on the part of the seller, or that he
had given an express warranty in a proper form of declaration, i.e. warrantizando
vendidit, otherwise the action would not lie. Strict adherence to the maxim left the law
without an adequate means of repressing fraud. The law burdened buyers with
preventing themselves from being cheated by cunning sellers. The buyer had the
opportunity of examining the goods before him; therefore his eyes and his taste ought to
be his judges.35 The courts regarded it as a matter between the parties themselves and
they were not interested in the fairness of the exchange.
34 de Zulueta, Sale, p.47-48.
35
Holdsworth, op. cit., vol. viii, p.69.
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Chandelor v. Lopus (1603)36 could be regarded as the classic authority for the
doctrine of caveat emptor, and was a famous landmark in the law of deceit and implied
warranty. In this case Lopus brought action on the case in the King's Bench against
Chandelor, who sold him a stone and asserted it to be a "bezar stone", a rarity which was
believed to have medical properties. Lopus complained that the stone was not "bezar
stone" and that Chandelor, as a jeweller who had skill in jewels and stones, affirmed it to
be "bezar stone". Lopus obtained judgement but was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber
on the ground that mere assertion or affirmation was not a warranty and therefore not
actionable. Lopus brought another action in the King's Bench, this time alleging that
Chandelor knew that the stone was not "bezar stone". His counsel argued that it would
be deceit if the seller affirmed more than was true of his wares even though he did not
warrant them. Counsel for Chandelor contended that deceit would lie if he knew that the
stone was not "bezar stone", but if he was ignorant of this, no action would lie. It was
held by Popham J. that it could be dangerous and might cause a multitude of actions if it
was thought that a bare affirmation of the seller would give rise to a cause of action. But
he went on to say that this was not necessarily so, because there must be knowledge in
the seller that the buyer would not get the effect of the bargain. In this case, the principal
matter was that Chandelor, knowing that the stone was false, sold it to Lopus as a "bezar
stone" in the knowledge that Lopus could not have the profit. The cause of action was
36 Cro. Jac. 4 79 Eng. Rep. 3 1603.
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the knowledge that the stone was not a "bezar stone" and the selling was with intent to
deceive. Judgment was recorded for the buyer.
When there was no warranty, liability could only be imposed upon a seller if he
had been fraudulent. The action would be one of deceit, which gave a remedy to the
buyer who suffered losses due to the fraud and misrepresentation of the seller. Deceit in
the king's court had to affect the royal interest, otherwise the court had no jurisdiction in
the matter. Common deceit thus went to the local jurisdiction, which provided that
cheating which induced others into actions detrimental to themselves was a wrong and
criminal. Local courts placed much attention on public interest especially in honest
dealing.37 But to support his claim, the buyer had to prove that the seller knowingly
misrepresented the facts or that he falsely promised a fact which he knew was not true.
The allegation would be not only that the defendant falsely made the representation but
that it was made knowingly.38
Even though express warranty and/or knowledge were important, in cases of sale
of food these requirements were dispensed with. Liability was imposed despite the fact
that the seller had neither given undertaking nor been fraudulent. Milsom quotes Frowyk
J. in a 1507 case putting forward this proposition: for food, the seller would be liable,
warranty or no warranty, and apparently knowledge or no knowledge; for other things he
3
Milsom, Historical Foundation of the Common Law, p. 362.
38
Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law, 1932, p. 380.
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would be liable without warranty only if he knew.39 The ground for allowing an action in
tort for such cases was that of public policy. It was in the interest of the community at
large that sellers of food or retailers should be honest in doing their job. They could be
sued in tort if failed to measure up to the standard required by the law40. It would seem
that consumer protection was already in existence in the middle ages in respect of
foodstuff.
(b) LAW OF WARRANTY IN ENGLAND
The law of warranty is the cornerstone of the study of the law of sales. It has been said
that without a grasp of the law ofwarranty, the central aspects of the law of sale of goods
cannot be really mastered.41 Through it one can also come to understand the other inter¬
related concepts of caveat emptor, representation and condition. However, the history and
development of the law of warranty has been in utter confusion because the term has
been used in various ways and given various meanings. It is therefore not surprising that
Lord Coke once remarked that "the learning of warranties is one of the most curious and
cunning learnings of the law".42
Warranty is originally a word used in the vocabulary of real property, i.e. land.
Ordinarily, warranty in land was an obligation which was owed by the lord to the tenant
39
Milsom, "Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century", Law Quarterly Review, vol. 77, p. 279.
40
Holdsworth, H.E.L., vol. iii, p. 386.
41
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed. p. 293.
42
Quoted in Burdick, "Conditions and Warranties in Sale of Goods", Columbia Law Review, 1901, p.71,
at p. 78.
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of a certain piece of land. This obligation was to defend the tenant in the possessions of
the land against all men. This obligation to warrant was primarily an obligation upon the
lord to go to court, if called upon by the tenant, in order to defend some action brought
against him for possession of that land.43
In the context of sale of goods, warranty covers almost the whole area and scope
of the seller's duties towards his buyer in respect of the goods sold. The literal meaning
of the word is an "undertaking" or promise on the part of the seller as to the condition of
the subject-matter of the sale. It is common for the parties to the contract of sale to
undertake a process of negotiation before concluding the sale. During this process, the
seller usually promises or undertakes that certain facts are true with regard to the subject-
matter of the sale. Such undertaking or promise, if not a mere statement of opinion, will
have a binding effect upon the seller, even though it may be implied.
Under section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, warranty is defined as "an
agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of the contract of sale, but
collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim
of damages but not a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated." There
are two aspects of this definition that require further discussion. Firstly, it says that a
warranty is an "agreement" and it also says that a representation can be a warranty if
43
Bailey, "Warranties of land in the Thirteenth Century", Cambridge Law Journal, 1944, p. 274.
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intended and incorporated into the contract as a term.44 So, a warranty can either be a
representation or an agreement. Stoljar comments that if a warranty is defined as an
agreement, how can a representation amount to a warranty as well? These are two
different concepts: an agreement is contractual while a representation is tortious.45
The dual character of warranty can be better understood when we look into its
history. Warranty began initially as a tort action which later turned into contract with the
development of assumpsit. When it was the tort of deceit, it was only necessary to prove
that the representation was false. There was no need to show that the warranty was part
of the contract.46 The basis for the claim was that the buyer had been deceived by the
statement of the seller. But when the warranty concept was received into contract, there
were some difficulties in determining when a representation is a warranty and, if it is a
warranty, what its status is. Since it is made prior to the contract, is it collateral to the
main contract or is it part of it?
As to when a representation is a warranty, reference has to be made to what was
said by Buller J. in the case of Pasley v. Freeman (1789).47 He said that, " an
affirmation at the time of a sale is a warranty provided that it appears on evidence to have
44 Chalmers Sale ofGoods, 18th ed. P. 5-6.
45
Stoljar, "Condition, Warranties and Description of Quality in Sale of Goods", Modern Law Review,
1952, p.425.
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Greig, "Misrepresentation in Sale of Goods", Law Quarterly Review, 1971, p. 179.
47
(1789) 3 T.R. 51.
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been so intended." The word "intention" can either mean intention to make the
representation a warranty or intention to contract. In Hopkins v. Tanqueray (1854)48
there was a sale of a horse by auction where a representation, that the horse "was
perfectly sound", was made by the seller on the day prior to the sale. The buyer was
dissuaded from his examination of the horse. Upon the purchase of the horse it was
found to be unsound. The buyer relied on the representation to claim damages. The
court gave judgment in favour of the defendant. Crowder J. said that to constitute a
warranty, a representation must be shown to have been intended to form part of the
contract.49 Jervis C.J. held that what was said was a representation only and not a
warranty.50 Maule J. expressed the same view, that what was said was an honest
representation of his opinion51. In this case "intention" means intention as to whether the
statement is a warranty or a mere representation. The intention refers to the
representation; it must be intended as a warranty and not as a statement of opinion.
In the case of Heilbut v. Buckleton (1913)52 the plaintiff inquired from the
defendant, a manager of a company, whether it was setting up a rubber company and also
whether it was safe to invest in it. Upon the defendant's reply the plaintiff was induced
into buying shares in the company. The company proved to be a failure, which resulted
48
(1854) 15 C.B. 130.
49 id. p. 141.
50 id. p. 138.




in the plaintiff suffering a great loss. In the lower court, judgment was entered for the
plaintiff but on appeal to the House of Lords the decision was reversed. The court held
that there was no issue at all of a warranty and therefore it should not have been
submitted to the jury. The court understood intention to mean intention to contract and
there was no evidence to show that the words used were words of contract.
Mackenzie Chalmers, the draftsman of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, noted that
"intention" meant intention to contract. According to him, a representation may or may
not be incorporated into the contract and whether or not it does so will depend upon the
intention of the parties. If it is made in the course of negotiations for the purpose of
inducing the other party to enter into the contract and it actually induces him to contract,
it is prima facie a term of the contract.53
There is no question of contrasting it with a purely collateral contract. Once it is
accepted as a warranty, the next question that needs to be answered is, what is its status?
Is it collateral to the main contract or is it part of it? This is the second aspect of the
definition of warranty, where it is given as collateral to the main contract. In the early
law of sales, by virtue of caveat emptor, the buyer could only protect himself against the
purchase of a latently defective item by insisting on an express warranty about the quality
of the goods. This warranty, which gave rise to a tort action, was collateral in nature.




and the other was the express warranty. But if the warranty is intended to form part of
the main contract, then it should be considered so.
The word warranty is also used to mean a term of lesser importance compared to
a condition. In section 53 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, derived from s.53 of the Sale of
Goods Act 1893, breach of a warranty entitles the buyer to sue for damages, but breach of
a condition gives rise to a repudiation of the contract.54 The term "condition" is another
source of problems because there are many meanings to it. A condition can be a quality
or character of a thing or a person; for example, the condition of the car is defective, or a
person is in good condition. Condition can also refer to some fact or event without which
a thing cannot be. The event can be one upon which the obligation of one or both parties
depend upon or upon which the existence of the contract depends. If that is the case,
then the event or the contigency upon the happening of which the duty of performance
depends is called a "condition". Therefore, "condition" describes the particular fact or
event in the contract which controls the existence of the duty of performance as well as
the existence of its breach.55 Such a condition is a condition precedent.
54 "Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach of which may give rise to a right to
treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach ofwhich may give rise to a claim for damages but
not to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, depends in each case on the
construction of the contract; and a stipulation may be a condition, though called a warranty."
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(c) DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
(i) Implied Warranty of Title
During the period between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the trend of the
courts was to develop the doctrine of implied warranties. The first warranty was the
implied warranty of title. Title is the most important factor in every contract of sale and
from the sixteenth century onwards, most cases involved the issue of title. In Dale's
Case (1585)56the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for selling him items
which belonged to another. Two out of three judges held that an action would not lie
because there was no fraud, nor was there any express warranty. The third judge
(Anderson J.) was, however, willing to adopt the doctrine of implied warranty because a
mere sale ofgoods necessarily involved a warranty.
The approach of Anderson J. was accepted by Holt C.J., who held in the case of
Cross v. Gardner (1689)57 that an affirmation of title in the seller, though made without
knowledge of falsity, and not put in special form and words, was ground for liability. In
this case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had sold two oxen in his possession, and
had falsely affirmed them to be his own when they actually belonged to another man. It
was held that the affirmation by the seller gave rise to a good cause of action even though
there was no fraud and that bare affirmation amounted to a warranty. This same




approach was taken in a later case of Medina v. Stoughton (1700).58 In this case the
defendant was in possession of two lottery tickets which he sold to the plaintiff, affirming
them to be his. Holt C.J. said,
"When one having the possession of property sells it, affirming it to be
his amounts to a warranty, and an action lies on the affirmation, and
perhaps no other title can be made out; aliter where the seller is out of
possession, for there may be room to question the seller's title, and
caveat emptor in such case to have either an express warranty or a
good title."59
It can be said from these two cases that in order for the court to imply a warranty
of title, the seller had to be in possession of the goods because possession is the colour of
title. If the seller was not in possession, there had to be an express warranty for a
successful suit. In Ormrod v. Huth (1845)60the court held that the buyer must prove that
there was a representation of title which was known to be false by the seller or the
affirmation was embodied in the contract. In Morley v. Attenborough (1849)61 the seller,
who was a pawnbroker, sold a harp which was pledged to him. Unknown to him, the
pledgor had no title to it. The court held that there must be an express warranty of title
or, if there was none, there must be something in the transaction to indicate that an
58 1 Salk210.
59
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affirmation was equivalent to an express warranty. But Parke B. opined that there was
always an implied warranty that the seller had the right to dispose of the subject he sold.
The seller must be considered to warrant that those who bought the goods from him
would have a good title to keep them.
There are two other related obligations of the seller in connection with the implied
warranty of title. These are of quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances. Once
it is established that the seller is the rightful owner of the goods and that he has a rightful
title to it, he can pass the same to his buyer. There will be no third person to interfere
with the goods, and thus the buyer can enjoy quiet possession of them.
(ii) Implied Warranty of Quality
The principle of implied warranty of quality was laid down by Lord Ellenborough in the
case of Gardiner v. Gray (1815).62 In this case the buyer bought twelve bags of "waste
silk" imported from the continent. Neither the buyer nor the seller had seen the goods,
but samples had been sent and shown to the buyer by the agent of the seller. The goods
were found to be unmerchantable. Lord Ellenborough held that a buyer had a right to
expect a saleable article answering the description in the contract. If there was no
particular warranty, this would be implied into the contract because without warranty, the
buyer could not insist that it should be of any particular quality or fitness. But the
intention of the parties must be clear that the goods should be saleable in the market
under the denomination mentioned in the contract between them. He went to say that if
62
(1815) 4 Camp. 144.
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there was no opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of caveat emptor did not
apply. According to him, "the purchaser could not be supposed to buy goods to lay them
on a dunghill."63 The issue in this case was whether the commodity bought by the
plaintiffwas of such quality as could be reasonably brought into the market to be sold as
waste silk. If it could not be sold as waste silk, then the goods were not of merchantable
quality.
A similar approach was taken in the case of Jones v. Bright (1829),64 where the
buyer bought copper from the manufacturer for the particular purpose of sheathing a ship.
The copper was defective and lasted for only four months instead of the normal period of
four years. Best C.J. observed that if a man sells generally, he undertakes that the article
is fit for some purpose; if he sells for a particular purpose, he undertakes that it shall be
fit for a particular purpose. The first limb of his judgment refers to the general
merchantability of the goods. If the goods are ordinarily described or named, they must
answer to that description or name. Further, they must also be saleable in the market
under the description or name, meaning that they must be reasonably fit for their ordinary
uses to which such goods were put.65 The second limb of his judgment refers to the
implied warranty for the particular purpose required by the buyer. This is a separate and
distinct obligation from that of merchantable quality, but it sometimes overlaps.
63 Id. p. 14.
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The doctrine of implied warranty of merchantable quality became applicable, not
in all cases, but only where the goods involved were unascertained. A distinction was
made between sale of specific goods, i.e. goods which are in existence at the time of the
sale and which could be inspected, and sale of unascertained goods, i.e. goods which are
not in existence, or which, though in existence, are not identified as the subject-matter of
the contract of sale. In the sale of specific goods there would be no implied warranty even
with regard to defects which might be latent, because there was an opportunity for
inspection available to the buyer. In the sale of unascertained goods the court was more
willing to imply merchantable quality if the goods were manufactured or supplied for a
particular purpose make known by the buyer to the seller; or if the gods were sold under a
particular description.66
Thus, under the common law, the maxim of caveat emptor did not apply to a sale
of goods where the buyer had no opportunity of inspection because the goods were
unascertained or not present at the time the contract of sale was entered into. In such a
case, the goods were described by reference to a certain class possessing certain
characteristics, so that they could be easily identified as being the subject-matter of the
contract. This form of sale began to flourish in the nineteenth century as a result of the
industrial revolution, which caused considerable expansion in the numbers and
complexity of goods offered for sale. There was also a rapid growth of international
trading because communication was made easier and contracting at a distance became
possible. Sometimes goods were bought before they were even made available.
66 E. McClain, op cit. p. 218.
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In the case of Jones v. Just (1868)67, the plaintiff bought a quantity of Manila
hemp from the defendant which was to arrive from Singapore by a certain ship. On
arrival, and after delivery to the plaintiff, the bales were found to have been wetted
through with salt water, unpacked afterwards and dried and then repacked and shipped at
Singapore. The damage was not so extensive as to make the goods lose the character of
hemp, but they were not "merchantable". The plaintiff sold the hemp by auction as
"Manila hemp with all faults" and realised 75% of the price which similar hemp,
undamaged, would have fetched. The court held that there was an implied warranty to
supply Manila hemp which was of merchantable quality. Where the manufacturer
undertakes to supply goods, manufactured by himself, or in which he deals, but which the
buyer had the opportunity of inspecting, it is an implied term in the contract that he shall
supply merchantable goods.
The principle which was established in the above case is that, under a contract to
supply goods of a specific description, where the buyer has no opportunity to inspect, the
goods must not only answer the specific description, but must be saleable or
merchantable under that description. This is because it must be assumed that the buyer
and seller contemplated dealing in an article which was merchantable. The buyer bought
with the purpose of resale, and if the goods were unmerchantable, it would not be easy




exercise his own judgment; therefore he trusted the judgment, knowledge and
information of the seller.
(iii) Implied Warranty of Description
The new doctrine of implied warranty of merchantable quality was closely associated
with the equally newly developed theory of description. Description developed to a
special form of sale, i.e. sale by description. As mentioned earlier, the nineteenth century
witnessed the rapid growth of trade; business people bought goods before they were even
produced. Goods were usually bought by buyers enumerating the qualities they required
them to possess. Buyers began to rely more and more on the seller's skill and judgment;
so much so that it was felt necessary that the law should intervene to provide some
protection to buyers, especially to those who had no opportunity to inspect and exercise
their own judgment. As a solution, the law came up with the notion of sale by
description.
The basic idea of the law was to impose upon the seller a duty to deliver to the
buyer the goods which were contracted for and goods which were priceworthy. This duty
had been legally and morally recognised by the courts in the early nineteenth century; and
was made strict if sale was by description.68 Sale by description was distinct from sale of
specific goods because the former applied only to goods which were unascertained
(although later development also included specific goods in sale by description for as
68
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33
long as they were sold relying on the description). It was implied in such sales that the
goods tendered were conform to their description and were worth the price they were
paid for. If the term was breached, the buyer could reject the goods and treat the contract
as repudiated, even ifproperty had passed to him.
In Barr v. Gibson (1838)69 a ship stranded in the Gulf of St. Lawrence was taken
ashore and became a mere wreck. The value of the ship dropped from £4,200 to £10.
The ship was sold to the buyer in London. There was no proof that the seller knew of the
mishap. The issues before the court were whether the ship was still a ship and whether
the warranty of quality would be implied by the law since the seller had neither promised
nor affirmed merchantability, i.e. the sea-worthiness of the ship. The court admitted that
the vessel was not a ship for the purposes of the law of insurance and probably was not a
ship for the purpose of sailing. But as a subject-matter of a contract of sale, it had not
ceased to answer to the description and still bore the character of a ship though damaged,
unseaworthy and incapable of being beneficially employed. And being specific and
ascertained, no implications of quality could be made. Parke B. said:
"In the bargain and sale of an existing chattel, by which property
passes, the law does not, in the absence of fraud, imply any warranty
of the good quality or condition of the chattel sold. The simple
bargain and sale, therefore, of the ship does not imply any contract
that it is then seaworthy, or in a serviceable condition But the
69
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bargain and sale of a chattel, as being of a particular description, does
imply a contract that the article sold is of that description."70
When it is said that goods are sold by their description, it means that the
identification of the goods, which are the subject-matter of the sale, is by the description
of their character. The description is also meant to define the goods which the seller is to
deliver and which the buyer is to accept.
(iv) Implied Warranty of Fitness
Another principle closely related to sale by description and merchantable quality was
fitness. It was another aspect of the duty of the seller with regard to the quality of the
goods. Quality was initially implied into sales by description, where the buyer could not
inspect the goods and was therefore not able to assess and judge the fitness of the goods.
For that very reason, it was thought that the buyer would necessarily have to rely on the
judgment and skill of the seller who was the manufacturer or dealer. There were two
levels at which reliance on the seller's skill and judgment could be made. In Jones v.
Bright (1829)71 Best C.J. held that, where goods were sold generally, the seller undertook
that the article was fit for some purpose; if he sold for a particular purpose, he undertook
that it should be fit for that purpose. The former, which demanded a minimum standard
of quality, refers to merchantability ofgoods and the latter refers to fitness for a particular
purpose required by the buyer, which he had made known to the seller.
70 Id. p. 399-400.
71 Best C.J in Jones v. Bright (1829) 130 E.R. 1167.
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As mentioned earlier, merchantability was implied only when the goods were sold
by description, but when the goods were specific, caveat emptor applied and there was no
term implied as to the general fitness of the goods. However, the implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose would still be implied for the purpose of providing
protection to a buyer for such goods. The law provided that where the buyer made
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods were required, so as to
show that he relied on the seller's skill and judgment, there was a warranty that they were
reasonably fit for that purpose. Mellor J. in Jones v. Bright (1868)72 said that where a
manufacturer or a dealer contracts to supply an article which he manufactures or
produces, or in which he deals, to be applied to a particular purpose, so that the buyer
necessarily trusts to the judgment or skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that
case an implied term or warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it
is to be applied. But where the manufacturer or dealer undertakes to supply goods which
the buyer has not had the opportunity of inspecting, it is an implied term that he shall
supply a merchantable item.
The implied warranties in the contract of sale developed to provide a series of
graduated protections to the buyer. In the first place, if the goods were sold by
description they must correspond with their description. Secondly, besides
correspondence with their description, the goods must also be of merchantable quality or
fit for their usual purpose or purposes. Finally, where goods were bought for a particular
72
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purpose, and this purpose was made known to the seller, the seller was under a duty to
deliver goods which were fit for that particular purpose.
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CHAPTER TWO
CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF SALE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
IMPLIED TERMS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter three is divided into three parts. Part (I) is on the pre-1893 law of sale in
Scotland. This includes a discussion of the Mercantile Law (Amendment) Act 1856 where
the English common law rule of caveat emptor was for the first time introduced into
Scotland. Part (II) contains a discussion on the Sale of Goods Act 1893. This includes
the process of its formation and its effects on the law of both countries. Part (III) consists
of the development of the implied warranties. They have undergone various changes and
amendments since the Sale of Goods Act 1893 until the passing of the Sale and Supply of
Goods Act 1994.
(I) PRE-1893 SCOTS LAW
The common law of Scotland pertaining to the law of sale, followed that of the Roman
law closely, and as such was different from that of England. According to the eighteenth
century writer Erskine, 3,3,2,
"sale is a contract whereby one of the parties becomes bound to deliver
a certain subject or commodity to another, with a view of transferring
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the property, in consideration of a determinate price in current money
to be paid for it. Though this contract is perfected by consent alone, it
does not strike against the rule of law that the property of things
cannot be transferred by tradition; for although the contract is entered
into and perfected with a view of transferring the property to the buyer,
it is not actually transferred, but remains with the seller or vendor till
delivery of the subject. The seller in Scotland thus remains undivested
of the property of the goods sold until they have delivered actually or
constructively. When the contract of sale is completed by the consent
of the parties, reciprocal personal rights and obligations are created;
the seller becomes bound to deliver the thing sold as and when it has
been agreed, and the buyer becomes bound to receive the goods, and
pay the price."
Accordingly, a contract of sale of goods was binding on the parties, although
entered into only by verbal agreement. A contract of sale was completed when the parties
had agreed that the subject-matter should be delivered by the seller to the buyer upon
consideration of the price. The three essentials of a valid contract of sale were consent,
price and subject-matter. There was no necessity for a written agreement. And if the
parties embodied their bargain in writing or did any external act to indicate the completion
of the agreement, such thing was not essential to its constitution. The parties to the
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contract of sale were bound and could not simply withdraw from the bargain just because
it was in writing. This rule contributed to commercial convenience. With regard to
transfer of property, the law of Scotland was that of the civil law. Until delivery the seller
remained the owner of the subject sold and there can be no property acquired by the buyer
without possession. All that he had was a personal right to demand fulfilment of the
seller's personal obligation, i.e. the obligation to deliver upon payment of the price.
The common law of Scotland was basically influenced by the Roman law. Its law on
the sale of goods proceeded on the principle of implied warrandice. The seller of goods
was under obligation to warrant good title to the buyer and also to warrant that the goods
sold were free from latent defects as to render it unfit for use for which it was normally
intended. The concept ofwarrandice was very wide compared with warranty. It included
an undertaking by a party, expressed as a term of the contract, guaranteeing some facts
relating to the goods and to get back his price if paid.1 This was the remedy of rejection
granted to the buyer. M.R Brown described warrandice in Scotland as meaning, "a sound
price implied or sound article, irrespective of the buyer's object in buying, or the
knowledge of the parties regarding the conditions of the goods."2
1
Gow, "Warrandice in Sale ofGoods", Juridical Review, 1963, p. 31, at p. 33.
2
Quoted in E.Sutherland, "Remedying an Evil?" Warrandice of Quality at Common Law in Scotland",
Juridical Review, 1987, p. 25.
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There were two aspects of the seller's obligations on entering into a contract of
sale:-
(1) the goods shall be fit and serviceable for their generic purposes.
(2) they shall be of a quality commensurate with the price.
The application of the implied warranty is subject to certain factors and price is
one of them. By looking at the price paid for the goods, one can imply the quality of it.
For example, if a high price had been paid for a particular item, it was implied that it
should be of the best quality. And vice versa, if the price was low, it was reasonable to
expect that the quality would be lower. From this hypothesis, it was implied that the seller
would be under an obligation to supply goods, the quality of which was commensurate
with the price. In furtherance of this, it followed that priceworthy goods should be
suitable for any purpose for which the goods were normally used and were saleable as
such. This was referred to as the merchantability of the goods.3
Sale in Scots law is a consensual contract and a bargain bonae fidei, like that of the
civil law. It is required that there should be an honourable dealing between the parties,
especially on the part of the seller.4 The requirement of bona fides was made the basis of
the priceworthy principle. The seller was expected to disclose any defects within his
knowledge. Any wilful concealment would amount to fraud. However, the seller was not
3
Gow, op. cit., p. 36.
4
Gow, id. p. 31.
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obliged to draw the buyer's attention to defects which were visible and easily noticeable
upon inspection. By that inspection or examination the buyer was barred from denying the
contract in case there were latent defects. The application of the price-worthiness
condition can be seen in these cases. In Hill v. Pringle (1827)5 the buyer bought a
quantity of rye grass from the seller. At the time of the sale, the buyer noticed that the
seed had a musty smell and a bad colour. However, he did not say anything about this.
When the seed failed to grow he made a claim against the seller for repetition of the price
and damages. He was successful in his action and it was held that his failure to act on the
warning signs did not bar him from his claim. According to Lord Pitmilly, even where the
buyer had made such an inspection he was still entitled to rely on the seller supplying him
with a price-worthy goods. He was not barred merely because he might have a suspicion
or doubt about the satisfactoriness of the goods.
The Scots common law did not only imply quality in a sale but also fitness. By
quality it meant that the goods must commensurate with the price, or in other words that
the goods must be merchantable. By fitness it meant that the goods must be fit for the
purpose/s to which they were commonly put. A seller therefore did not perform his
contract unless he supplied a commodity "fit and serviceable" for the uses for which it was
commonly put.6 This duty was recognised in any kind of sale, irrespective of whether the
seller was a dealer or not. When the buyer stated a particular use to which the goods were
5
(1827) 6 S 229.
6
Hume II 40. Quoted in Gow, op. cit., p. 47.
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to be put, the duty of the seller in respect of its fitness came to be over and above that of
the ordinary implied warrandice. In Baird v. Pagan (1765)7 the seller sold a quantity of
strong ale to the buyer for the particular purpose of being exported to the West Indies.
Because of some latent defects the ale was not able to answer the purpose for which it
was bought. The seller brought an action for the price but his claim failed. He had failed
to fulfill his obligation to supply goods which were fit for the buyer's particular purpose.
Goods were usually bought and sold with reference to their names, and names
were attached for a variety of reasons, but chiefly for the purpose of identification and also
to describe the character to which the goods must correspond. From this the law
developed a warrandice of correspondence with description. In Adamson v. Smith
(1799)8 there was sale of annual rye-grass seed as perennial seed. The buyer brought an
action against the seller for damages. The seller admitted on oath that in the negotiations
for the sale of the seed, the buyer had told him that if it was annual seed he would not
purchase it on any account. The court held that the buyer had concluded the bargain in
the belief that the seed was perennial and that the seller, who was uncertain as to what it
was, had concealed his uncertainty in order to induce the buyer to go ahead with the sale.
The seller was then held liable to restore price and interest. The case of Dickson v.
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seed - which turned out to be Swedish turnip-seed of a very poor kind. Although the
seller was acting bona fide throughout, he was held liable in damages under both the
implied warranty of the contract of sale that the thing sold should be of the kind described
and under the express warranty that the commodity was good and sound.
Following from the discussion of the duties of the seller, it is necessary next to
discuss the remedies available to the buyer. One of them was the right of rejection. This
remedy was equivalent to the remedy under the aedilician edict of actio redhibitoria,
whereby the buyer was given the right to reject the goods and cancel the sale within six
months from the time the defects were discovered. In Scotland, the buyer had the right to
reject goods which were different in kind and quality from the ones agreed. The buyer
could reject by intimidating to the seller his intention of rejecting and by returning the
goods to the seller as soon as he possibly could. The right of rejection was lost if the
buyer had accepted the goods either by keeping them beyond reasonable time or by using
or consuming them.10 Therefore, to preserve the right of rejection, the buyer had to
examine the goods without delay and to reject and return them upon the discovery of the
defects. Lapse of time would amount to an acceptance.
10
Wright, "The Differences Between the Laws of England and Scotland as to the Contract of Sale",
Journal of Jurisprudence, 1872, p. 403.
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In Ransan v. Mitchell (1845)11 the defendant bought a cargo of cork from the
plaintiff, to be shipped at a foreign port and delivered to Glasgow. When the goods
arrived, the defendant inspected and rejected them as being an inferior quality. Sometime
later the defendant used the goods. The plaintiff brought an action for the balance of the
price. It was held that the defendant had lost the right to reject the goods. The inferior
quality of the goods would have entitled the defendant to repudiate the contract
altogether. But by taking and using them, he had adopted the contract.
As mentioned earlier, delay by the buyer would bar him from rejecting the goods.
Where the defects were latent it would take time to become apparent. Under the Roman
law, actio redhibitoria was limited to six months after the defects were discovered, but
under the Scots law there was no specified period for rejection. According to M.P.
Brown, this was an arbitrary question determined by the circumstances of the case.12
The second remedy available to the buyer was a claim for damages and this remedy
accrued only after rescission and the return of the goods to the buyer. This remedy was
equivalent to the Roman actio quanti minoris. The buyer could not keep the goods and
claim from the seller as much of the price as exceeded what the buyer would have paid had
he known of the defect13. During the time of Stair and Bankton, actio quanti minoris
11
(1845) 7 D 813.
12 M.P. Brown, Treatise on the Law of Sale, p. 310.
13
Gloag, The Law of Contract, P. 193 ; The Merchantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, 1964, p. 205.
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was part of the law of Scotland. But by the time of Erskine, it was beginning to be
confused with laesio enormis, which was never accepted by the Scots law. Both remedies
were distinct but had one similarity, i.e. as damages, both normally offered a reduction in
price paid. The remedies differed in the fundamental respect of their cause. In laesio
enormis it was a simple disproportion in price paid and the true value while in the other it
was the sale of defective goods14. Confusion crept in because of the use of the term actio
quanti minoris. However, the actio quanti minoris which was accepted was to reduce
price due to a defect in the goods. This was nothing other than the ordinary action on the
contract of sale. The one that was rejected was the reduction of price due to
disproportion between the value of the thing and the price actually paid. By the nineteenth
century the two remedies were no longer distinct from each other and because of that the
buyer was deprived of a right to damages in certain circumstances.
The state of the law prevailing in the nineteenth century is reflected through the
cases. In Amaan v. Handyside & Henderson (1865)15 there was a sale of a steamer of
which the boiler was described as being eighteen months old when in fact it was already
five years old. The buyer brought an action against the seller claiming damages for the
fraud of the latter. The seller argued that, if that was so, the buyer could rescind the
contract, but could not retain the object and claim for the reduction in the price. Lord
14 Robin Evans-Jones, "The History of the Actio Quanti Minoris in Scotland", Juridical Review, 1991, p.
190
15
(1865) 3 M 526.
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Ordinary (Kinloch) said in his judgement that the law of Scotland rejected the actio
quanti minoris and this was a "traditional maxim of the law". It was the principle of law
that the sanctity of contract should be upheld and if the buyer was not entitled or not
disposed to throw up his bargain, he had to be content with what he had and pay the full
price contracted for. It was said further that the actio redhibitoria and the actio quanti
minoris were available to a buyer "who had received an article different from that which
had been ostensibly sold to him." It can be inferred from this sentence that the basis of the
action was error. If the article was so defective that it became something different from
what he had bargained for, the buyer was entitled to rescind the contract.16
In McCormick & Co. v. Rittmeyer (1869)17 the cause of action was over a sale of
hemp of an inferior quality. The buyer ordered 100 bales of prime cordage hemp from the
seller. He then made a second order for the same amount on the same terms. The seller
shipped the first order in two instalments and these were accepted and resold to the buyer.
Of the second order, the seller shipped 35 bales but these were rejected. The buyer
claimed damages for the inferior quality of the goods of the first and second orders. It
was held by the court that the claim for damages in respect of the second order was
justified because the goods did not conform to order. However, the claim in respect of the
16 Evans- Jones, op cit., p. 206.
17
(1869) 7 M 854.
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first order did not succeed because the goods were not rejected. Lord President Inglis
stated that:-
"When a purchaser receives delivery of goods as in fulfilment of a
contract of sale, and thereafter finds that the goods are not conform to
order, his only remedy is to reject the goods and rescind the contract
The purchaser is not entitled to retain the goods and demand an
abatement from the contract price corresponding to the disconformity
of the goods to order, for this would be to substitute a new and
different contract for that contract of sale which was originally made by
the parties, or it would resolve into a claim of the nature of the actio
quanti minoris, which our law entirely rejects."
This case was decided after the passing of the Mercantile Law (Amendment) Act
1856, which removed the implied warrandice at common law in respect of defective
goods. The court in this case drew a distinction between a claim for defective goods and
claim for the supply of goods which did not conform to order. The buyer was allowed
damages on the second ground.
The above two cases concerned the sale of goods. As for sale of heritage the
leading case is Louttit's Trs v. HighlandRwy (1892).18 In this case the judges took the
18
(1892) 19 r. 791.
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opportunity to express their views on the actio quanti minoris. Both Lord President
Robertson and Lord Adam agreed that it was not a competent form of action for the buyer
to retain possession of the heritage and at the same time claim damages for the difference
in value between a clear and a restricted title. But the peculiar thing in this case was that
the seller had not taken any objection to it. Lord McLaren made some important
comments. He said:-
"There are only two remedies open to the purchaser which are known
to our jurisprudence. He has in the first place the right to rescind the
contract conditional on his rejecting the goods or heritable property,
and to claim damages proportioned to the inconvenience to which he
has been put by the non-fulfilment of the contract. His other remedy is
the actio quanti minoris, the proper application of which is to the
case of latent infirmity either in the title or the quality of the subjects
sold, discovered when the matters are no longer entire. At one time it
was doubtful whether we had this form of action in relation to sales of
movable property, but it was never doubted that under the claim of
warrandice such a right did belong to the purchaser of heritable estate,
who discovered that some part of the subject of sale had not been
conveyed to him."
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The statement of his Lordship seem to broaden the application of the actio quanti
minoris to cases of defective title. It went a step further than what was said in
McCormick's case, in that the actio quanti minoris was applicable in cases when the
goods delivered did not conform to contract.
In comparison between the English and the Scots common law, the latter had a
wider concept of warrandice than the former. The English implied warranty can only be
found in cases of sale of unascertained goods by description. Where the buyer had not
seen the goods and only bought it on reliance of the description given by the seller, then
there would be an implied warranty that the goods should answer that description. And
under some circumstances, i.e. where the buyer had made known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods were required, the law would imply a warranty
that the goods must be fit for that particular purpose. Under Scots law the seller was to
warrant that the thing sold was free from such defects as to render it unfit for the use for
which it was intended. It was immaterial whether the sale was of specific or unascertained
goods. A buyer could be rest assured that he was sufficiently protected under the law.
Secondly, the general rule of the English law was caveat emptor, whereby it was
for the buyer to make sure that he was not cheated. The principle of Scots law was that
every man selling an article was bound, though nothing was said about quality, to supply
goods free from defects. These obligations were imposed unless there were circumstances
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to show that an inferior article was agreed upon. This developed from the understanding
that a sale was a bona fidei bargain of the parties. The seller should contemplate that
goods were bought for certain use and purpose and were price-worthy.
Thirdly, under English law there was no warranty of fitness for ordinary purposes
but only for particular purpose. Even this was restricted to sale of unascertained goods.
The buyer must have made known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
were required so as to show that he was relying on the seller's skill and judgment. If there
was anything to suggest otherwise, then the seller could not be made responsible. Under
Scots law the seller had a duty to supply a commodity which was fit and serviceable for
the uses to which it was commonly put. It was immaterial whether the seller dealt with
such goods or not, or what kind of sale it was. In a case where a buyer bought for an
extraordinary or for a particular purpose which was other than the ordinary purpose, he
had to expressly declare that particular purpose to the seller. This would create an
obligation upon the seller which was over and above the already existing one.
Fourthly, English law categorised terms into warranty and condition. This caused
some confusion because these words were capable of many meanings. Scots law, on the
other hand, had no such distinction. Every implied warrandice was a material term and
was therefore important. Thus, on the whole it would seem that Scots law was more
favourable and fairer to the buyer than its English counterpart. Furthermore, Scottish
judges were more lenient than the English ones. In the Scottish case of M'Lellan v.
Gibson (1848)'9 the buyer bought from the seller a landscape picture in exchange for three
other pictures and £5. This action was brought by the buyer who claimed that the
landscape painting which had been sold as an original was not so. Two issues came before
the court: one was whether the seller had warranted the painting to be original and two,
whether the buyer had been induced to enter into the contract by the false and fraudulent
misrepresentation of the seller. In his direction to the jury the judge made no reference to
the need for proving an absence of honest belief in the seller. It seems that, if a false
statement was made, it was automatically considered fraudulent. Fraud was implied from
the false statement by the seller.
As it stood during the middle of the nineteenth century, two different laws were in
operation, one in England which was caveat emptor, the other in Scotland which was
implied warrandice. However, the exception to the rule of caveat emptor had to some
extent diminished the difference between the two systems. The Scots rule was difficult to
implement because of the problem in ascertaining whether defects were latent or not at the
time of the sale, or whether the buyer could easily detect the fault on inspection of the
goods. It was also difficult to decide whether the defects were of a kind to render the
goods unmerchantable. As a consequence, the Mercantile Law (Amendment) Act 1856
was passed.
19
(1848) 5 D 1032.
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Before the passing of the Acts, the Mercantile Law Commission was set up and
their task was to inquire and ascertain how far the mercantile laws of the different parts of
the United Kingdom might be advantageously assimilated.20 As far as the sale of goods
was concerned, the report dealt with, among other things, the constitution of the contract,
the liability of the buyer to be deprived of goods sold to him by third parties claiming a
preferable right thereto, and warranty. As to the constitution of the contract, the
Commissioners recommended that the law ofEngland and Ireland should be assimilated to
the simpler rule of the common law observed in Scotland. For obvious reasons, the
important business of buying and selling ought not to be trammelled with unnecessary
solemnities; such transaction if satisfactorily proven ought to be binding.21
As to the law of warranty, the report recommended that Scots law should be
assimilated to that of the law of England, because the former rule tend to cause litigation.
The problem was the difficulty in ascertaining whether the defect was latent or otherwise
at the time of the sale and also whether or not the faults were of such as to render the
goods of unmarketable quality. The recommendation was adopted and in section 5 of the
Mercantile law (Amendment) Act 1856, the implied warranty of Scots law was removed
from the sale ofmovables. Section 5 read:-
"Where goods shall, after the passing of this Act, be sold, the seller, if
at the time of the sale he was without knowledge that the same were
20 Second Report of the Mercantile Law Commission, Reports Commission, (4) 1854 - 5, vol. 18, p.6.
21 ibid.
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defective or of bad quality, shall not be held to have warranted their
quality or sufficiency, but the goods, with all faults, shall be at the risk
of the purchaser, unless the seller shall have given an express warranty
of the quality or sufficiency of such goods, or unless the goods have
been expressly sold for a specified and particular purpose, in which
case the seller shall be considered, without such warranty, to warrant
that the same are fit for such purpose."
There were two limbs to the section:-
If at the time of the sale the seller had no knowledge that the goods were defective or of
bad quality, it shall not be held that he had warranted their quality. Goods sold were, with
all faults, at the risk of the buyer, unless: -
(a) the seller gave an express warranty of their quality, or
(b) he knew of the defect at the time of the sale, or
(c) he expressly sold them for a specified and particular purpose.
By virtue of this section, caveat emptor was introduced into Scotland; and not
only that, Scots rule became narrower than that of English rule because the implied
warranty was only preserved in cases of goods expressly sold for a specified and particular
purpose. This meant that the buyer must expressly tell the seller the particular purpose
why he required the goods. The term would not be implied from trade usage or where the
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buyer relied on the seller's skill and judgment. There would, however, be a warranty
under English rule in such situation.
There is another, different, view of the effect of the 1856 Act. Gow opines that
the Act neither destroyed nor replaced the common law with caveat emptor because it was
restricted in its application to an instantaneous emptio perfects, or a bargain or a sale of
specific goods, and that only where the seller had no knowledge of any defect.22 He
declares that in any such contract there was to be implied a term that the buyer took with
all faults. In so far as it applied to a sale of goods for a specified and particular purpose it
was merely a declaration of the common law.23 As such the common law was left
untouched. I think however that even though the Act did not expressly destroy nor
replace the common law with caveat emptor, it did to a certain extent change the Scots
common law. Before the Act, Scotland did not know about caveat emptor, but it was
introduced by section 5 of the 1856 Act, in relation to sale of specific goods and where the
seller had no knowledge. Elaine Sutherland is also of the view that, by virtue of the
Mercantile Law (Amendment) Act caveat emptor was for the first time began to have
effect in Scotland.24 According to her, the Act only applied to the sale of specific goods
because there risk was capable of being passed to the buyer.25
22
Gow, Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, 1964, p. 181.
23 Ibid
24 E. Sutherland, op. cit., p. 33.
25 Ibid.
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Gow further says that as regard to sale for specific and particular purpose, the
common law was left untouched. According to limb 2 of section 5, goods sold were, with
all faults, at the risk of the buyer, except if they were sold for particular purpose. So,
where the buyer bought for particular purpose, he could rely on the common law rule. It
is important to note that there was a similar rule under the English common law whereby
on a sale of goods by a manufacturer or dealer, to be applied to a particular purpose, it
was a term in the contract that they should reasonably answer that purpose. So, I would
think that section 5 was the provision of the English common law which was similar to the
Scots common law. It is not correct for Gow to say that the Scots common law was left
undestroyed or untouched for it was certainly affected in practice.
Another aspect of change brought about by the 1856 Act was the effect of
contract of sale upon the right ofproperty in goods. The notion of the right of property in
the goods become relevant when considering matters of risk and rights against and of third
parties. By the law of Scotland, property in the goods did not pass by virtue of the
contract of sale, but only when there was delivery of the goods to the buyer. But although
the property did not pass by the contract, as soon as the parties agreed as to the subject-
matter and the price, the result was that risk passed to the buyer. This rule was changed
when the Act was passed and by virtue of section 1:-
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"Where the goods have been sold, but the same have not been
delivered to the purchaser, and have been allowed to remain in the
custody of the seller, it shall not be competent for any creditor of such
seller, after the date of such sale, to attach the goods as belonging to
the seller by any diligence or process of law, including sequestration, to
the effect of preventing the purchaser, or others in his right, from
enforcing delivery of the same; and the right of the purchaser to
demand the delivery of such goods shall, from and after the date of
such sale, be attachable by or transferable to the creditors of the
purchaser."
This section meant that goods sold, but not delivered, might be demanded to the
exclusion of the creditors of the seller by>
(1) the buyer, or
(2) his creditors, or
(3) his sub-buyer;
subject to the satisfying the seller's lien for the price.26 The creditors of the seller should
be allowed to attach goods sold, but left in his custody, thus rendering the buyer's right to
delivery indefeasible.
26 "Mercantile Law Amendment Act", Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 1, 1857, p. 15.
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Further assimilation of the two systems of law was made with the passing of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1893. This did not happen without any criticisms and objections and
this will be discussed in the next part.
(II) SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893
During the nineteenth century, after the unification of England and Scotland, there was a
great deal of codification of the law for the purpose of assimilation of the commercial law
of the two countries. Among these codifications were the Bills of Exchange Act 1882,
Factors Acts 1889 and Partnership Act 1890. It was necessary to assimilate the laws of
England and Scotland because during the nineteenth century, commerce was booming,
especially in Scotland. Trade between two neighbouring countries was made difficult by
the existence of two different rules operating in each country. For this reason, the
businessmen in Scotland moved to assimilate the commercial laws.
In the year 1879, Frederick Pollock drafted the Partnership Act of 1890. One year
after Partnership Act was drafted, McKenzie Chalmers drafted the Bills of Exchange Act
of 1882. This was a succesful work by Chalmers. Further codification took place with
the passing of the Factors Act of 1889.27 All the above statutes were extended to Scotland
27
Rodger, "The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian England", 1992, Law Quarterly Review,
p. 570.
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after some amendments were made. The other important codification was the Sale of
Goods Act 1893 which will be discussed below.
Many observations pertaining to codification were made by Alan Rodger in his
article. According to him, assimilation and codification was advocated by Scottish
businessmen who were trading with England. They found that assimilation was necessary
to unify the law on commerce, especially so when trade involved bills of exchange.28
According to him, codification was not a drastic step and the problems talked about were
mere exaggeration because, commercial law was based on the practice of merchants.
Therefore, there was little variance between England and Scotland.29 Next, he observes
that the circumstances in the continent during the nineteenth century induced codification.
After the outbreak of the Napoleonic War, Scotsmen no longer went to the Netherlands,
instead they went to Germany. At that time the Germans had their commercial law
codified into the Commercial Code. Their success had influenced the Scotsmen to have
their own codified commercial law.30
Codification was the main agenda for the legislature not only for England and
Scotland, but also for the colonies throughout the Empire. In India, its commercial law
was chiefly a codification of the English law, for example, Contracts Act 1872, Sale of
28 Id. p. 587.
29 Ibid.
30 id. p. 588.
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Goods Act 1930, and Partnership Act 1932. The British came to India for purposes of
trade and by virtue of a Royal Charter in 1600, The East India Company was formed. The
Company had powers to make orders, laws and also ordinance which were not contrary to
the local laws and customs.31 The Indian Sale of Goods Act is based largely upon the
1893 Act; however, the particular conditions of India called for provisions in some respect
different from those in force in England.
(a) BACKGROUND TO THE SALE OF GOODS ACT
The Sale of Goods Bill was framed by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers in the year 1888. He was
then the judge of the Birmingham County Court. His great experience in a busy
commercial centre afforded him special advantages in dealing with the subject of sale. He
had already been responsible for the successful Bill of Exchange Act 1882 which
pioneered the work of codification in England.32 Chalmers' Sale of Goods Bill was
considered by Lord Bramwell, who made various suggestions to adjust it. Lord
Bramwell, a judge, was one of the members of the House of Lords' Select Committee. It
was also revised by Lord Herschell with the draftsman. He took upon himself the
responsibility that the Bill had been made as perfect as possible.33 Lord Herschell was the
31 Dr. S. Ventakaraman. Krishna Murthy and Ramamoorthy, The Law of Contracts, 5th ed., 1990, p. 2.
32 R. Brown, "The Sale of Goods Bill", The Scottish Law Review, vol. 8, 1892, p. 149.
33 March 17, 1891. Hansard Third Series, vol. 351 col. 1183.
60
Lord Chancellor in 1886 and once again from 1892 to 1895. His efforts were more in
politics rather than in judiciary.34
The Bill was first introduced in the House of Lords at the end of the 1888
Parliamentary session35 and was reintroduced in the next session with some modifications.
The Bill was presented again by Lord Herschell in March 1891 and in moving the second
reading in the House of Lords, he stated in his speech the objectives of codification of the
law and its advantages and disadvantages.36 According to him,
"whilst at one time there was a disposition to exaggerate the effect and
advantages of codification and to suggest that codification could put to
an end to the necessity for lawyers and litigation; on the other hand
there was perhaps, a disposition to depreciate the advantages of
codification which are real. But nevertheless, the advantage of
codification far outweighs its disadvantages."37
According to him, among these advantages are:-
34 Simpson, ed., Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law, ed. 1984, p. 236 - 7.
35
August 8, 1888, Hansard Third Series, vol. 330 cols. 70-71.
36 March 17, Hansard Third Series, vol. 351 col 1181 -1182.
37 Ibid.
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(1) Codification makes the law certain on a particular point rather than having to
consult textbooks and authorities. (2) It is likely to diminish the amount of litigation. (3)
The law codified will be adopted by the colonies and thus would create a uniform law in
the mother country and in the greater proportion of self-governing colonies.
Lord Herschell went on to say that, with the codification of the law of sale of
goods, it was hoped to establish a similar mercantile law for all parts of Her Majesty's
dominions where English law prevailed. It would be for the benefit of commerce within
the Empire. There was, however, no mention of extending the Bill to Scotland and in fact
when the Bill was first drafted, it was made applicable to England and Ireland alone.38 It
was not until in the 1892 session that there was any mention in Parliament of the Bill being
extended to Scotland,39 even though the view that it should be had manifested itself as
early as 1889 among Scottish lawyers and merchants.40 According to a writer in the
Juridical Review, the Bill, in its original form, would lose much of its value and would
result in a "sharper conflict in mercantile transactions of Glasgow and Liverpool or Leith
and Newcastle as regards to legal rights and remedies."41 Scottish interests, like the
Faculty of Advocates, Aberdeen Chamber ofCommerce, Glasgow Chamber ofCommerce
and Glasgow Faculty of Procurators, fought hard to make the Bill applicable to Scotland.
38 J.G.S., "Sale of Goods Bill", vol. 1 1889, The Juridical Review, p. 310, at p. 311.
39 Hansard Fourth Series, vol.4 col. 1093.
40 Vol. 1, 1889, Juridical Review.
41 J.G.S., op. cit.,311.
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The Glasgow Faculty of Procurators appointed a Bills Committee in June 1889 to revise
and report on the Bill. The policy was to bring the law of the two kingdoms, as regard
sale, into closer agreement by fixing distinctly the points on which they agreed.42 Nothing
much happened until 1891 when the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce prepared a petition
which referred to the great and general advantages of assimilating the laws on sale of
goods and sent it to Lord Watson for presentation in the House of Lords.43 Lord Watson
put down amendments to the Bill to make it applicable to Scotland. The amendments with
their objects were intimated for the third reading by Lord Watson but were too late for
consideration by the House for the session.44 However, it formed valuable groundwork
for adaptation in the future session.
The primary difficulty in adapting the Bill to Scotland originated in the very root of
sale, i.e. the concept of passage of property.45 Under the English rule, in an unconditional
contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods
passed to the buyer when the contract was made and it was immaterial whether the time of
payment or time of delivery or both was postponed. Under the Scots rule, property would
only pass to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery of the goods. A seller of
undelivered goods remained undivested of the property in them. Although property did
42 Ibid.
43 Alan Rodger. "The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain", Law Quarterly Review,
vol. 109, 1992, p.570, at p. 582.
44 R. Brown, "Assimilation of the Law of Sale", Juridical Review, vol. 3, 1891, p. 297.
45 Ibid.
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not pass to the buyer, risk could. Unlike the English rule, in Scotland, property and risk
were separate. This principle was not affected by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act
1856 because that Act did not enact that the contract of sale transferred the right of
property to the buyer. It only provided that the buyer, having acquired certain rights i.e.
jus ad rem - a right of action against the seller, transmissable to a sub-buyer and a right
against seller's creditor,- incurred a corresponding obligation under the contract.46 The
corresponding obligation intended was risk. According to Bell, "risk is not a test of
property (as in England). It forms a point in the law of obligation not in the law of
transference."47
Richard Brown commented that the Scots rule was inconsistent when put in
application. A seller who remained the owner was not subject to the most ordinary
incidents of ownership, i.e. to suffer risk, while a buyer who had no ownership was. A
seller being debtor for delivery of a specific subject which perished without his fault, was
freed from an obligation which became impossible; but a buyer remained bound, under a
possible obligation.48 What was proposed by Lord Watson in his amendments to the Bill
was to assimilate the two rules by yielding up the Scots rule.49 His other proposal was to
46
Anonymous, "The Mercantile Law Amendment Act",Journal of Jurisprudence,vol. 1. 1857, p. 13, at
p. 15; Wright, T.G., "The Differences Between the Laws of England and Scotland as to the Contract of
Sale", Journal of Jurisprudence,vol. 16, 1872, p.402, at p. 406-408.
47 Bell 1 Comm. 180.
48 R. Brown. Juridical Review, vol. 3, 1891, p. 298-299.
49 Ibid.
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introduce the actio quanti minoris - reduction in price or damages,- into Scotland.
Absence of such remedy had occasioned inconvenience, especially where the subject-
matter of the sale had been partially used, or had changed in its nature, before discovery of
the defect forming part of the breach.50
The issue of actio quanti minoris was also raised by the Bills Committee of the
Glasgow Faculty of Procurators in their recommendations for amendments to the Sale of
Goods Bill. In their report they suggested that the actio quanti minoris should be adopted
in Scotland but the English rules as to warranties should be rejected.51 Their proposal was
embodied in the form of clause 12.52 It reads:-
1. In England and Ireland -
(a) Where a contract of sale is subject to any condition to be fulfilled by the seller, the
buyer may waive the condition, or may elect to treat the breach of such condition
as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for treating the contract as
repudiated.
50 id. p. 303.
51 R. Brown, The Scottish Law Review, vol. 8, 1892, p. 150.
52 Id. p. 151.
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(b) Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach of which may
give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of
which may give rise to a claim for damages, but not a right to treat the contract as
repudiated, depends in each case on the construction of the contract.
(c) Where a contract of sale is not severable, and the buyer has accepted the goods, or
part thereof, or the contract was for specific goods, the property in which has
passed to the buyer, the breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller can
only be treated as a breach ofwarranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods
and treating the contract as repudiated, unless there be a condition in the contract
to that effect.
2. In Scotland -
(a) Where a contract of sale is subject to any condition to be fulfilled by the seller, the
buyer may waive the condition, or elect to treat the breach of such condition as a
breach which may give rise to a claim for damages.
(b) Failure to perform any material part of a contract of sale is in general a breach of
contract which entitles the party not at fault to reject the goods and treat the
contract as repudiated, and it depends on the circumstances and equities of each
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case whether the contract can be treated as repudiated or the breach complained of
falls to be satisfied by damages.
This proposal by the Glasgow Faculty was criticised by Richard Brown, who was a
member of the Faculty's Bill Committee.53 According to him, the proposal would only
result in great difficulty because the actio quanti minoris or damages was closely
connected with the English principle of warranties. In England a stipulation in a contract
of sale could either be a condition, which entitled the innocent party to repudiate on
breach, or a warranty which gave rise to a claim for damages. Flowever, breach of a
condition might be waived as a breach ofwarranty and a claim for damages made in lieu of
a repudiation. The English section of clause 12 was merely a codification of the existing
law. Not so with regard to Scotland; all warranties were conditions and the innocent
party, whether seller or buyer, could claim rescission of the contract, restitution of the
goods or price and damages for the breach.54 Thus, a faultless buyer who had received the
goods must return them to the seller and put him in his original position as if the contract
had never been entered into; only then could he claim damages. Damages was not a
remedy in lieu of rescission but a remedy after rescission had been made.
To have a sub-section as in 2(a) was to admit the English principle of warranties
because although no mention of the word "warranty" was made, the effect talked about
53 Ibid.
54 id. p. 152.
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was precisely that of a breach of a warranty, i.e. a claim for damages. As for sub-section
2(b), it contradicted the previous sub-section which provided for either a repudiation or a
claim for damages. The sub-section in itself contradicted its own provision. The words
"the party not in fault" suggested the rights and remedies for both seller and buyer, but the
only remedy specified in the sub-section was that of a buyer, i.e. rejection of the goods.
Brown's solution to this problem was either to accept or reject the whole of the English
rules ofactio quanti minoris and warranty.55
Brown's criticism of the Committee's proposal was attacked by John A. Spens who
accused him of want of loyalty to the Committee for which he was a convener.56 Spens
was also a member of the same Committee. In his defence, Brown replied that the article
was written in June 1892, while the Committee had ceased to exist in December 1891.57
During that six month period he had been communicating and corresponding with the
framer of the Bill, from whom he had gained valuable suggestions. He had increased
doubts as to whether the benefits of assimilation in the matter of actio quanti minoris
outweighed the disadvantages associated with the principle itself. He was convinced that
"to admit the actio quanti minoris into Scotland in the form in which it is recognised in
55 Ibid.
56 Scottish Law Review, Vol. 1, 1893, p. 74
57 Id. p. 106.
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England, and at the same time to attempt to exclude the English rules as to warranty
would be a serious blunder. "58
During the 1892 session, the Bill with the Scottish amendments made no progress.
Lord Herschell, who had become the Lord Chancellor, reintroduced the Bill in February
1893 without the Scottish amendments. The Scottish amendments would be introduced if
the position could be agreed. Lord Watson, who was in favour of extending the Bill to
Scotland, said that the differences of opinion upon some points were comparatively trivial
and would not justify dropping the Bill.59 A fortnight later the Scottish amendments were
back in the Bill.60
After passing the House ofLords for the third time, the Bill made its initial venture
in the House of Commons. The Bill was read for the first time on 21st. April 1893 and a
second time on 21st. June 1893. A Select Committee was nominated on 24th. July 1893.
It consisted of Sir Charles Russell, AG.; Sir R. Webster, Q.C.; Mr. Asher, Q.C. (Scots
Solicitor-General); Mr. Shiress Will, Q.C.; Mr. Bousfield, Q.C.; Mr. Ambrose, Q.C.; and
Mr. Mather. The Select Committee completed their labours and presented their report on
15th. August 1893. Considerable alterations were made and the Bill was much improved.
Clause 12, proposed by the Glasgow Faculty of Procurators was re-drafted. The clause
58 Id. p. 107.
59
February 21, 1893, Hansard Fourth Series, vol. 9, cols. 4-5.
60 March 6, 1893, Hansard Fourth Series, vol. 9, col. 1069.
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became clause 11 and the Scottish provision became sub-section 4. It came in the
following form:-
"In Scotland, failure by the seller to perform any material part of a
contract of sale is a breach of contract which entitles the buyer, either
within a reasonable time after delivery to reject the goods and treat the
contract as repudiated, or to retain the goods and treat the failure to
perform such material part as a breach which may give rise to a claim
for compensation or damages."61
By such clause the buyer was given the option between the actio redhibitoria or
actio quanti minoris. This power was in accordance with the rule of the civil law which
gives similar option to the buyer within specific period of time.62
The Bill passed its third reading in the Commons on 15th. September 1893. The
Commons made some amendments to the Bill but they were not approved by the Lords,
who made further amendments to those amendments. The Bill finally received the Royal
Assent on 20th. February 1894 and was passed as the Sale of Goods Act 1893. The Act
was entitled "An Act for codifying the law relating to the Sale ofGoods." The purpose of
a codifying enactment is to present an orderly and authoritative statement of the leading
rules of a law on a given subject, whether those rules are to be found in statute law or
61 R. Brown, "Sale of Goods as Amended", Scottish Law Review, vol. 9, 1893, p.212, at p. 214.
62 Ibid.
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common law.63 But the Act did not succeed in presenting a codified law on sale of goods.
Being a code, it should have stated the whole body of the law. However, the 1893 Act
was far from being all-embracing, only presented the statement of principles derived from
cases decided during the nineteenth century.64 If there was any point of law which had not
arisen before, there would be no provision for it in the Act because it made no allowance
for such potential disputes. Therefore, it would not be easy to apply the code to the
modern conditions. Secondly, the Act reflected the nineteenth century concept of trade
and law and these have now changed. For example, "merchantability" would relate to
"merchants" rather than to "consumers" and to natural products rather than to
manufactured goods.65
(b) THE EFFECTS OF THE SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893
The effect of the 1893 codification of the law of sale was that now a common legislated
code was superimposed upon two fundamentally divergent legal systems. The new Sale of
Goods Act 1893 made little change to the law of England because it was basically a
codification of the existing common law.66 The conscious changes effected in the law
were very slight. But as far as Scotland was concerned, many of its provisions were
63
Benjamin on Sale of Goods, p.4.
64 Introduction to the First Edition by Chalmers.
65 See Law Commission Report No. 160 on Sale and Supply of Goods.
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entirely novel and subverted principles and practice which had ruled Scottish legal
decisions for centuries. Among the major changes in the Scottish law were:-
(i) The passage of property in specific goods sold but not delivered.
(ii) The introduction of actio quanti minoris.
(iii) Alterations as to representation or warranty.
(i) Passing of Property.
By English law, in a sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods
passes to the buyer irrespective of whether delivery and/or payment of price are/is
postponed,67 and risk, prima facie, passes with property. Therefore, when nothing else
need be done by the seller to effect delivery, the goods are said to be in a deliverable state.
In Scotland, the property in the goods did not pass to the buyer by virtue of the contract
of sale but when there was delivery, actual or constructive. But although property did not
pass, as soon as the parties agreed as to the subject-matter and the price, risk passed to the
buyer. By virtue of the Act, sections 17,18 and 20, the same rules, substantially English
ones, were applicable to both countries.
(ii) Actio Quanti Minoris.
In England a stipulation can either be a condition or a warranty and there are also
circumstances when a condition can be treated as a warranty. Where there is a breach of a
67
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condition, the remedy would be repudiation and if there is a breach of a warranty, the
remedy is damages. In Scotland, there was no such division; all warranties were
conditions and breach of them would give rise to a rescission. A claim for damages was
only permissible after restitution of either the goods or price. Now under section 11(5) of
the Act, the buyer had the right of repudiation or to retain the goods and treat the failure
to perform such material part as a breach giving rise to a claim for compensation or
damages. The damages are measured by the reduction of the price, in respect of sale of
defective goods, equivalent to the reduction in value attributable to the defects.68
(iii) Representation and Warranty
Another aspect of the changes made by the 1893 Act upon the law of England as well as
Scotland was with regard to representation and warranty. The Act categorised
representations or statements into either conditions or warranties. Breach of a condition
entitled repudiation whereas breach of a warranty entitled only a claim of damages. In
Scotland there was no such distinction and by section 61, a breach ofwarranty is deemed
to be a failure to perform a material part of the contract. "Material part of the contract"
thus meant that it was a condition. Breach of a condition led to a remedy of repudiation.
But by section 11(5) of the Act, the unfortunate buyer had a choice of either to repudiate
the contract or to retain the goods and claim damages. This section was said to have re¬
introduced the formerly rejected remedy of actio quanti minoris into Scotland.
68
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However, it was restricted to a situation where the buyer could not return the goods; for
example, the buyer had used the goods.
The provisions of implied terms in the 1893 Act retained the English common law
division between condition and warranty. In Scotland the distinction was between
material and non-material parts of the contract. In Turnbull v. M'Lean_& Co. (1874),69
McLean & Co., coal merchants, contracted to supply Turnbull with coal. They agreed
that the price was to be paid monthly. Turnbull refused to pay for the coal of a past month
or even to make a payment to account. McLaren rescinded the contract and it was held
that they were justified to do so. Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff expressed the principle as
follows:-
"I understand the law of Scotland, in regard to mutual contracts, to be
clear - first, that the stipulations on either side are the counterparts and
the consideration given for each other; second, that a failure to perform
any material or substantial part of the contract on the part of one will
prevent him from suing the other for performance; and third, that
where one party has refused or failed to perform his part of the
contract in any material respect, the other is entitled either to insist for
implement, claiming damages for the breach, or to rescind the contract
altogether - except so far as it has been performed."
69
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Lord Neaves said;
"It is a general principle that all the material stipulations in a contract
forming a unum quid (single entity) are mutual causes."
In the case of Lupton & Co. v. Schulze & Co. (1900),70 Lupton & Co. entered
into a contract of sale of cloth to Schulze & Co. Part of the cloth did not conform to
contract and Schulze & Co. rejected them. Rejection was intimidated to Lupton & Co.
But instead of returning the cloth, Schulze & Co. retained them as security for claim of
damages. Lupton & Co. brought an action against Schulze & Co. for the price and then
Schulze & Co. brought an action against Lupton & Co. for damages. The two actions
were joined. It was held that, having rejected the goods, it was wrong for Schulze & Co.
to retain possession of the goods. They were liable to pay for the price and their claim
against Lupton & Co. was dismissed. Lord Trayner said that:-
"The appellants had open to them an alternative course. They could
reject the goods and place them at the disposal of the respondents, or
they could keep the goods at the contract price, and claim damages on
the ground that the sellers had failed to perform a material part of their
contract. Between these alternatives the appellants had to choose; they
could adopt either, but they must adopt one of them."
70
(1900) 2 F 1118.
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From the above two cases it can be seen that where there is a breach of a material
part of the contract, either failure to pay the price of coal or the goods which did not
conform to the contract, the innocent party had the right to reject the goods and treat the
contract as rescinded. The divergence in terminology between English and Scots law led
to some uncertainty. It became unclear if the word "condition" should be read to mean
"material part of the contract" and "warranty" to mean "non-material part of the
contract". I am inclined to say that the terms "condition" and "material part" could be
used interchangeably because, both terms are used to describe the fundamental part of the
contract which goes to the root of it. Breach of that fundamental part would affect the
very existence of the contract.
(HI) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED TERMS
Sections 12 to 15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 marked a diversion from the common
law rule of caveat emptor because these sections codified the implied terms of title,
description, fitness and merchantable quality. Although the Act appeared simple, but there
were underlying problems. The Law Commissions of England and Scotland, set up in
1965, produced a report in 1969,71 where they discussed two major problems of the Act,
namely, the problems created by the practice of contracting out of the conditions and
71 Law Commission First Report: Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893, No. 24, 1969
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warranties implied by sections 12 - 15 of the 1893 Act72 and the problems related to the
operation of those sections. The Law Commissions went through these sections critically
and, where necessary, recommendations were made. I would like to discuss the report of
the Law Commissions because upon these recommendations, the Supply of Goods
(Implied Terms) Act, 1973 was passed, which implied similar terms into contracts of hire-
purchase and reformed the bases upon which terms were implied into contracts of sale.
(a) LAW COMMISSIONS' FIRST REPORT: AMENDMENTS TO THE SALE
OF GOODS ACT 1893
Section 12
Section 12, under which the seller warrants the buyer's title, was made applicable to all
contracts of sale "unless the circumstances of the contract are such as to show a different
intention". This phrase meant that the term could be ousted by an express agreement
between the parties as well as by the general provision under section 55. This section
provided that where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract by implication
of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing
between the parties, or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the
contract. Sale, by definition, is a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer
the property in the goods to the buyer for a price. If section 12 could be excluded, there
72 Section 55 of the 1893 Act provided that, "Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a
contract of sale by implication of law, it maybe negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course
of dealing between the parties, or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the contract."
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would be no sale at all. So, it was recommended by the Law Commissions that there
should be some limitations of contracting-out by the seller. They also recommended that,
where the seller purports to sell only such right or title that he or a third party may have,
there should be no implied condition.
Section 13
Section 13 implied that if sale is by description, the goods delivered must correspond with
the description. The Law Commission criticised this section on two grounds. First, it adds
very little to the law since if goods are described in the contract it is clearly an express
term that the goods should fit that description. Second, it is misleading to say that the
term as to description is a condition of the contract which could be excluded. The true
position is, if a seller delivers goods which do not correspond to the description, he has
not merely broken a condition of the contract but has entirely failed to perform it.
Therefore, it imposes a fundamental obligation on the seller, breach of which goes to the
root of the contract and the seller is deprived the benefit of the exemption clause.73
Despite these criticisms, the Law Commissions found that there were little problems in
practice and the Act provided buyers with great protection. The only recommendation
made was to extend the meaning of "sale by description" to sale in self-service shops. For
this reason, section 13 still exists in its original form with the addition of the
recommendation to it. The recommendation came in subsection 3 and was included in the
73 Law Commission Report, No. 24. p. 7.
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Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. It provides that a sale of goods is not
prevented from being a sale by description by reason only that the goods being exposed
for sale or hire, are selected by the buyer.
As mentioned earlier, any description of goods is really an express term or the
spelling out of the express term, but section 13 implied a term that the seller should
comply with the express term. This is odd and redundant because what section 13 is really
saying is that "where the seller uses words of description which would otherwise amount
to a condition, then it is an implied condition that the goods should comply with that
description".74 When there is an express term, it is not necessary to imply compliance. It
is suggested that this section needs revision, if not outright repeal75 which was not done
even by the latest Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994.
Section 14
This section was one of the most important provisions in the Sale of Goods Act 1893
because many cases involved defects in the quality of goods. It dealt with two different
concepts of quality, i.e., fitness and merchantability. The opening words read,
"Subject to the provision of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, there is no
implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose
of goods supplied under a contract of sale,..."
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The effect of these wordings was to retain the common law rule although greatly
restricted. The Law Commissions did not recommend any changes in these opening
words because they were necessary to restrict the application of the section to where the
seller is acting in the course of business and to make it applicable to all goods supplied
under a contract of sale.76 However, they made these observations and recommendations.
Subsection (1) required that "the goods are of a description which it is in the
course of the seller's business to supply". It was recommended that this should be implied
into all sales other than private sales and would include a situation where the seller has not
traded in goods of the relevant description before. Secondly, the Law Commissions
recommended that the proviso for sale under patent or trade name be dispensed with it
had become redundant. The subsection required prove of reliance on the seller's skill and
judgment. Where there is no such reliance, that would mean that there is reliance on
patent or trade name.
The final recommendation was as to the requirement that the buyer must make it
known to the seller, the particular purpose for which the goods were required, so as to
show that he had relied on the seller's skill and judgement. The law was, the condition of
fitness is implied, if the goods were bought for their normal or obvious purpose. Reliance
76 Law Commissions Report, no. 24, p. 10.
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on the seller's skill and judgment was implied. But if the buyer required the goods for a
particular purpose, that purpose should be expressly made known to the seller before the
can be such reliance. In England, therefore, "particular purpose" would include goods
bought for special or unusual purpose as well as goods bought for usual or normal
purpose.77 This had also caused some overlapping between subsections 1 and 2 of the
1893 Act. The Law Commissions recommended that subsection 1 should be re-worded to
interpret the effect of purchase for usual purpose and the effect of sale for a special
purpose. Secondly, there should be an adjustment to provide an alternative burden of
proof for the seller. Instead of having to prove that the buyer had not relied on his skill
and judgment, the seller had only to prove that it was not reasonable for the buyer to have
relied on him.
As far as subsection 2 was concerned, there were some major problems attached to
it. Among the problems were:-
(1) There was no definition given to the term "merchantable quality".
(2) It was only implied in sale by description.
(3) It was a requirement that the seller should be in the course of business to supply.
(4) The effect of the proviso (the opportunity of examination) actually protected
buyers who did not inspect at all rather than protecting the buyers who did in fact
examine, but could not detect the defects because the examination was carried out
improperly or negligently.
77 id. p. 14.
81
(5) The law did not make any distinction between new and used goods. As it stood,
the buyer of a second-hand goods could expect them to be perfect.
To these problems, the Law Commissions recommended that, there should be a
statutory definition for "merchantabile quality", which would include description and price.
So, if the goods are described as second-hand or if the price is low, then the buyer should
not expect to them to be perfect in every way. It was also recommended that subsection 2
should be extended to all types of sale rather than only to sale by description. Finally, as
regard the proviso, it was recommended that there should be a specific notice of the defect
before the implied term could be excluded. It would mean that there must be actual
examination and not a cursory one or the mere opportunity of examination.
Section 15
By this section, a contract of sale is by sample only if there is a term, express or implied,
to that effect. Mere exhibition of the sample to the buyer by the seller would not be
sufficient to constitute a sale by sample. If there is a sale by sample, the law would imply
that the bulk must correspond with the sample, the buyer must have a reasonable
opportunity to compare the bulk with the sample and the goods must be free from the
defect, rendering them unmerchantable, which would not be apparent on reasonable
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inspection of the sample (subsection 2). There were not many problems here so as to
cause the Law Commissions to make any recommendations.
All the above-mentioned implied terms could be contracted out by the seller by an
express agreement or under the general provision of section 55 of the 1893 Act. The Law
Commissions recommended that there should not be any contracting out of implied terms
in all sales to private consumers, except in second-hand goods, and if there is such term of
exclusion, it would be void.
(b) SUPPLY OF GOODS (IMPLIED TERMS) ACT 1973
These recommendations of the Law Commissions were adopted in the Supply of Goods
(Implied Terms) Act 1973. The important thing about this Act is that, it extended the
implied terms in Sale ofGoods Act 1893, in amended form, to hire-purchase. Before this
Act, in transactions other than sale, terms were implied under the common law because
the Sale ofGoods Act was not applicable. In 1973, the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms)
Act was passed with these provisions.
Even though section 12 could not be exempted in all sales, but where the seller has
a limited title to the goods, there is no implied term under section 12. However, this fact
must be expressed or inferred from the circumstances of the case, that it is the seller's
intention to transfer only limited title.
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The Act extended the concept of sale by description to include goods which are
specific and seen by the buyer. Formerly sale by description only applied to situations
where the buyer had not seen the goods but relied on the seller's description of them. But
there were cases where the courts had held that, even though the buyer had seen and
inspected the goods, they would not cease to be a sale by description for as long as the
buyer bought them relying on the seller's description of them.78 The decisions of the
courts made their way into the statute, whereby it is provided that, a sale of goods does
not cease to be a sale by description by reason only that, being exposed for sale, they are
selected by the buyer.79
The Act for the first time supplied a statutory definition to the word "merchantable
quality". The definition included description and price. It also made merchantable quality
applicable to other sales besides sale by description. Also, it replaces the phrase "deals in
goods of that description" to "goods supplied under he contract". The significance of this
change was that, merchantable quality was extended beyond the goods sold; it would
include the containers in which the goods contained, the packaging and so on.
The other radical change made by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973
was to restrict the power of the seller to contract out of his liability. In other words, the
78 Beale v. Taylor [1976] 1 WLR 1193; Thornett & Fehr v. Beers & Sons [1919] 1 KB 486.
79 Section 13(3).
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right granted under section 55 of the 1893 Act was greatly restricted and altered by the
1973 Act. The seller could not contract out of the implied term under section 12 and any
exclusionary clause would be void. As for the other remaining sections, i.e. sections 13,
14 and 15, contracting out was void in relation to consumer sales. In 1977, the Unfair
Contract Terms Act was passed, which provides for a more general control of the
exclusionary clauses. It replaced the relevant provisions in the 1973 Act. The Unfair
Contract Terms Act gives extensive powers to the courts to strike down exclusionary
clauses, especially in consumers' contracts.
(c) SALE OF GOODS ACT 1979
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 is a consolidation Act whereby the original 1893 Act and
with the various amendments made to it by subsequent legislation, were consolidated into
a single Act. The function of a consolidating Act is to do away with various statutes on
the same subject-matter, for easy reference. Therefore, much of the present law is based
on the old law but with some amendments to it by subsequent legislation. It was said that
because of this the Sale of Goods Act 1979 does not fully cover the area of consumer
contracts and consumer protections. This, being a twentieth phenomenon is not dealt with
by the common law which is the basis of the Act.80 Consumer protections are therefore
covered by other legislation.
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Section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides for the implied terms about
title; namely, that the seller has the right to sell the goods, that they are free from any
encumbrances and the buyer will enjoy a quiet possession of them. The first is a condition
and the second two are warranties. This section is based on the 1973 Act. Subsection 3
provides for the circumstances where the seller may effectively avoid liability by, expressly
or impliedly, indicating his intention to transfer limited title; for example, where an
auctioneer or the sheriff sold an article, this subsection is applicable.81
Section 13 of the 1979 Act is a reproduction of the 1893 Act with the extended
application of sale by description to specific goods in accordance to the 1973 Act.
Section 14 contained major changes from the old Act and these changes are made by the
1973 Act, which are incorporated into the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Subsection 1 lays
down the common law rule of caveat emptor, i.e., there is no implied conditions of
quality or fitness for any particular purpose. The exceptions are found in subsections 2
(merchantable quality) and 3 (fitness for particular purpose). Subsection 2 states that
"where the seller sells in the course of business, there is an implied condition that the
goods supplied under the contract are of merchantable quality, except where the defects
are specifically drawn to the buyer's attention or if the buyer examines the goods, as
regards defects which that examination ought to reveal." Subsection 6 gives the meaning
ofwhat is "merchantable quality". Goods are merchantable if they are fit for the purpose/s
81
Benjamin"s Sale of Goods, ed. By A G.Guest, 3rd ed., p. 168.
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for which goods of that kind are commonly bought as it is reasonable to expect having
regard to their description, price and all other relevant circumstances. Fitness "as it is
reasonable to expect" means that the goods are not expected to be perfectly fit for use
having regard to the factors mentioned therein. This had lowered the standard of fitness
and this can be seen from the following cases.
In Cehave v. Bremer (1976)82 there was a sale of citrus pulp pellets, some of
which were damaged due to over-heating. The buyer rejected the goods. The court held
that even though the goods were far from perfect, they were nevertheless merchantable
because they were as fit for the required purpose as it was reasonable to expect. The facts
of the case showed that the goods were actually used for that purpose. Although some
were damaged, that would not go to the extent ofgiving the buyer the right to reject. The
proper remedy was an allowance against the price.
The decision in the above case was echoed in the Scottish case of Millars of
Falkirk ltd. v. Turpie (1976)8, whereby a new car with some defects was held to be
merchantable because the court considered these relevant factors, i.e, the defect was minor
and could be readily and easily cured at a small cost, the seller was willing and anxious to
cure the defect, the risk of danger was slight, and many new cars have some defects and
the defect in this particular car was not exceptional.
82
[1976] QB 44.
83 1976 SLT 66.
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Subsection 3 was formerly subsection 1 of the 1893 Act. This subsection also
requires the seller to be in the course of business, so, a private sale is excluded from this
implied condition. The buyer must, expressly or by implication, makes it known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are bought. This signifies reliance on the
seller's skill and judgment. The seller is not liable if there is no reliance or if it is not
reasonable to rely on his skill and judgment. This is a radical change from the former
subsection 1. Previously, if the buyer requires for a particular purpose, he had to make it
known to the seller that particular purpose in order to show reliance. Now, there can
either be an express or implied notification of use to the seller, and reliance will be
presumed. The duty is on the seller to disprove reliance or that it is not reasonable to rely
on his skill and judgment.
There have been many changes made in respect of the 1979 Sale of Goods Act,
but nevertheless there are still many more loop holes in it. Despite being a code, it is not
all embracing. Its greatest drawback is its limitation in application to only contracts of
sale of goods. Contracts for supply of goods and services are excluded from this Act.
Because of this particular weakness, in 1982 the Supply of Goods and Services Act was
passed. But the 1982 Act applied only to England and Wales, and not to Scotland. This
Act is based on the recommendations of the Law Commissions on the Implied Terms in
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Contracts for the Supply of Goods 1979.84 Their starting point for inquiry was that the
obligations of a supplier in relation to the goods supplied should be the same whatever the
kind of contract employed.85 Suppliers of word and materials should be under the same
obligations as sellers of goods.
(d) SUPPLY OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACT 1982
The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 was passed to extend the application of the
implied terms similar to those under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 to contracts analogous to
sale. These are the "contracts for the transfer of goods" whereby one person transfers or
agrees to transfer to another the property in goods (section 1 (1)). Excluded in this
definition are contract of sale, hire-purchase (regulated by 1973 Act), transfer of goods in
exchange for trading stamps, transfer by deed and transfer to operate by way ofmortgage,
pledge, charge or other security (section 1 (2)). What is included are barter, hire, and
contracts for work and materials. Prior to the 1982 Act, if the contract was a sale of
goods, the implied terms under the Sale of Goods Act were applicable. But if the contract
was for services, the supplier's duties were only to take due care. But if goods were
supplied incidental to such contract, the supplier's duties were strict in regards the
goods.86 After the passing of the Act, similar terms as those implied under the sales
contract by the Sale of Goods Act were implied into the contract for work and materials
84 Law Commissions Report: Implied Terms in Contract for the Supply of Goods, No. 95, 1979.
85 Id. p. 11.
86
Atiyah, op. cit., 22-23.
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(sections 3 - 5). The Act further requires the work performed under the contract to be
carried out with reasonable skill and care (section 13).
When the Law Commissions made their report, it was confined to England and
Wales only, because, according to them, the development of the law relating to contracts
for the supply of goods other than sale and hire-purchase has been different in England
from Scotland.87 So, when the Act was passed, it applied only to England and Wales.
Because of this, it was recommended in 1987 by the Law Commissions that the statutory
implied terms should be extended to Scotland.88 The recommendation was put before the
Parliament in the form of the Consumer Guarantees Bill 1990 but fell through lack of
Parliamentary time. The Act of 1982 was however, finally extended to Scotland by virtue
of the recent enactment of the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994.
(e) SALE AND SUPPLY OF GOODS ACT 1994
The first thing to note about this Act is that it makes applicable an amended version of the
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 to Scotland. By virtue of Schedule 1 of the Act,
Part 1A, "Supply ofGoods as respects Scotland", is inserted into the 1982 Act. There are
now new sections ranging from sections 11A to 11L. The Act was passed to give effect to
the Law Commissions' report made in 1987. This report examined the statutory implied
terms in contracts for the sale of goods, remedies for breach of those terms and the loss of
87 Law Commissions' Report No. 95, p. 5.
88 Law Commissions' Report: Sale and Supply of Goods, No. 160, 1987.
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the right to reject non-conforming goods. The implied term of merchantable quality was
greatly criticised on these grounds: -
(1) The word "merchantable quality" is out-dated and is inappropriate in the context of
consumer transactions because it is more suitable to natural products like grain,
wool or flour.
(2) The word concentrates on the fitness of the goods ignoring the other aspects of
quality like appearance, finish, freedom from minor defects.
(3) The Law Commissions questioned whether durability and safety could be
considered in quality.89
The Law Commissions recommended that "merchantable quality" should be re¬
defined. The new definition should consist of two elements: a basic principle formulate in
language sufficiently general to apply to all kinds of goods and all kinds of transaction; and
a list of aspects of quality, any ofwhich could be important in a particular case. The basic
principle should be that the quality of goods sold or supplied under the contract should be
such as would be acceptable to a reasonable person bearing in mind the description of the
goods, their price (if relevant), and all the other circumstances. The list of the aspects of
quality should include:
89 Id. p. 8-11.
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(1) the fitness of the goods for all their common purposes
(2) their appearance and finish
(3) their freedom from minor defects
(4) their safety
(5) their durability.90
The above recommendation was accepted into the 1994 Act, it provides that:-
(1) In section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (implied terms about quality or fitness)
for subsection (2) there is substituted -
"(2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of business, there is an implied term
that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality.
(2A) For the purposes of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the
standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any
description of the goods, price (if relevant) and all other relevant circumstances.
(2B) For the purposes of this Act, the quality of goods includes their state and
condition and the following (among others) are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality
ofgoods -
fitness for all the purposes which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied,




(c) freedom from minor defects,
(d) safety, and
(e) durability.
(2C) The term implied by subsection (2) above does not extend to any matter
making the quality of goods unsatisfactory -
(a) which is specifically drawn to the buyer's attention before the contract is made,
where the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made, which that examination
ought to reveal, or in the case of a contract for sale by sample, which would have been
apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample."
From the above provisions it can be seen that some aspects of the old law are
retained, for example, there is still the requirement that the seller must sell in the course of
business, and that the term would not be implied in relation to defects brought to the
buyer's attention or where he examines the goods. However, the Act, implies that goods
supplied under the contract must be of a satisfactory quality (the Law Commissions used
the word "acceptable"). The goods are of satisfactory quality if a reasonable person
would regard them so, taking into consideration the description, price and the relevant
circumstances. This change has been in line with the trend of the courts to decide cases in
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favour of consumers.91 This Act has been long overdue and its enactment is very much
welcomed.
91
Rogers v. Parish Motors [1987] QB 933; Bernstein v. Pamsons Motors [1987] 2 All ER 220;Shine v.





In every sale transaction the duty of the seller is to deliver the contract goods. There are
basically two ways of ascertaining the subject-matter of a sale. The first is by reference to
the goods by their position in time and space; for example, "this pen in my hand" or "the
car in the garage". The subject-matter in these examples is ascertained by being identified
physically and, therefore, the goods are specific. Secondly, the subject-matter of the
contract can be ascertained by reference to its description, for example, "a black leather
bag". In defining the goods they may be described as possessing certain characteristics or
features. Goods which are usually sold in this manner are goods which are not
ascertained, or future goods. A sale in pursuance of the process of description is called a
sale by description. Under section 13(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, it provides that
"where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied
condition that the goods correspond with the description". By this section when goods
are sold by description, the seller's duty to deliver goods in conformity with the description
is an implied term. If he delivers something which is of a different kind than the one
described, he is in breach.
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In this chapter, 1 will discuss the background to sale by description, its meaning,
scope and its relationship with merchantable quality. Prior to 1973, merchantable quality
was only implied in sale by description, and because of this, the concept of "sale by
description" was extended to include sale of specific goods (for purpose of quality). This
wide interpretation of the term gave rise to many issues. Finally in 1973, sale by
description was confirmed in the form found in subsection 3 of the Sale of Goods Act
1979. 1 will then discuss the elements of section 13; (1) what are descriptive words
(identity or attributes), (2) they must be a term of the contract, (3) reliance on the
description. In part three I will look at a similar provision in the Uniform Commercial
Code of the United States ofAmerica.
(I) BACKGROUND OF SALE BY DESCRIPTION
(a) SECTION 13 OF THE 1893 ACT
When the draftsman first drafted section 13, he meant to distinguish between a sale of
specific goods and a sale by description.1 In case of the former, the rule was caveat
emptor, which was against the buyer because there was no implied term.2 But in the latter,
the rule was more favourable to the buyer because, not only that the law implied a term of
correspondence with the description, but also a term of merchantable quality.3 In its
1
Benjamin's Sale of Goods, ed. A.G. Guest, 3rd. ed. 1987, p. 436; Goode, Commercial Law, p. 235.
2 Barr v. Gibson (1838) 3 M&W, 390; Chandler v, Hopkins (1838) 4 M & W, 399.
3 Gardiner v. Gray (1815) 4 Camp. 144; Nichol v. Godts (1854) 10 Exch. 191.
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original form found in section 13 of the 1893 Act, sale by description was a sale where the
buyer had not seen the goods or had not the opportunity of inspecting the same, either
because they were unascertained or because they were not in existence. In such a sale the
court would hold that goods delivered must answer their description. Also the court
would imply the term of merchantable quality. Thus, the seller's duty was not only to
deliver goods which are genuine according to the name, kind and description specified in
the contract, but also that they must be merchantable, i.e., of a quality to pass in the
market under that description. To be merchantable, the goods must be reasonably fit for
the ordinary uses to which the goods are put.4
The court implied conformity with description in sale of unascertained goods because
the buyer did not see the goods but bought them relying on their description. Therefore,
to protect him, the court implied conformity with description. It followed from this that,
when the buyer could not inspect the goods, he could not judge their fitness, therefore it
was thought that it would be reasonable to imply that the goods must be fit for their usual
purpose/s. This was the reason why he law implied these two terms in sale of
unascertained goods.
Since merchantable quality was only implied in sale by description, and sale by
description only applied to unascertained or future goods, a buyer who bought specific
goods but found them unfit had no recourse. It was felt necessary to extend the concept
4
Prosser, "The ImpliedWarranty ofMerchantable Wuality", Canadian Bar Review, 1943, p. 446, at p.
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of sale by description. In mid-nineteenth century and early twentieth century, courts began
to flex sale by description to sale of specific goods. In the case of Shepherd v. Pybus
(1842)5, warranty of quality was implied in a sale of an admittedly specific barge which the
buyer had inspected and in which the property had passed to him. The warranty was
implied by law not because the buyer had the opportunity to inspect but because he had
not been able to exercise his own judgement.
In Varley v. Whipp (1900)6 it was held that sale by description must apply to cases
where the buyer had not seen the goods but is relying on the description alone. In this
case the parties met at Huddersfield where the seller sold a reaping machine, located at
Upton, which he described as "a second-hand self-binder reaping machine new the
previous year and very little used." The buyer did not see the machine and when it was
delivered, the buyer discovered that it was neither new nor little used. He then returned it
to the seller who later brought an action to recover the price. He argued that this was a
sale of specific goods which were identified and agreed upon at the time of the sale.
Property had passed to the buyer and he had lost his right to reject the goods. The seller's
contention was rejected by the court and Channel J. stated that:-
"The term "sale by description" must apply to all cases where the
purchaser has not seen the goods but is relying on the description
5 3 M & G 868.
6
[1900] 1 QB 513.
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alone. It applies in a case like the present, where the buyer has never
seen the article sold but has bought by description."7
The concept of sale by description as laid down by the above case is to cover all sales of
specific goods where the buyer had not seen the goods either before or at the time of
contracting, but was relying on description alone. This concept was later extended to
cover situations where the buyer is contracting in the presence of the goods but had no
opportunity to inspect them. The consequence of such an extension was to cause all retail
sales to become sales by description. Holmes L.J. in the case of Wallis v. Russell (1902)8
expressed his doubt as to the extension of the concept of sale by description because that
would mean "no sale otherwise than sale by description would be possible". The courts
were too eager to say that a particular sale is a sale by description; and as a result
problems were created.
One of the problems is to maintain the common law dichotomy between condition and
warranty in respect of all contractual descriptive statements. The descriptive statement
must be a part or a term of the contract as opposed to a mere representation. Once it is
accepted as a term, the next relevant question to be asked is, is it within the "description"
as in section 13? Description under section 13 only refers to a descriptive statement which
7 Id. p. 516.
8
[1902] 2 IR 585, at p. 631.
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goes to identify the goods and as such is a condition. Any other statement which does not
identify the goods may be regarded only as a warranty.9
In T.J. Harrison v. Knowles & Forsier (1918)10 the defendants wanted to sell ships.
They delivered to the plaintiffs certain particulars which stated, inter alia, that the ships
were of dead-weight capacity of460 tons each. There was a provision that the defendants
were not to be "accountable for errors in description". The plaintiffs relied on these
particulars about the ships and bought them, only later to discover that their dead-weight
capacity was merely 360 tons each. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover damages
for:-
(i) breach of condition and/or
(ii) breach ofwarranty.
The court held that the misstatement of the dead-weight capacity amounted to a
breach of warranty and not a breach of a condition because the goods were specific
existing chattels. Since it was a warranty, the provision for exemption would be operative
to protect the defendants from liability and as such the plaintiffs' action for warranty failed.
Bailache J. in his judgement said:-
"If the subject-matter of the contract is a specific existing chattel, a
representation as to some quality attached to it or possessed by it is




only a warranty unless the absence of that quality or the possession of
it in a less degree makes the thing essentially different from that
described in the contract. Applying this principle here, and making, I
hope, full allowance for the importance of the statement about the
dead-weight and the serious discrepancy between the statement and the
true fact, it seems to me that the difference is essentially one of degree
and not of kind, and that the statement as to dead-weight capacity was
a warranty and not a condition."
The judge relied on the case ofBarr v. Gibson (1838)11 and he distinguished the case
of Varley v. Whipp (1900).12 The same approach as in the case of T.J. Harrison was used
by Salmond J. in the New Zealand case of Taylor v. Combined_Buyers Ltd (1924).13 The
plaintiff bought from the defendant a "new Calthorpe car" which he found not to be so
after using it for over three months. His action against the defendant was for rescission or
damages for:-
(i) fraudulent misrepresentation and/or
(ii) breach of implied condition ofmerchantable quality and fitness for purpose.
11 3 M & W 390, 7 L.J. Ex. 124.
12
[1900] 1 QB 513.
1311924] Gaz. L.R. 60.
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One of the issues before the court was whether this was a sale by descripton, for the
purpose of establishing merchantability. Salmond J. held that:-
" the sale of a specific article is a sale by description .... in so far,
but so far only, as the article is expressly sold as being of a certain kind,
class or species; but .... statements made as to the quality or other
unessential attributes of the article sold are not parts of the description,
but are merely representations and inoperative unless fraudulent or
unless on the true construction of the contract, in accordance with the
express terms of any necessary implication there from, these statements
amount to an express warranty or condition."
Thus, summarily, the descriptive statement in a sale of a specific goods must be
incorporated into the contract and it must refer to the identity of the goods. Then only
will the statement be considered as a "description" within section 13. If the statement
refers to anything less than the identity of the goods it will only be a warranty as opposed
to a condition.14 In sale of unascertained goods the descriptive statement would naturally
refer to the identity of the goods because it is used to define and identify them for
purposes of the contract.
14 This problem will be dealt with again in part (b).
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In Scotland, when dealing with the problems of sale by description, the first thing to
decide is whether the statement communicated to the buyer during the pre-contractual
negotiation amount to a term of the contract or a representation or a mere puffery or trade
gimmick. If it is a term or a representation, then it has a legal effect, unless if it is just a
puff or gimmick. If the statement is a term, breach of that term means breach of contract.
But if the statement is a representation, if it is not true, then it renders the contract void or
voidable. Intention of the parties is the means of proving the status of a statement.
Usually this will be decided based on certain factors, i.e.:-
(1) Whether the statement is made with or without obligation or warranty.
(2) what was the content of the statement; was it in reference to something
collateral or something as to the state of the subject of the contract?
(3) The stage of the contract at which the statement is made.
(4) Whether the oral statement is reduced into writing.
(5) Whether one party had expert or professional knowledge of the subject-
matter of the contract.15
After it has been decided that it is a term, the next thing to consider is, whether it is a
material term so as to justify rescission or a non-material term which only gives rise to a
claim of damages. For this purpose reference is made to the intention of the parties, based
on a few guidelines. These are: the commercial importance of the term to the party
15 Walker, The Law of Contracts and Related Obligations in Scotland, 2nd. Ed., 1985. p. 339.
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prejudiced by the breach; whether it goes to the root of the contract and affect the
fundamentals of the contract; and whether the defect which has emerged has allowed
substantial performance of the contract or has in fact prevented it.16
Another problem which resulted in the extension of the concept of description is that
quality and fitness would seem to be redundant. Since almost all sales are sales by
description, it would be better to rely on section 13, where the only requirement is to
show that the sale is by description. And the court in such case would make liability strict.
The strict attitude of the court can be seen in the cases ofAreas Ltd v. E.A. Ronaasett &
Son (1933)17 and Re Moore & Co. Ltd and Landauer & Co. Ltd (1921).18 In the
former case, the buyer agreed to buy a quantity of staves which they required, as the
sellers knew, for making cement barrels. With respect to the length, breadth and thickness
the agreement contained stipulations which allowed some variation in the length and
breadth of the staves, but none in thickness which was specified to be half an inch. When
the staves were delivered, only five percent conformed with the description but the rest
were nearly all less than 9/16 of an inch. It was found as of fact that the goods were
"commercially within and merchantable under the contract specification, and also they
were reasonably fit for the purpose for which they were required". However, despite




[1921] 2 KB 519.
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these findings the court held that the buyers were entitled to reject the staves as they did
not conform to description.
In the case ofRe Moore the mode of packing was treated as part of the description by
which the goods had been sold. The buyers in this case had agreed to buy 3000 tins of
Australian canned fruits to be packed in cases of 30 tins each. When they were delivered,
it was discovered that some of the boxes contained only 24 tins although the total amount
delivered was correct. The court held the buyer was entitled to reject. There was nothing
to suggest that the merchantability or fitness of the goods were affected; nevertheless,
there was a breach of section 13. Another point to note is that it is difficult to reconcile
how a failure to perform an express term, pertaining to the packing, could be a breach of
an implied term of description.
Section 13 imposes a strict liability upon the seller. In Shepherd v. Kain (1821)19 a
specific ship was sold as copper-fastened when in fact it was only partially so. There was
a provision that "the vessel, with her stores, as she now lies, to be taken with all faults,
without allowance for any defects whatsoever". The court held that although it was part
of the contract that the ship should be taken "with all faults", they should be construed to
mean all faults consistent with the advertisement.
19 5 B Aid. 240.
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The courts became too liberal in their interpretation of sale by description. The implied
term was initially created for the purpose of providing some form of protection to a buyer
who had not seen the goods. But this protection has been misused and taken advantage
of, for example, where the buyer may seek to reject the goods tendered by alleging non¬
conformity with description, when in reality the true reason is a decline in the market or
that it is no longer beneficial for the buyer to continue with the contract.20 But despite
these problems, the court never ceased to extend the Varley v. Whipp doctrine. Lord
Wrignt in Grant v. Australian KnittingMillLtd. [1936]21 stated that
"...it may also be pointed out that there is a sale by description even
though the buyer is buying something displayed before him on the
counter; a thing is sold by description though it is specific, so long as it
is sold not merely as a thing corresponding to a description, example
woolen undergarments, a hot water bottle, a second-hand reaping
machine, to select a few illustrations."
In Beale v. Taylor (1967)22 the seller advertised his car for sale as a "Herald,
convertible, white, 1961". The buyer answered the advertisement, and examined the car
and saw a "1200" disc at the rear of the car and bought it. The car turned out to be made
J" Arcos Ltd. v. E.A. Ronaasen & Son [1933] AC 470; Re Moore & Co. Ltd and andauer & Co. Ltd.
[1921] 2KB 519.
21
[1936] AC 85, at p. 100.
22
[1967] 1 WLR 1193.
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of two parts; the rear halfwas of a 1961 model and the front part was of an earlier model.
The Court of Appeal held that the words "1961 Herald" were part of the contractual
description. The combined effect of the advertisement and the disc was that the seller was
offering to sell a 1961 Herald and the buyer was relying on that description to make his
judgment about the car.
Lord Wilberforce in Reardon Smith Lines v. Hansen Tangen (1976)2" criticised this
liberal attitude of the courts. This case involved ship builders who contracted to build a
vessel to a certain specification at Yard No. 354 at Osaka. But because of its size it had to
be built at Oshima at Yard No. 004. By the time the vessel was ready for delivery in 1974,
the market had collapsed due to oil crisis. The charterers sought to escape from their
obligation by rejecting the vessel on the ground, by analogy, with the contract for sale of
goods, that the vessel tendered did not correspond with the description in that it was
Oshima 004 and not Osaka 354. Their Lordships agreed that the authority as to
"description" is sale of goods cases was not to be extended or applied to contracts of the
present nature. However, Lord Wilberforce did discuss the issue of description. He drew
a distinction between the use of the words "identity" and "identification". Words read in
the first sense would mean that each element in them has to be given contractual force
because their purpose is to state (identify) an essential part of the description of the goods.




(identification) of the goods so that he can find them.24 He dismissed the decisions in
earlier cases as being excessively technical.
There is a legal maxim which says de minimis non curat lex which means the law
does not concern itself with trifles. Sale by description is made subject to this rule to
disallow repudiation on grounds of slight disconformity, as in the case of Re Moore. But
since description is an express term, breach of it, no matter how trifle, entitles the buyer to
some kind of damages. So, sale by description is actually a double-edged sword which
cuts on both sides. If the buyer could not succeed under section 13, because the
description is not of identity but quality, he can claim for breach of the express term.
Whatever remedy that he will be awarded will depend on the consequences of the breach.
As mentioned earlier, in a sale by description merchantable quality was implied. So,
what is the relationship between description (section 13) and quality (section 14(2))?
Section 13 covered a different scope from that of section 14(2). Section 13 applied to
cases where goods do not correspond to their description while section 14(2) was limited
to cases where goods tendered do correspond with their description but are damaged to
some extent or defective in quality. In the Scottish case ofM'Callum v. Mason (1956)25
the buyer, a nursery man, bought from the seller, a manufacturer, a quantity of a
proprietary fertiliser to which a percentage of magnesium sulphate was to be added. This
24 Id. p. 999.
25 1956 SC 50.
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mixture was recommended to him by the seller for application to his tomato crop as a
remedy for soil deficiency. When the mixture was applied to the tomato plants, they died.
The mixture was again applied to the next year's crop, which also died. When analysed,
the mixture was found to contain sodium chlorate, which was poisonous to plants. The
buyer brought action for breach of section 14(1) and (2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893,
alleging that the seller had failed to supply goods which were ofmerchantable quality. It
was held that the buyer did not get what he had ordered. Section 14(2) was irrelevant
since the implied condition that goods must be of merchantable quality did not apply to
goods which were of a different description from those purchased. Lord Justice Clerk
(Thomson) made a distinction between the two section and said:-
"The scope of this subsection (section 14(2)) is, however, limited to the
case where the goods tendered are damaged to some extent or are
defective in quality but not so much that they can no longer be said to
correspond with the description. The buyer gets goods of the sort
described in the contract but they are for some reason or another, sub¬
standard. In section 13 the goods are not what was ordered; in section
14(2) the buyer gets the kind of goods he ordered but they are
defective. It seems to me therefore that, where, as here, the buyer says
that having ordered fertiliser he got weed-killer, he is far from section
14(2). Section 14(2) operates where what he got is still capable of
being described as fertiliser but on account of some defects it is not of
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such quality as a reasonable buyer would regard as satisfying the
contract, assuming him to be aware of the true facts."26
(b) SECTION 13 OF THE 1979 ACT
From the evolution of the cases during the early twentieth century, sale by description did
not only include sale of unascertained goods, but also sale of goods which were specific
but were bought by description. One issue arises here, i.e., if description goes to identity,
identifying the subject-matter of the contract, what would description mean in sale of
specific goods (which are already agreed upon at the time of the contract)? It must be
recognised that the identification function of "description" is not the same with specific
goods as in unascertained goods. In sale of unascertained goods the description serves to
identify the subject-matter of the contract, so that when the goods are delivered they
answer to the contract description. In sale of specific goods description does not function
to identify, but to delineate the fundamental obligation of the seller, i.e., to define the
essence of what he is undertaking to deliver.27 What it means is that description defines
the essential characteristics which the subject-matter must possess if the seller is to fulfill
his fundamental obligation.
26 Id. p. 56.
2 Goode. op. cit., p. 250.
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The broad interpretation of sale by description was confirmed by the Supply of Goods
(Implied Terms) Act 1973. Section 13 was amended by this Act, which added a new
subsection (3) providing:-
"A sale of goods is not prevented from being a sale by description by
reason only that, the goods being exposed for sale or hire, are selected
by the buyer."
By this provision it is made clear that sale of specific goods can be regarded as sale by
description, even though the buyer has the opportunity of inspecting and examining it.
This subsection has been a far cry from the law as stated in early cases. In Joseph Trovers
& Son s Ltd, v. Longel Ltd (1947)28 Sellers J. accepted the following passage from
Benjamin's Sale ofPersonal Property29-
"Sale by description may be divided into sales (1) of unascertained
or future goods, as being of a certain kind or class, or to which
otherwise a "description" in the contract is applied; (2) of specific
goods, bought by the buyer in reliance, at least in part, upon the
description given, or to be tacitly inferred from the circumstances, and
which identifies the goods."30
28
(1947) 64 TLR 150.
29 7th ed., p. 641.
30
Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 451.
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This Act also amended section 14(2), whereby the words "sale by description" were
deleted. Now merchantable quality is implied in all sales where the seller deals in the
course of business. In the Scottish case of Border Harvesters Ltd. v. Edwards
Engineering (Perth) Ltd (1985)31 there was a written contract for sale of a machine for
drying grain known as Kamas Flakt Continuous Flow Tower Dryer. In the contract there
was an express term that the machine was of a certain basic capacity for drying grain.
There were other terms in the contract which basically limited or excluded the seller's
liability in respect of the goods sold. The buyer built his case on section 17 and section 20
of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 197732 with regard to the contractual terms. In
considering section 20, two points arose:-
(1) Whether the sale was by description within the meaning of section 13 of the Sale
ofGoods Act 1979;
(2) Whether it was a contract to which section 14 applied.
31 1985 SLT 128.
32 Unfair contract Terms Act 1977:
Section 17:- "Any term of a contract which a consumer contract or a standard form contract shall have no
effect for the purpose of enabling a party to a contract - (a) who is in breach of a contractual obligation, to
exclude or restrict any liability of his to the consumer or customer in respect of the breach ... if it was not
fair and reasonable to incorporate the term in the contract..
Section 20(2):- "Any term of a contract which purports to exclude or restrict liability for breach of the
obligations arising from - (a) section 13, 14 or 15 of the said Act of 1979 (seller's implied undertakings as
to conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to their quality or fitness for a particular purpose)
... shall ... (ii) have no effect if it was not fair and reasonable to incorporate the term in the contract."
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As to the first point, the buyers argued that the equipment was described as having a
certain peformance capacity and was therefore a sale by description within the meaning of
section 13. His Lordship disagreed and held that "what was contracted for in this case
was described as a Kamas Dryer, and what was supplied was a Kamas Dryer. What the
dryer was capable of doing was in my judgment not part of the description of the goods
supplied."33 He quoted Lord Dunedin's judgment in Manchester Liners Ltd. v. Rea Ltd
(1922)34 who made a distinction between description ofgoods and their quality. He said:-
"The tender of anything that does not tally with the specified
description is not compliance with the contract. But when the article
tendered does comply with this specific description, and the objection
on the buyer's part is an objection to quality alone, then I think section
14(2) settles the standard, and the only standard by which the matter is
to be judged."
Thus, statement about capacity is not description under section 13 but goes to the
quality of the goods and is dealt with under section 14(2).
33 1985 SLT 128, at p. 131.
34
[1922] 2 AC 74.
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(II) ELEMENTS OF SECTION 13 SALE OF GOODS ACT 1979
Before section 13(1) can be successfully invoked, the buyer has got to establish all the
elements of the section, and they are:-
(a) The words are descriptive of identity rather than attributes;
(b) They are terms of the contract; and
(c) Sale was made because of reliance on the description.
(a) WHAT AMOUNTS TO DESCRIPTION
To describe is to set forth in words or to recite the characteristic of something.35
Reference to identity and characteristics of goods is a description of them. Description is
necessary to define contract goods which are not present or not in existence, so that one
may know what the seller is to deliver and what the buyer is to receive. '6 Goods which
are not present or unascertained can be defined in various ways/7
(1) By enumeration of qualities and reference to quantity. Example, 27 1/2 quarters of
seeds described as common English sainfoin.38
(2) By reference to the position of the goods in time and space. Example, goods
"afloat per SS Morton Bay due London approximately June 8th."39
35 Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 7th. Ed.. 1984.
36
"Identity" is also important in the definition of specific goods. Section 61 defines specific goods as
goods which are identified and agree upon at the time of the contract of sale."
37
Montrose, op. cit. p. 763.
38 Wallis Son&Wells v. Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394.
39 MacPherson Train & Co. v. Howard Ross & Co. [1955] 1 WLR 640.
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(3) By combined reference of spatio-temporal factors with quality. Example, "the
black horse in the last stall in my stable."40
(4) By combined reference of spatio-temporal factors with quantity. Example, 100
quarters ofwheat ex SS Mary.
These modes of definition are the result of description. By describing the quality,
quantity and their whereabouts, the goods can be sufficiently defined and identified as the
contract goods. What matters in the description is the substantial ingredient of the identity
of the thing as to its kind, class or genus as contrasted with its attributes.
(i) Identity and Attributes
From the foregoing it can be seen that descriptive words are employed to define and
identify the subject-matter of the contract and they are relied upon by the buyer for that
purpose, especially when the goods are not yet in existence or present. The difficulty,
however, remains as to how to determine what are the parts of the descriptive words
which are so crucial to the identity of the subject-matter that their absence would make
what was tendered essentially different from what was bargained for. According to Scott
L.J. "as a matter of law every item in a description which constitutes a substantial
ingredient in the "identity" of the thing sold is a condition."41 The most important element
in the description is the substantial ingredient in the identity of the goods and not mere
40
Example given by Channel J. in Varley v. Whipp.
41 Couchman v, Hill [1947] KB 554, at p. 559.
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attributes of them. What then is the difference between identity and attribute and, if there
is a difference, what is the test to distinguish between them? The Oxford English
Dictionary states that identity means the condition of being specified, and attribute means
quality ascribed to a person or thing.42 The descriptive statement made about goods will
only form part of the description if it has been used to identify the goods. This test was
laid down by the cases in the 1950s and 1960s in line with the development of the theory
of fundamental breach. The theory of fundamental breach provides that a party could not
deny liability by relying on an exemption clause if he was guilty of a fundamental breach of
contract. However, it should be noted that this theory is short-lived, is discredited in
England and never existed in Scotland. Under this principle, a seller is in fundamental
breach of his contract if he delivered goods "different in kind" from those contracted for.4"'
This test was reaffirmed in the case ofAshington Piggeries Ltd. v. Christopher Hill Ltd.
(1972)44
In the Ashington Piggeries Case, there were two contracts. The first was between the
plaintiffs and the defendants whereby the plaintiffs agreed to supply the defendants, mink-
breeders, with feeding stuff compounded in accordance with a formula which had been
drawn up by the defendants in consultation with the plaintiffs. The formula included a
42 Oxford dictionary of Current English. 7th. Ed. 1984.
43 Brian Coote, "Correspondence with Description in the Law of Sale of Goods", Australian Law




proportion of "herring meal" and this expression was the only relevant description. The
second contract was between a third party (a Norwegian Company) and the plaintiffs,
whereby the third party was to supply Norwegian herring meal to the plaintiffs. This
contract was more detailed and had an exemption clause. When the herring meal was
mixed into the compound it proved fatal to the mink. The reason was that sodium nitrate,
a preservative present in some of the herring meal set-off a reaction which produced
DMNA, which was highly toxic to mink.
On the issue ofwhether there was a breach of section 13, the majority of the House of
Lords held that the meal was still herring meal. Lord Hodson and Lord Guest held that
nothing external which was poisonous had been added to the herring meal. It was still
herring meal despite being contaminated.45 Lord Diplock held that the test is "whether the
buyer could fairly and reasonably refuse to accept the physical goods profered to him on
the ground that their failure to correspond with that part of what was said about them in
the contract makes them goods of a different kind from those he had agreed to buy. The
key to section 13 is identification."46 And accordingly he held that the reaction of the
preservative with the herring meal affected the quality but not the identity of the goods.
Lord Wilberforce suggested a broader, more common sense, test of description, i.e. a test
of a mercantile character.47 He said that buyers and sellers and arbitrators in the market,
45 Id. p. 467-472.
46 Id. p. 504.
47 Id. p. 489.
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asked what this was, could only have said that the relevant ingredient was herring meal
and, therefore, that there was no failure to correspond with description.48 Viscount
Dilhorne was the only one of their Lordships who held that there was a breach of section
13. He said that although in many cases it was difficult to draw a line between a difference
in quality and a difference in kind, here, where the distinction was between poisonous and
non-poisonous herring meal, there was not merely a difference in quality but in kind.49
The majority of their Lordships distinguished the case ofPinnock Brothers v. Lewis &
Peat Ltd. (1923)50 This case concerned the sale of East African copra cake. The goods
were found to contain castor oil which caused them to be poisonous to cattle. It was held
that the goods did not correspond to their description, i.e. as copra cake. In the Pinnock
Brothers Case, something external was added to the copra cake so as to make it of a
different kind. In the instant case, DMNA was not something added to the herring meal.
It was contaminated but no poison was added to it to make the description "herring meal"
erroneous.51 It was still "herring meal" though gone bad.
As regards the second contract of sale between the respondents and the third party, this
was in writing and there was a clause headed "Quantity and Description". The herring
48 Ibid.
49 id. p. 484-485.
50
[1923] 1 KB 690.
51 Lord Hodson, id. p. 467.
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meal spoken ofwas of "Norwegian Herring Meal fair and average quality of the season";
this was followed by the ingredients which the meal was supposed to contain. Their
Lordships held that the contractual description did not extend beyond the phrase
"Norwegian Herring Meal". Neither the ingredients nor the "fair average" clause were
part of the description. Description under section 13 refers to identification, therefore,
only to so much of the contractual description as is required to identify the goods.52
According to Coote, identification is a process of describing goods which are already in
existence and it is a concrete process, for example, "this book in my hand". The goods are
being ascertained by being identified. On the other hand, if the goods are not in existence,
they have to be defined by setting out the characteristics they will possess. And in this
case it was not necessary for their Lordships to have recourse to identification or
difference in kind. Since the goods were future goods, it was more appropriate to apply
description in its full force; i.e., that every definition is a part of the description which has
to be complied with. There was no need to refer to the abstract notion of identity and
attributes.53
Since Ashington Piggeries, it has been the law that, if the goods tendered are different
in kind rather than quality, then they fail to answer or conform with their description. And
the test whether it is of a difference in kind is a common sense test of a mercantile
character. "The question whether that is what the buyer bargained for has to be answered
52
Patient, "Ruminating on Mink Food". Modern Law Review, 1971, p. 557.
53 Coote. op. cit., p. 18.
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according to such tests as men in the market would apply, leaving more delicate questions
of condition, or quality, to be determined under other clauses of the contract or sections of
the Act."54
In Gill & Duffus v. Berger & Co. Inc. (1984)55 the sellers sold to the buyers 500
tonnes of Argentine Bolita beans, 1974 crop. It was provided for in the contract that the
quality was to be "as per sample submitted to the buyers". There was also a term in the
contract that a certificate must be issued by the General Superintendent Co. Ltd. to certify
that quality at final port of discharge was equal to one of the sealed samples. On arrival of
the goods at the port, a certificate was duly issued. When the beans were delivered, they
were found to contain 1.8 per cent of coloured beans and Bolita beans are white. The
buyers sought to reject the goods, it was held by the Court of Appeal that the beans did
answer their contractual description and the mere presence of coloured beans did not
make them of different in kind. Had the beans been substantially mixed with coloured
ones, the General Superintendent Co. Ltd. would not have issued the certificate.
In the light of the Ashington Piggeries Case, it is clearly established that description
refers to the identity of the goods rather than their quality. A question now arises: does
this mean that quality is eliminated from the sale of future goods? This is not so because
description of quality may not be deprived of all effects. It can be made and agreed upon
54




as an express promise as to description, or it can be an express or implied undertaking as
to quality. Quality and description overlap significantly so much that breach by the seller
will normally involve section 13 as well as section 14. Sometimes a description may carry
an implication of quality. In a New Zealand case, Cotter v. Luckie (1918)56 the buyer
bought a bull described as a "pure bred polled Angus bull" from the seller. The seller was
informed of the purpose for which the bull was required, namely for breeding purposes.
The bull turned out to be physically abnormal and thus was prevented from breeding. The
court held that the descriptive words were "meaningless unless intended to convey the
impression that the animal might be used to get this class of stock". The sale was by
description and that the description implied that the bull possess the quality of being
capable of breeding.
On the other hand, in the case of Border Harvesters Ltd, v. Edwards Engineering
(Perth) Ltd (1985),57 the judge did not think that quality could be used as part of the
description. In this case there was a sale of a machine for drying grain and there was an
express term as to its capacity. The court held that the capacity of the dryer was not part
of its description but quality. Therefore, the sale was not one by description. It was for a
specific type of dryer and one had been delivered. As to its capacity quality, since it was
an express term, section 14(2) did not apply.
56
[1918] NZLR811.
57 1985 SLT 128.
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(b) TERM OF THE CONTRACT
A sale is not necessary sale by description so as to invoke section into play merely because
during the pre-contractual negotiations, descriptive words were used. And even if it is a
sale by description, not all the descriptive words amount to "description" under section 13.
To qualify as "description", the statements must form a term of the contract as opposed to
mere puffery or representation. So, if there is a sale by description, we have to establish
whether the descriptive words constitute a term of the contract or not.
To distinguish a term from a representation is a question of considerable difficulty, and
drawing a line between the two is not easy. The cardinal rule is that the intention of the
parties is important and should prevail. This intention can be inferred from the facts of the
case and the relevant facts appropriate for consideration are:-
(1) The time interval between the making of the statement and the final agreement.
The shorter the time lapse, the more likely it is to be a term of the contract.
(2) The importance of the statement to the parties. The more important the statement
is, the more likely it is to be a term of the contract.
(3) If the statement, made orally, become incorporated into the written agreement, it is
a term of the contract.
(4) If the maker of the statement is in a better position to ascertain the accuracy of the
statement, then it will tend to be regarded as a term of the contract.58
58 Anson's Law on Contract, 26th. Ed. P. 111.
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Even with such guidelines, it was still not any easier to say whether a description was a
term of the contract or a representation. In some cases where the facts are similar, the
decisions were conflicting and quite irreconcilable. In Hopkins v. Tanqueray (1854)39 a
statement made by the defendant about a horse which was offered for sale by auction was
held to be a mere representation, not a term of the contract. Crowder J. said that the
conversation was a mere representation and was evidently not made with an intention to
warrant the horse. To constitute a warranty, a representation must be shown to have been
intended to form part of the contract. In Couchman v. Hill (1947)60 the defendant put up
his heifer for auction. In the catalogue it was described as "unserved", but another
statement added that the sale was "subject to the auctioneers' usual conditions" and that
the auctioneer would not be responsible for any error in the catalogue. The "usual
conditions" were exhibited at the auction and contained a clause that "the lots were sold
with all faults, imperfections and errors of description". Before bidding, the plaintiff asked
the auctioneer and the defendant if they could confirm that the heifer was "unserved" and
to this they replied in the affirmative. On that assurance, the plaintiff bid and secured the
heifer. The heifer later died. It was found out that it was in calf and it died because it was
too young to carry a calf. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover damages for breach of contract. The written document and the oral agreement
formed a single and binding contract. The exemption clause was not applicable.




In theory every contract is to be interpreted in the light of its own terms and the
circumstances surrounding the case. From this developed the novel idea of "contractual
intention" which had far-reaching implications because a transaction might be dealt with in
accordance with rather an arbitrary and elusive canon of "intention". Secondly, this idea
made useless the whole idea of law. The Sale of Goods Act implied various terms into the
contract of sale, but these terms maybe excluded or varied in accordance with the parties'
express or implied intentions. If this is permitted and allowed to prevail in all
circumstances without any safeguard, then the whole purpose of the law of implied
warranty is defeated.
In Bannerman v. White (1861)61 the contractual intention was made the vital test.
The defendants bought from the plaintiff a large quantity of hops. Before the sale and
during the course of negotiation, the defendants inquired whether sulphur had been used
in the treatment of the hops. If that was so, the defendants would not even ask for the
price. The plaintiff replied that no sulphur had been used. It was in fact used over five
acres of the entire 300 acres of cultivation. The plaintiff had either forgotten or thought it
was unimportant. After delivery the defendants refused to pay the price for which this
action was brought. The court held that the plaintiffs assurance that sulphur was not used
was the condition upon which the parties contracted. Erie C.J. in his judgement said that:-
61
(1861) 10 CBNS 844.
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"....the defendants required and the plaintiff gave his undertaking that
no sulphur had been used. This undertaking was a preliminary
stipulation; and if it had not been given, the defendants would not have
gone on with the treaty which resulted in the sale. In this sense it was
the condition upon which the defendants contracted, and it would be
contrary to the intention expressed by this stipulation that the contract
should remain valid if sulphur had been used. The intention of the
parties governs in the making and in the construction of all contracts.
If the parties so intend, the sale may be absolute, with a warranty
superadded, or the sale maybe conditional to be null if the warranty is
broken; and upon this statement of facts we think that the intention
appears to have been that the contract should be null if sulphur had
been used."62
From the above statement it would seem that even if delivery had been made and
property had passed, this would have been unimportant but for the intention of the parties
which may be elusive and unclear.
Sometimes there would be an intervening factor that can further aggravate the problem
of ascertaining intention. That factor is error or mistake which will affect the
consensuality of the contract because the parties may not agree on the same terijns. For
62 Id. p. 860.
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example the seller may make a promise in one sense and the buyer may understand it in
another, and thus put a different interpretation on that promise. In Smith v. Hughes
(1871)63 a farmer sold certain oats to the buyer, a horse-trainer, by exhibiting a sample.
The buyer intended to buy old oats to feed his racehorses but what was delivered was new
oats. The seller knew they were new oats. The buyer rejected them but was refused by
the seller who claimed for the price. The issue in this case was whether the subject-matter
of the sale was described by the seller as "good oats" or "good old oats". The court was
of the view that this was a crucial question and since it had not been put to the jury, a new
trial was ordered. The evidence was not clear about whether the seller actually described
the goods as "good oats" or "good old oats". The court made assumptions that if the
seller had not used the word "old", what the buyer perceived would be crucial. If he
realised that the seller had described them as "good oats", but he himself had mistakenly
thought them to be old, the contract would still be valid because the mistake was unilateral
or one-sided. But if he had mistakenly thought that the seller had described them as "good
old oats", then the contract would be void because of the mistake as to the terms of the
offer.64
The courts' attitude towards the idea of contractual intention seems to be to interpret a
statement as a term of the contract rather then a mere representation, and this is especially
so when the seller is a dealer in the goods. In Dick Bentley (Productions) Ltd. v. Harold
63
(18710 LR 6 QB 597.
64
Macleod. Consumer Sales Law, p. 501.
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Smith (Motors) Ltd. (1965)65 a statement was made by a motor dealer that, based on the
reading of the mileometer, the car had done only 20,000 miles when in actual fact it had
done 100,000 miles. This was held to be a term of the contract. In contrast is the case of
Oscar Chess Ltd. v. Williams (1957).66 A private seller sold a car to a firm of dealers. He
told them that the car was a 1948 model and the car log-book showed that it was first
registered in 1948. The car was actually a 1938 model. The Court of Appeal held that the
statement was a mere representation.
In the recent case of Harlingdon & Leinster Ltd v. Christopher Hull Fine Art
Ltd.( 1990)67 the sellers offered for sale two paintings which they described as being by
Gabriele Munter. The buyers sent their employee to view the paintings and was told that
the sellers knew little about the painting and about the artist. The painting was found to
be a forgery and the buyers brought an action to claim for the return of the purchase price.
At first instance the judge held that the buyer failed in his claim because they had not relied
on the description of the painting as being by Gabriele Munter and therefore, there was no
sale by description. The buyers appealed and on appeal it was held that the description of
the painting as being by Gabriele Munter did not have sufficient influence on the sale for it
to have been intended by the parties to become a term of the contract. The contract was




[1957] 1 WLR 370.
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[1991] 1 All ER 737.
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sale to be by description under section 13, the descriptive words must be relied upon to be
a term of the contract and not a mere representation.
(c) RELIANCE ON THE DESCRIPTION
It is a requirement that seller offers to sell by description and the buyer accepts to buy by
description and there is a contract on those terms.68 Thus, reliance on the description is an
essential ingredient in the contract of sale by description. Reliance is not difficult to prove
if the goods are unascertained. The buyer necessarily has to rely on their description
because there is no other way that he could identify the goods.69 In sale of specific goods,
if they are ordinary articles of commerce the court will usually presume that the buyer
intended to buy in reliance on the goods possessing the characteristics making up their
description rather than purchasing a specific article as such. As in the case of Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mill (1936)70, Lord Wright said that it is a sale by description even
though the buyer is buying something displayed before him. A specific thing is sold by
description if it is sold as a thing corresponding to it. Similarly, in the case of Beale v.
Taylor (1967)71 even though the car was a specific thing, it was bought by the buyer
relying on the description of it in the advertisement.





[1967| 1 WLR 1193.
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(d) EXCLUSION OF SECTION 13
The provisions in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 clearly prohibit the exclusion or
limitation of the seller's liability under sections 13 - 15 of the Sale of Goods Act. Section
6 of the Act provides that any such terms will be void as against a buyer who deals as a
consumer, and in other cases will be subject to the reasonable test. Despite this
prohibition, which is only apparent, sellers can still exclude or limit their liabilities towards
the buyer. How they do it is, firstly, by preventing it from being a sale by description. In a
sale of specific goods, the seller may use descriptive words about the goods, but at the
same time requires the buyer to examine them, or he disclaims as to the correctness of the
statement.72
Secondly, the seller can prevent the buyer from relying on any description. As in the
case ofHarlingdon and Leinster (1990)73 the seller informed the buyer that he had no
relevant expertise, as he (the buyer) had, in German expressionist painting. In this manner,
the seller was able to contract out of section 13 by claiming not having the expertise.
Where it is reasonable to exclude section 13, in cases of non-consumer sale, its effect is
minimal. Its exclusion merely negates the implied term of correspondence with
description. There is still the express duty on the part of the seller to deliver goods
2
Atiyah, Sale of Goods, p. 220.
73
[1990] 1 All ER 737.
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conforming to the contract description. Negating this would mean negating the whole
contract.74
(Ill) SALE BY DESCRIPTION UNDER OTHER STATUTES
(a) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In the United States of America, sales law is governed by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code 1952. This Code was drafted by Karl Llewellyn and has been adopted
by every state. The Code categorised warranties into two, i.e., express and implied
warranties. By virtue of Article 2-313, it states that:-
"Express warranties are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model."
74 Goode. op. cit.. p. 254.
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Part (b) stipulates that any description of the goods, which forms part of the "basis of
the bargain", creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
Although factual statement will create a warranty, a statement of the seller's opinion does
not. The duty of the court is to decide whether the statement made is a fact or an opinion.
In the case ofRoyal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp. (1980)75 the fact-opinion test
was stated as>
"The decisive test for whether a given representation is a warranty or
merely an expression of the seller's opinion is whether the seller asserts
a fact of which the buyer is ignorant or merely states an opinion or
judgment on a matter ofwhich the seller has no special knowledge and
on which the buyer may have expected also to have an opinion and to
exercise his judgment .... General statements to the effect that goods
are "the best" ... or are "of good quality" or will "last a lifetime" and be
"in perfect condition" ... are generally regarded as expressions of the
seller's opinion or "the puffing of his wares" and do not create an
express warranty."
Once it is proven that the statement is a fact, then the next question to be asked is,
does the statement form "the basis of the bargain"? What does this phrase mean? It is
said that this is a murky concept but it is very much like reliance.76 If the buyer relies on
75 633 F.2d 34 (1980).
76 Dunfree. T.W., et. al., Modern Business Law, 1984, p. 407.
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the seller's description of the goods, and that description is not a mere puffery, there is an
express warranty that the goods will correspond with their description. The basis for
liability is the reliance by the buyer on the words of the seller. But in the case ofEwers v.
Eisenzopf (1979),77 it was held that the seller's affirmation must have been only a
contributing factor in the buyer's decision to purchase. What happened in this case was,
Ewers owned a saltwater aquarium with tropical fish. He bought some seashells, a piece
of coral and a driftwood branch from Eisenzopfs shop. Although the shop sold these
items, it did not specialise in aquariums or water life Ewers asked the sales clerk whether
the items bought would be suitable in a saltwater aquarium. He replied that they "were
suitable for saltwater aquariums, if they were rinsed". Ewers took the items home and
rinsed them for twenty minutes before putting in his aquarium. Within one week,
seventeen of his tropical fish died due to pollution from the toxic matter released from the
decay of the once-living creatures contained in the shells. Preventing such pollution would
need a week long soaking in boiling water. Ewers sued Eisenzopf for breach of express
warranty but it was held in the lower courts that; (1) the clerk's statement was too
indefinite to constitute an express warranty and, (2) even if there was an express
warranty, it was not breached, since the proper method for cleaning the items was "little
more than an extended rinsing or soaking". On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held
that, Article 2-313 does not require the words "warrant" or "guarantee" to establish an
express warranty. A buyer has the burden of proving the purchase was consummated on
the basis of factual representations regarding the title, character, quantity, quality, identity
11 276 N.W.2d. 802 (Wis. Sup Ct. 1979).
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or condition of the goods. In this instance, there was an express warranty. Secondly, on
whether the express warranty was the "basis of the bargain", the court held that it was not
necessary that the affirmation be the sole basis for the sale, it would be sufficient if it is a
factor in the purchase.
Thus, from the above case it seem that there is no necessity that the seller should use
any formal words to create a warranty, or even intend to create a warranty. By simply
describing the goods, the seller warrants that they will meet their description.
Goods may be described by way of advertisements. If the advertisements are meant to
induce sales, they can amount to express warranties. In the case of Keith v Buchanan
(1985)78 the plaintiff bought a sailboat from the defendant for the price of US$75,610. In
the advertisement about the boat, it was described as a "picture of sure-footed
seaworthiness". In another brochure, the same boat was called, "a carefully well-
equipped, and very seaworthy live-aboard vessel". The plaintiff bought the boat relying on
the advertisements. After the delivery of the boat was made, a dispute arose whereupon
the plaintiff brought action against the defendant for breach of the express warranty. In
the first instance, the trial judge held in favour of the defendant in that there was no
express warranty as there was undertaking in writing by the defendant to preserve or
maintain the utility or performance of the vessel. The plaintiff appealed against this
78 1985 173 Cal. App. 3d. 13. 220.
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decision and on appeal it was held by the court that statements made by a manufacturer or
retailer in an advertising brochure which is disseminated to the consuming public in order
to induce sales can create express warranties. The statements in the brochure are specific
and unequivocal in asserting that the vessel was seaworthy and therefore they were
affirmations of fact relating to the quality or condition of the vessel. The court held
further that the affirmation had form part of the basis of the bargain as the plaintiff had
expressed to the defendant of his desire for a long distance ocean-going vessel.
An important distinction can be made between the English law and the American law
regarding warranty of description. In England, compliance with description is an implied
warranty whereas in America, it is an express warranty. This is obvious because
description is an express term. I am of the opinion that the American approach should be
more appropriate because it saves the trouble of having to imply something which is
already expressed.
(b) VIENNA CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
This Convention consists of statutory rules on the international sale of goods which are
contained in an international treaty. These rules, like the other statutes on this subject, are
supplementary to the parties' agreement. It is the contract that is the principal source of
the seller's obligations. Article 35 of the Convention presents a unified approach to the
seller's contractual obligations with respect to the goods. Article 35(1) provides:-
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" The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and
description required by the contract and which are contained or
packaged in the manner required by the contract."
Article 35 provides a simple and comprehensive text. Paragraph (1) emphasises the
rule of compliance with the contract, i.e., the seller must deliver goods conforming to the
contract, not only in quantity, quality and description, but also in which they are contained
and packaged. All these factors are usually expressed in the terms of the contract and the
duty of the seller is to deliver goods in accordance with what they have agreed. The
seller's duty is to deliver goods contained or packaged in the usual manner or, where there
is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.79
The description of the goods may be made by the seller in his offer, in the form of an
advertisement illustrating the goods and their qualities, is binding on him. The request
may also be made by the buyer as to the description of the goods. If the seller does not
raise any objections, the delivered goods must be as required by the buyer.80 There is a
breach of contract when goods delivered do not conform to the contractual terms.
9 Bianca & Bonell, Commentary on the International Sale of Goods, the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention, 1987, p. 269.
80 Id. p. 273.
135
From the foregoing it is submitted that under the Vienna Convention, as under the
Uniform Commercial Code, warranty of description is an express term. It is clear from the
reading of Article 35 that the obligation of the seller in relation to the description and
other particulars of the goods is to deliver them as required under the contract. Therefore,
the obligation of the seller is based on what had been expressly agreed between the seller
and the buyer. Article merely emphasises that the seller is bound to comply with the
contract. I opine that this approach is also appropriate as it recognises what is obvious.
(IV) CONCLUSION
Although section 13 is not free from any criticisms, it has caused little difficulty in
practice. It has served as a valuable means of protection to the buyer. Section 13 still
retains its original wording, except with the addition of subsection 3, which was added by
the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. This amendment was based on the
proposals made by the Law Commissions in their 1969 report on the amendments to the
Sale of Goods Act 1893.81 Subsection 3 extended the meaning of sale by description to
include sale ofgoods selected by the buyer. So, if a buyer buys specific goods but he buys
it relying on the description of them, it is a sale by description. So, it can be said that there
can be no sale other than sale by description.
In a sale by description, there is an implied term of merchantable quality. Since there is
no sale but sale by description, it is no longer necessary to have the words "sale by
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description" in section 14(2). Therefore, they were deleted from the section by the 1973
Act. Now, merchantable quality is implied in all sales, except where the buyer is buying
something which he has examined. Here, he is buying a specific goods as such.
The relevant provisions in the 1973 Act were incorporated into the 1979 Sale ofGoods
Act without any further amendments. The same provision in section 13 was enacted in the
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, in relation to transactions other than sale and
hire-purchase. This Act was made applicable to Scotland by the recent Sale and Supply of
Goods Act 1994. The incorporation of section 13 into these Act were made without any
changes in its form or wordings. This goes to show that section 13 is not a problem
section.
Between the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Uniform Commercial Code and the
provisions in the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods, the difference is
that, the English law implied condition of description, while in the other two, description is
an express warranty. Besides this difference, they are similar in application. They all
specify the duty of the seller to deliver goods as agreed under the contract.
81 Law Commissions Report no. 24, 1969 on Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893.
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CHAPTER FOUR
UNDERTAKING OF MERCHANTABLE QUALITY
INTRODUCTION
The undertaking of merchantable quality is implied under Section 14(2) of the Sale of
Goods Act 1979. According to Atiyah, the implied condition of merchantable quality
is in many respects the most important part of the law of sale because it is the
foundation of the seller's obligation as to the quality of the goods, which is the very
essence of the law of sale.1 In this chapter, I will discuss:- first, the background to the
implied term of merchantable quality. This consists of a discussion of the former
section 14(2), the problems faced by the court in defining merchantable quality and
how this was solved by the 1973 Act and incorporated into the Sale of Goods Act
1979. Second, I will discuss the statutory meaning of merchantable quality in
subsection (6) and the recent re-definition of the phrase in the 1994 amendment.
Third, I will discuss the elements and the exceptions under section 14(2). The
elements that the buyer has to prove are, the seller sells in the course of business and
the goods are supplied under the contract. The seller will not be liable if the defects
are specifically drawn to the buyer's attention or if he has examined the goods. Finally,
in conclusion, we will see whether it was necessary to re-define merchantable quality
when the courts have already indicated this change in the decided cases.
1
Atiyah, Sale of Goods, 8th. Ed. P. 142.
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(I) BACKGROUND TO MERCHANTABLE QUALITY
(a) SECTION 14(2)
In section 14(2) of the Sale ofGoods Act 1893, merchantable quality was only implied
in sale by description.2 The two almost always run together. But the difficulty was as
to whether the meaning of "sale by description" in section 14(2) was the same as in
section 13. Another issue was whether the seller could be said to deal in goods of a
particular description if he had never previously dealt in goods of that precise
description before. As to the first issue, according to Lord Diplock in Ashington
Piggeries Ltd. v. Christopher Hill Ltd (1972),"' description in section 13 is confined
to those words in the contract which were intended by the parties to identify the kind
of goods which were to be supplied, since sale of this kind is usually of unascertained
goods. Under section 14(2), description was a means by which the buyer made known
to the seller a range of purposes for which the goods were required.4
The old provision also required that the seller "deals in goods of that description".
This phrase implied that the seller must be in the business of selling goods such as that
sold. Could the seller be said to "deal in goods of that description" if he had never
dealt with goods of that contractual description before, but had dealt with something
of its kind. The Ashington Piggeries case, where although the sellers had never
2 See chapter 5.
3
[1972] AC 441.
4 Ibid. Lord Diplock at p. 507.
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compounded food for minks before, being animal food compounders, they had dealt
with animal feeding stuffs, is an example of the problem. Could they be said to "deal in
goods of that description"? The majority of the House of Lords held that it was
sufficient if the seller dealt in goods of that kind.5
The above problems were solved when the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act
1973 made some amendments to the section. These amendments were incorporated
into the Sale of Goods Act 1979. First, the Act deleted the phrase "sale by
description" found in the subsection, second, it replaced the phrase, "seller who deals
in goods of that description", with the phrase, "the seller sells goods in the course of a
business". The new provision is wider than the original one because it applies to all
business sales. In Buchanan-Jardine v. Hamilink (1981)6 the seller of a farm and its
live and dead stock brought an action against the buyer for payment of the balance of
the price. The buyer counterclaimed that the goods bought were not merchantable
because shortly after the sale there was a "stop notice" was issued by the health
authorities because one of the cows belonging to the seller was found to be a positive
T.B reactor. The "stop notice" prevented resale of the animals and this it was
contended, led to a breach of section 14(2). The seller argued that he could not be
selling in the course of a business when he actually sold the business. But it was held
by the Lord Ordinary that the words "in the course of a business" would include a
displenishing sale.
5 Id. Lord Guest p. 474. Lord Dilhorne p. 485, Lord Wilberforce p. 495.
6 1981 SLT (Notes) p. 60.
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Section 14(2) excludes from its ambit a private sale by an individual seller. In the
case of Beale v. Taylor [1967]7 where a private seller sold a second-hand car as a
"1961 Herald", the buyer had in consequence no remedy under section 14 and was
compelled to take action under section 13.
The 1893 Act made reference to "the goods" which was replaced by the phrase "the
goods supplied under the contract". The new provision extended the requirement of
merchantable quality to cover more than the mere goods. Protection would include
the container in which the goods were supplied. In Geddling v. Marsh (1920)8 it was
held that the seller's obligations covered not only the goods which were the actual
subject-matter of the sale but also the container in which the goods were contained.
Even though the container was to be returned to the seller, that was immaterial. In
another case, Wilson v. Rickett CockerelI & Co. Ltd (1954)9 the plaintiffs, a husband
and wife, bought a ton of Coalite from the defendants who were coal merchants. The
wife made up the fire with some of the Coalite and suddenly there was an explosion
caused by the presence of an explosive in a piece of coal. It was held by the court that
the consignment of Coalite was delivered as a whole and must be considered as a
whole. The presence of that piece of coal containing explosive made the whole
consignment unmerchantable. Denning L.J. said in his judgement that:-
7
[1976] 1 WLR 1193.
8
[1920] 1 KB 668. The case involved section 14(3), formerly subsection (1).
9
[1954] 1 QB 598; Duke v. Jackson (1921) SC 362.
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"Goods supplied under a contract of sale" means the goods delivered in
purported pursuance of the contract. The section applies to all goods
so delivered, whether they conform to the contract or not: that is, in
this case, to the whole consignment, including the offending piece, and
not merely to the Coalite alone."10
The above case criticised the case of Duke v. Jackson (1921)11 where the facts
were similar. The buyer bought a bag of coal from the seller, a coal merchant, which
contained a detonator. While the coal was being burned in a kitchen fire, it exploded,
injuring the buyer. An action was brought against the seller exclusively on section
14(1). The court held that the buyer's action failed because the averments of the buyer
did not set forth that there was any defect in the fitness of the coal supplied under the
contract, but merely the presence of a foreign substance which was not a subject of the
contract of sale. The decision of the court was rather surprising and was criticised by
Evershed M R. in Wilson v. Rickett. He said that the court "introduced too great a
refinement into the pursuer's pleading".12 The court had drawn a line between goods
supplied under the contract, i.e. the coal, and goods which were outside the contract,
i.e., the detonator. Since there was no complaint about the coal, they were therefore
fit for their purpose. The detonator, which was foreign, was not governed by the
contract. This reasoning is hard to swallow because the coal and the detonator should
10 Id. p. 607.
11 1921 SC 362.
12
[1954] 1 QB 598, at p. 611.
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be considered as a whole consignment of the "goods supplied under the contract of
sale" in section 14.13
(b) COMMON LAW DEFINITION OF MERCHANTABLE QUALITY
The Sale of Goods Acts 1893 did not give a definition of the term "merchantable
quality". A definition was introduced by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act
1973. Prior to this statutory definition, there was a long list of cases which attempted
to define this elusive term. According to Roskill L.J., the complications regarding the
meaning of the word did not arise before 1893. The problems seem to have arisen
because of the "gloss that lawyers in this century repeatedly sought to impose on this
single and simple word by seeking to re-define it by use of phrases which raise as many
if not more problems than they solve."14 Basically, there were two approaches or tests
ofmerchantability, namely, the test of "acceptability" and the test of "usability".
(i) "Acceptability Test"
This was the test put forward by Farwell L.J. in the case ofBristol Tramways, etc. v.
Fiat Motors Ltd. [1910],13 This case involved a sale of a Fiat omnibus which was
required by the buyer for the purpose of carrying passengers in Bristol. This purpose
13 See also Aswan Engineering Establishment Co. v. Lupdine [1987] 1 WLR 1 and Wormel v. RHM
Agriculture (East) Ltd. [1987] 1 WLR 109.
14 Roskill L.J in Cehave v. Bremer [1976] QB 44.
15
[1910] 2 KB 831, at p. 841.
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was made known to the seller and the vehicle was inspected by the buyer. In this case
his Lordship suggested that:-
"The phrase in section 14(2) is, in my opinion, used as meaning that the
article is of such quality and in such condition that a reasonable man
acting reasonably would after full examination accept it under the
circumstances of the case in performance of his offer to buy that article
whether he buys for his own use or to sell again."
This test of acceptability was taken a step further by Dixon J. in Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. (1933)16 to include an element of price. Acording to
him,
"The condition that goods are ofmerchantable quality requires that they
should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully acquainted with the
facts and, therefore, knowing what hidden defects exist, and not being
limited to their apparent condition, would buy them without abatement
of the price .... and without special terms."17
The price of the goods is an important element for consideration because the price
will generally reflect the quality of the goods. The higher the price, the better should
be the quality; and the cheaper the price, the lower should be the quality expected.
This is however, not a conclusive proof ofmerchantability. In B.S. Brown & Son Ltd
16
(1933) 50 CLR387.
17 At p. 418.
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v. Craiks Ltd. (1970)18 the buyers bought some material from the sellers who were
manufacturers. The buyers wanted them for dress-making, but this was not made
known to the sellers, who thought that they were wanted for industrial purpose. The
material which was bought for 36.25p per yard had to be sold for 30p per yard. The
sellers claimed that the materials were not merchantable under section 14(2). The
House of Lords rejected their claim and held that despite the discrepancy in the price,
the goods were not unmerchantable. According to Lord Guest, what was said by
Dixon J. in Grant v. Australian KnittingMill could not be construed strictly. It could
not be a requirement of merchantability that there should not be any abatement of
price. Unless there is a substantial difference in the price, so as to show that the goods
could only be sold at a "throw-away price", the goods would still be regarded as
merchantable.19 In this case the difference of the price was not so substantial as to
indicate unmerchantability.
In contrast to the above case is an Australian decision in H. Beecham & Co. Pty.
Ltd. v. Francis Howard & Co. Pty. Ltd (1921)20. The buyers bought spruce timber
from the sellers for making pianos. The timber was selected by the buyers themselves
from the sellers' stock. Later, much of the timber was found to be affected by dry rot,
which was not noticeable upon a reasonable external examination. The sellers argued
that the timber was merchantable because it still could be used for making boxes,
18
[1970] 1 All ER 823.




which is one of the other purposes of spruce timber. The court held that the timber
was not merchantable because the buyer paid 80 shillings per hundred feet, whereas
spruce timber for making boxes only cost 30 shillings.
(ii) "Usability Test" or "Fitness for Purpose Test"
This test was propounded by Lord Wright in the case of Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. v.
Manganese Bronze and Brass Ltd [1934],21 He said:-
"What subsection (2) now means by "merchantable quality" is that the
goods in the form in which they were tendered were of no use for any
purpose for which such goods would normally be used and hence was
not saleable under that description."22
The test as laid down by Lord Wright was modified by Lord Reid in Henry Kendall
& Sons v. Lillico & Sons Ltd (1969).23 According to him, the words "such goods"
would grammatically refer to "the goods in the form in which they were tendered".
But he (Lord Wright) could not have meant that. What he meant by "such goods"
were goods which complied with the description in the contract under which they were
sold.24 Thus, his amended version was:-
21
[1934] AC 402 at p. 430.
22 See also CanadaAtlantic Grain Export Co. Ltd. v. Eilers (1929) 35 Lloyd's L.R 206.
23
[1969] 2 AC 31.
24 P. 77.
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"What subsection (2) now means by "merchantable quality" is that the
goods in the form in which they were tendered were of no use for any
purpose for which goods which complied with the description under
which these goods were sold would normally be used, and hence were
not saleable under that description."
What Lord Reid was saying is that, the goods tendered are not merchantable if they
are not fit for any of the purpose for which goods of the contract description are
normally used. In Henry Kendall & Sons v. Lillico & Sons Ltd, the plaintiffs
(Hardwick) were game farmers in Suffolk and the defendants (SAPPA) were animal
food compounders who compounded food for pigs and poultry. The plaintiffs bought
compounded meals to be fed to their pheasants and partridges, which they reared for
stock and sale. The meal contained Brazilian groundnut extraction which was
contaminated by fungus and the birds died or became deformed. The plaintiffs brought
an action against the defendants who paid them damages. The defendants sought
indemnity by bringing an action against the retailer, Grimsdale, who in turn brought an
action against Kendall, the wholesaler. The majority of the House of Lords held that
the groundnut extraction was not unmerchantable for the simple reason that it was
perfectly suitable for compounding animal feeding stuff for other animals. It was only
unsuitable for poultry, and as such it would not be reasonable to hold that the
groundnut extraction was not merchantable just because it was not fit for
compounding meal for poultry. The fact that it was still fit for compounding meals for
other animals made the groundnut extraction still merchantable and capable of use for
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one of the main purposes for which such goods were commonly bought. Furthermore
it could still be sold under the description as "Brazilian groundnut extraction."
Lord Reid and Lord Morris agreed with Havers J., at first instance, who held that
the goods were merchantable. Havers J. applied Lord Wright's test of merchantable
quality, i.e. if the goods in the form in which they were tendered were of no use for any
purpose for which such goods would normally be used and hence were not saleable
under that description, the goods are not merchantable. No reference was made to the
element of price. Lord Pearce and Lord Wilberforce thought that Lord Wright's test
was inadequate and preferred to rely on Farwell L.J.'s test as amplified by Dixon J.
Based on that they held that the goods were not merchantable. Lord Guest alone
preferred the approach ofDixon J. and held that there was no evidence that the price at
which the goods were sold after the defect had been discovered was other than the
ordinary price for the goods and as such the judge's finding was justified.25
The court was faced with different approaches and tests ofmerchantability. Which
one was to prevail? A satisfactory test, proposed by Davies, would have been a
combination of Lord Wright's test with that of Dixon J. Lord Wright's test by itself
was not adequate to deal with cases where the goods are irregular or "seconds" but
could still be saleable under the same name and still be fit for other usual purposes.
For example, rice, under that description, can be used for consumption by people as
well as by poultry. If a buyer bought rice for his own consumption, but found it not
25 At p. 108.
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suitable for his consumption but fit only for his poultry, he would have no remedy
under section 14(2). But adding the element of price by Dixon J., it can be decided
whether the rice is merchantable or not. Rice for human consumption must be of a
higher price because it is of a better quality, but rice for the poultry would be of a
lower price and of lesser quality.26 Thus, Davies' proposed test was: "merchantable
quality means that the goods in the form in which they were tendered were of no use
for any purpose for which goods which sold at the price and which complied with the
description under which the goods were sold would normally be used, and hence were
not saleable under that description or at that price."27
(c) STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MERCHANTABLE QUALITY
The statutory definition of merchantable quality was first introduced by the Supply of
Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. The definition was incorporated into the Sale of
Goods Act 1979 in section 14(6) to read:-
"Goods of any kind are of merchantable quality within the meaning of
subsection (2) above if they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for
which goods of that kind are commonly bought as it is reasonable to
expect having regard to any description applied to them, the price (if
relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances."
26 See C. Davies, "Merchantability and Fitness for Purpose: Implied Conditions of the Sale of Goods




This definition is based on a relatively simple concept of fitness of goods for the
usual purposes for which they are bought.28 And according to the Law Commissions,
this definition is in line with the Uniform Law on the International Sales of Goods29
and one of the minimum standards of merchantability laid down in the Uniform
Commercial Code.30
The test of merchantability is meant to be flexible and to be applicable to a wide
range of circumstances. But, despite being statutorily defined, "merchantability" is still
not free from problems and criticisms. Firstly, the gist of subsection (6) is that the
goods must be "fit for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are
commonly bought". It appears that the goods must be fit for all their normal purpose
or purposes, whereas under the old definition, goods would be merchantable if they are
fit for any one of their normal purposes, even though unfit for the other/s.31 The new
definition places emphasis on the purpose or the usability of the goods to the exclusion
of everything else. This criteria is helpful with regard to defective consumer goods
because most consumer goods have only one purpose, e.g. a washing machine which
28 Law Commissions' Report No. 24, 1969, First Report: Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893,
p. 16.
29 Uniform Law of International Sale of Goods, Article 33(1), "The seller shall not have fulfilled his
obligation to deliver the goods, where he has handed over: ...(d) goods which do not possess the
qualities necessary for their ordinary or commercial use;...."
30 Article 2-314(2), "Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ... (c) are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used ..."
31
Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd. [1969] 2 AC 31.
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does not spin or a vacuum cleaner which does not suck dust will not be merchantable.
However, with multi-purpose goods there would be some difficulties. By the wordings
of subsection (6), it might be thought that such goods must be fit for all such purposes,
but in the case of Aswan Engineering Establishment Co. v. Lupdine Ltd. (1987)32
the court upheld what had been decided in the earlier cases that it is not necessary that
the goods must be fit for all the purposes . 33 In this case the plaintiffwas a construction
company carrying out construction work in Kuwait. They bought from the first
defendants a quantity of waterproofing compound to be shipped to Kuwait. This
compound was supplied in heavy plastic pails which were manufactured by the second
defendants. Upon arrival in Kuwait, the pails were stacked five or six high and they
were left on the quayside in very hot sun. As a result the pails melted and gave way
under their own weight. The waterproofing compound was lost. Had the pails been
stored in a proper manner, they could have withstood the heat. It was held by the trial
judge that the plaintiffs' action against the first defendants under the contract should
succeed, but the first defendants' action against the second defendants failed because
the pails were not unmerchantable under section 14(2). This decision was upheld by
the Court of Appeal. It was still a good law that if goods were capable ofmany uses,
fitness for at least one of the uses would make them still merchantable.
Secondly, the subsection requires the goods to be fit for such use as "it is
reasonable to expect" having regard to the various factors enumerated in the statutory
32
[1987] 1 WLR 1.
33
Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd. [1969] 2 AC 31.
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definition. If goods are bought for use, but suffer from cosmetic defects which do not
impair their function, does this mean that they are not merchantable? Under the
common law merchantable did not mean good, fair or average quality: goods might be
inferior or even of bad quality but still would be merchantable within their description.
In the case of Bartlett v. Sidney Marcus Ltd. (1965),34 the plaintiff" bought a second¬
hand car and was informed of the defects in the clutch and oil-pressure gauge. He was
told that they were not serious. After a few weeks, other problems appeared and the
plaintiff sued for the cost of repairing them. At the first instance, it was held that the
car was not merchantable. On appeal, this decision was reversed and was held by Lord
Denning that,
"
.... a buyer should realise that, when he buys a second-hand car,
defects may appear sooner or later and in the absence of an express
warranty, he has no redress...."35
In Cehave N. V v. Bremer Handelsgesellscgaft mbH (1976)36 the sellers agreed to
sell to the buyer 12,000 tons of citrus pulp pellets, delivery to be c.i.f. Rotterdam and
shipment to be made in good condition. The buyers paid the price and the goods were
unloaded. They found that, although the cargo in one hold was perfectly sound, part
of the cargo in another hold was severely damaged through overheating. The buyers
rejected the entire cargo and claimed for the return of the price. The sellers refused to
34
[1965] 1 WLR 1013.




repay the price. The buyers applied and obtained an order from the court for the sale
of the cargo by an agent appointed by the court. The goods were bought by one Mr.
Bass, who later resold it to the buyers. The buyers resumed possession of the goods
and used them in exactly the same way they would have used them if they had all been
sound. The court held that the goods were still merchantable. They did not have to be
perfect in order to be of merchantable quality; it sufficed that they remained saleable
for the purpose for which they would normally be bought., even with some reduction
in price. In this case the pulp pellets were bought for use as cattle food and were still
usable and had in fact been used as such, they were therefore merchantable.
In Spencer v. Claude Rye (Vehicles) Ltd.(\912)31 the plaintiff, a barrister, bought a
new Triumph "Vitesse" from the defendant's garage. The car was a "freak" and had to
be returned to the dealers a dozen times in the few months after the purchase. Faults
included the throttle cable coming adrift, the engine running hot, a rattle, leaks in the
hood and elsewhere, a knock on acceleration, "fierce vibration" at speed, wind whistle,
first signs of rust, collapse of a boot-support strut, exhaust fumes inside the car,
excessive petrol consumption, and finally the radiator boiling over four times in 400
miles. The judge, Croom-Johnson J., allowed the buyer to rescind but only because of
the defect of the radiator. As regards the other complaints, he said that although they
were reasonable to make and must have been most irritating to experience in a new
37
(1972) The Guardian. Dec. 19, cf. Farnworth Finance Facilities v. Attryde [1970] 1 WLR 1053.
See Whincup, "Reasonable Fitness pf Cars", Modern Law Review, 1975, p. 661.
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car, they were not such as to justify rejection. They were all capable of adjustment or
being put right without too much trouble.
The statutory definition similarly does not require goods to be perfectly fit for use.
This can be seen from the cases decided after 1973. In the case ofMillar s ofFalkirk
Ltd. v. Turpie (1976),s the buyer bought and took delivery of a new car in part
exchange from the seller. It was agreed that the buyer would pay the balance of the
purchase price in a few days. This was an action by the seller against the buyer for the
failure to pay the purchase price due to him. In his defence it was alleged that the car
was not merchantable in that there was a leakage in the power steering system. This
was a minor defect that could be put right at a nominal cost of £25. The court held
that the car was nevertheless merchantable on the ground that it was still "usable" as a
car.
In the case of Bernstein v. Pamson Motors (Golders Green) (1987)39 the plaintiff
bought a new Nissan Laurel car for just under £8000. Within three weeks and only
about 140 miles, the car broke down on a motorway. Upon inspection of the vehicle,
it was discovered that the cause was the present of a blob of sealant in the lubricating
system. This was a minor defect that could have been easily and cheaply put right.
But despite it being a minor defect, it had caused extensive damage, because the blob
had completely blocked the oil supply to the camshaft, causing it to seize up. Rougier
38 1876 SLT 66.
39
[1987] 2 All ER 220.
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J. held that although a purchaser of a new car was entitled to expect a better-quality
vehicle than a buyer of a second-hand car, nevertheless, teething problems had to be
expected. However, on the facts of this case, the car was held not to be merchantable.
In reaching his conclusion, the judge took into consideration several factors. First, the
nature and consequence of the defect; though minor, had caused serious and extensive
damage. Second, the car should have been capable of being driven safely, and this car
was not safe. Third, how easy was it to remedy the defect once it occurred? In this
case the repair took several days and cost over £700. So, in this case, if the minor
defect did not cause an extensive damage nor give rise to safety problems, the court
would not find it unmerchantable.
Thus, from the cases mentioned above, it seems that the statutory definition would
lower the standard of quality of the goods, because, irrespective of minor defects, the
goods are still merchantable. Even if the goods are resold at a reduced price, they
would still be merchantable if they are marketable under their contract description and
for their normal purpose. In the case of B.S. Brown & Sons Ltd. v. Craiks Ltd
(1970)40 the sellers sold cloth to the buyers, which they believed was for industrial use.
The buyers actually required them for resale for making into dresses. This was a
common use of this type of fabric but the particular fabric supplied was not suitable
because of an irregularity in the weaving. The price charged was rather high for
normal industrial fabric but lower than normal price of fabric dress. The resale value of




buyers had intended to resell it. The court found that the fabric was merchantable
because even though the resale value was low, it was not so far below as to render the
cloth commercially unsaleable as industrial fabric.41
It was not made clear whether Parliament intended to replace the old case law
entirely or not. Because of this uncertainty in its application, it did not seem to have
any special effect on the law and the cases decided thereafter still followed the old way,
be it commercial or consumer sale.42 However, in the 1980s this attitude began to
change, and in cases of consumer sales, the courts were prepared to adopt a more
liberal meaning of the word "merchantable".43
(d) SATISFACTORY QUALITY UNDER THE 1994 ACT
Because of the unsatisfactory state of the law regarding merchantability of goods, a
Law Commissions reviewed the situation and to suggest reforms in 1987. There were
three aspects ofmerchantable quality which were under criticism. One, the use of the
word "merchantable"; two, extensive reliance on fitness of purpose/s neglecting other
aspects of quality, like appearance and finish, freedom from minor defects, etc.; three,
41 See also Cehave v. Bremer [1976] QB 44.
4~ See Aswan Engineering Case, Cehave v. Bremer andMillars ofFalkirk v. Turpie.
43 See Rogers v. Parish (Scarborough) Ltd. [1987! QB 923; Shine v. General Guarantee Corp. Ltd.
[1988] 1 All ER 911; Wormell v. RHM General Agriculture [1986] 1 All ER 769. These cases
suggest a more buyer-friendly approach,
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should durability and safety be included in the definition.44 According to the
Commissions, the term "merchantable quality" was out-moded and inappropriate in the
present situation because it reflected the notion of merchants' dealings in commercial
sphere rather than a consumer transaction. Ormrod L.J. in his judgement in one
decided case said:-
"the word [merchantable] has fallen out of general use and largely lost
its meaning, except to merchants and traders in some branches of
commerce. Hence the difficulty today of finding a satisfactory
formulation for a test of merchantability. No doubt people who are
experienced in a particular trade can still look at a parcel of goods and
say "those goods are merchantable" or "those goods are merchantable
but at a lower price" distinguishing them from "job lots" or "seconds".
But in the absence of expert evidence of this kind it will often be very
difficult for a judge or jury to make the decision except in obvious
cases."45
The Law Commissions recommended that the term and meaning of "merchantable
quality" be changed. They formulated a new definition for the word "merchantable
quality" based on the test of "acceptability" which is more akin to the test of Dixon J.
in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills (1936). This basic principle should be
accompanied with a list of aspects of quality, i.e.
44
Law Commissions' Joint Report No. 160, 1987, para. 2.9. See also chapter 3.
45 Cehave v. Bremer[ 19761 QB 44, at p. 88.
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(a) their fitness for all their common purposes;
(b) their appearance and finish;
(c) their freedom from minor defects;
(d) their safety and
(e) their durability
The proposal of the Law Commission to replace the current definition of
"merchantable quality" was commented upon by Livermore as being unnecessary.
According to him the definition in section 14(6) was a general definition which applied
to both commercial and consumer contracts and which is flexible.46 If the definition
was made more accurate or precise, this flexibility would be lost in case of commercial
contracts.
In 1990 there was an attempt to introduce these reforms as part of the Consumer
Guarantees Bill, which was a Private Members' Bill, but the Bill failed due to lack of
Parliamentary time. But in 1994, the Sale and Supply of Goods act was passed,
whereby the recommendations of the Law Commissions in 1987 were adopted.
However, the proposed "acceptable quality" was not included in the Act. The term
used is "satisfactory quality". Even though the Consumer Guarantees Bill failed for
the first time, that did not stop the court from changing their attitude. In the case of
46 John Livermore, "Merchantable Quality II", Journal of Business Law, 1985, p. 294; Tiplady,
"Supply of Goods: a Comment", Solicitors Journal, 1988. p. 149.
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Rogers v. Parish (Scarborough) Ltd. (1987)47 the plaintiff bought a Range Rover
motor vehicle from the defendants. The vehicle was described as new but it was found
to be defective in a number of respects. The parties agreed to substitute the defective
vehicle with another Range Rover. Upon delivery of the substituted vehicle, its engine,
gearbox and bodywork were substantially defective. There was also a substantial oil
loss due to defective oil seals. Six months after delivery the plaintiff rejected the
vehicle and alleged that the defendants were in breach of section 14. The plaintiff
claimed, among other things, the return of all the monies paid to the defendants. At
first instance, the trial judge held that the car was merchantable because the defects had
not in any way rendered the vehicle unroadworthy, unusable or unfit for the normal
purposes for which a Range Rover was used. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of
Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that the car was not merchantable. Mustill L.J.
opined that the purpose for which "goods of that kind", namely passenger vehicles, are
commonly bought would not only include driving it from place to place but also to be
able to do so with the appropriate degree of comfort, ease of handling and reliability.
He would also add pride in the vehicle's outward and interior appearance. Here the
vehicle was sold as new, therefore, any fault acceptable in a second-hand car would not
be expected in this vehicle. Furthermore, its value was far above the value of the
ordinary vehicle and as such the plaintiffwas entitled to value for his money.48 Upon
analysing this case it appears that the consumer would be in a more favourable
situation because he could get more than what he had bargained for. Not only could he
47
[1987] 2 WLR 353.
48 Mustill L.J. p. 359.
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expect to get a car capable of being driven from one place to another, but he could
expect something more than that. In economic term this is known as "consumer
surplus". This is actually the difference between the value the consumer places on a
unit ofproduct and how much the consumer actually has to pay for the unit.
This decision was applied in a subsequent case of Shine v. General Guarantee
Corp. Ltd. (1988).49 The defendant purchased an enthusiast's car from a third party
and let it under a hire-purchase to the plaintiff. The car was described as being in a
good condition. The plaintiff subsequently discovered that the car had been written off
by an insurance company after having been submerged in water for 24 hours. The car
had no specific defect or unroadworthiness, but the plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant alleging breach of the condition of merchantable quality. The basis of
this was his inability to obtain a rust guarantee from the car's manufacturers. The
Court of Appeal held that the condition of merchantable quality implied in section
14(2) required the purchaser's reasonable expectations about the goods at the time of
the sale to be considered, as well as their condition. The plaintiff thought that he was
buying a second-hand enthusiast's car in good condition at a fair price when in fact he
was buying at the same price a car which no one, knowing its history, would have
bought at other than a substantially reduced price. Consequently there had been a
breach of the implied condition of merchantable quality. In this case there was no
specific defects being alleged and the car appeared generally to be usable, but despite
that the court still held that it was not merchantable. It was suggested that the decisive
49
[1988] 1 All ER 911.
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fact was perhaps the evidence of the dealer who said that the car would be worth
£1000 less had its history been known.50 Thus, as under the old law, the central
general question remains, what were the buyer's reasonable expectations in the
circumstances.51
Looking at these cases, it would seem that although the recommendations of the
Law Commission did not pass immediately into statute, protection to consumers was
well guaranteed due to the change in attitude of the courts. This change of attitude of
the courts related to consumer sales, where they tended to take a more buyer-friendly
approach. However, in sales other than consumer ones the courts were still rather
reluctant to be liberal in their approach: for example, in the case of B.S. Brown and
Sons Ltd. v. Craiks Ltd (1970) In Harlingdon & Leinster Ltd v. Christopher Hull
Fine Art Ltd (1990)52 the subject-matter of the sale was a painting said to be by a
German painter Gabriele Munter, but it turned out to be a forgery. The plaintiff sued
the seller for breach of section 13 and section 14(2). The court held that the plaintiff
had failed to establish that the painting was unmerchantable as defined by section 14(6)
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. This was because the complaint made by the plaintiff
was based on the identity of the painter and not on the quality of the painting. The
painting could still be used for the purpose of resale and/or aesthetic appreciation, and
50 See Atiyah, Sale of Goods, p. 175.
51 See also Bernstein V. Pamsons Motors [1987] 1 All ER 220.
52
[1990] 3 WLR 13.
161
therefore, it was merchantable. According to Slade L.J, with whom Nourse L.J.,
concurred,
"The complaint, and only complaint as to the quality of the picture,
relates to the identity of the artist. There is no other complaint of any
kind as to its condition or quality. If the verdict of the experts had been
that the artist was in truth Gabriele Munter, the claim would not have
arisen. Having concluded that this was not a contract for the sale of
goods by description ... I see no room for the application of section 14.
if the plaintiffs fail to establish a breach of contract through the front
door of section 13(1), they cannot succeed through the back door of
section 14."
However, in the dissenting judgment of Stuart-Smith L.J., he said that he would
agree with the above proposition if the sale was simply for the specific picture, an
article consisting of oil on board without any description as to the identity of the artist.
But in this case, the parties knew perfectly well that the purpose of the sale was resale
as dealers, and not merely putting the picture on the wall and enjoying its aesthetic
qualities. In this situation, he could not think that it was a reasonable expectation that
a fake which was virtually worthless was fit for the purpose of being sold as a painting
by Gabriele Munter at a price of £6000. In this case the court was said to have been
influenced by the fact that the attribution of artistic works is not an exact science, and
that anyotie dealing in fine art is taking a calculated risk.53
53
Bradgate and Savage, Commercial Law, p. 192.
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(II) ELEMENTS UNDER SECTION 14(2)
As mentioned earlier, the 1994 Act has reformulated section 14(2) of the Sale of
Goods Act 1979.54 Despite its redefinition, the new section still contains the important
elements of the old law, thus retaining the relevancy of the old cases. In order to
successfully claim under section 14(2), the buyer has to prove these elements:-
(a) Seller must be acting in the course of a business.
(b) Goods were supplied under the contract.
(c) If defects are brought to the buyer's attention or are revealed by any
examination made by the buyer, the implied term of merchantable quality will be
excluded.
(a) SELLER ACTING IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
Under section 14(2), it is a requirement that the seller must act in the course of
business. This means that it applies to all business sales. There is a similar provision in
section 1(1) of the Trade Description Act 1968, as well as in section 12 of the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977. Their provisions also require the sale to be "in the course of
a trade or business". In a decided case it was held that a sale by a seller who was in a
car hire business was a sale "in the course of a trade or business" for the purposes of
the Trade Description Act 1968. The judge said that in a car hire business it is a usual
54 See chapter 3.
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practise to buy and dispose cars and the application of the trade description in the
course of that sale was an integral part of the business of a car hire.35
In Davies v. Sumner (1984),56 the defendant, a self-employed courier, bought a car
which he used exclusively for the purpose of his business. A year later he sold the car
in part exchange for a new vehicle. He signed an invoice, recording the mileage of the
car as shown on the odometer, and received credit appropriate to that mileage against
the price of the new vehicle. He was convicted of an offence under the Trade
Description Act 1968, whereby he had falsely described the car to have travelled
18,100 miles when its true mileage was in excess of 118,000 miles. The defendant
appealed and the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the offence of
applying a false trade description contrary to section 1(1) of the Act was committed
only if the transaction in respect of which the false trade description was applied
formed an integral part of the defendant's trade or business and the fact that the car
was used substantially or even exclusively in the course of the defendant's business was
not of itself to bring the transaction into the section. The prosecution appealed against
this judgment. In dismissing the appeal it was held that, the words "in the course of
trade or business" were intended to limit the application of section 1(1) to transactions
which had some degree of regularity so that they formed part of the normal practice of
a business. There was an absence of an established practice by the defendant of buying
55
Havering London Borough Council v. Stevenson [1970] 1 WLR 1137, see Lord Parker C.J's
judgment at p. 1137. See also Buchanan-Jardine v. Hamilink 1983 SLT 149.
56
[1984] 1 WLR 1301.
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and selling cars; the disposal of a vehicle which constituted the equipment and not
stock in trade of his business did not fall within the section. Therefore, the disposal
was not an offence.
The decision in the above case was applied in the case ofR & B Customs Brokers
Co. Ltd. v. United Dominions Trust Ltd (1988).57 In this case, The plaintiff company
bought a car on conditional sale for a private use by one of the directors. The sale
arranged through the defendants, a financial company. The car was delivered before
the contract was concluded. The director discovered that there was a leakage in the
roof and he expected the dealers to put this right. Repairs were done but the defects
could not be put right. The company rejected the car and claimed damages against the
defendants for breach of contract. The defendants claimed against a third party. There
was a clause in the defendants' agreement that the conditions of description, quality or
fitness for any purpose was excluded, unless the buyer was dealing as a consumer. In
the first instance, judgment was given in favour of the company (and in favour of the
defendants against the third party). The exclusionary term in the contract was not
applicable since the company was acting as a consumer. The third party appealed and
it was held, inter alia, where an activity was merely incidental to the carrying on of a
business, a degree of regularity had to be established. Such regularity would make the
activity an integral part of the business and so was carried on in the course of that
business. On the facts of the case, the necessary degree of regularity was not proven




In both these cases, it can be seen that "in the course of business" implies that there
must be some kind of regularity in the practice or that the goods concerned form an
integral part of the business. But on the other hand, in the case ofBuchanan-Jardine
v. Hamilink (1983)58 the court held that under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the final
sale of items to wind up a business is a sale in the course of a business. In transactions
for the supply of goods, there is also this provision.59 The phrase must be given a
uniform interpretation in all these statutes which are meant to protect consumers. But
such uniform interpretation is subject to the facts of each particular case when deciding
whether the seller is really selling in the course of business.
The next relevant question to ask is, what does it mean by business? Under section
61(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and section 18 of the Supply of Goods and
Services Act 1982, "business" means to include a profession and the activities of any
government department (including a Northern Ireland department) or local or public
authority. Whatever activity which has some commercial involvement in it would be a
business, but it does not necessarily mean that the business be for profit. The rationale
for imposing such liability upon the seller in business is, because of the regularity of
58 1983 SLT 149.
59 Sections 4 & 9 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. Section 13 of the Act states that the
supplier of a service who acts in the course of a business will supply the service with reasonable care
and skill.
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their dealings they are expected to have some expertise and competence in the goods
supplied.60
(b) GOODS SUPPLIED UNDER THE CONTRACT
The phrase "goods supplied under the contract", included in the section by the 1973
Act, extended the requirement of merchantable quality to cover more than the mere
goods.61 The containers in which the goods contained and the packaging in which the
goods were packed are all included in the merchantability of goods. What about labels
and instructions, are they included in the merchantability of the goods?
(i) Liability for Labelling and Instructions
This century has witnessed the mass production of complicated goods which cannot be
used without accompanying instructions, for example computers and self-assembly
furniture. Instructions can be on how to use the goods, how to maintain the goods,
how to construct and built the goods and how to avoid hazards in relation to or
emanating from them.62 With the increase in sales of pre-packaged goods, labelling has
become an important necessity, not only as a means of identifying those goods, but
also to guide or warn the buyer-user of the correct use of the goods. The question that
arises now is, can the seller be liable for the labelling and instructions of his goods? On
60
Davies, Textbook on Commercial Law, p. 91.
61
Geddling v. Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668; Wilson v. Rickett Cockerell & Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 QB 598;
Duke v. Jackson 1921 SC 362.
62
MacLeod, "Instructions as to the Use of Consumer Goods", Law Quarterly Review, 1981, p. 550.
167
behalfof sellers, it can be argued that these are only effective forms of advertising and
marketing products. But buyers see them as valuable information which will help them
to decide the merits of the product before buying them. It was suggested that a seller
could be made liable for labelling and instructions in two ways; first, the written labels
and instructions are integrated as a term of the contract of sale. Second, it is regarded
as part of the "goods" within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, and thus
subject to the implied term under the Act which relate to quality and fitness.63
In the case of Wormell v. RHMAgriculture (East) Ltd. (1986)64 the plaintiff who
was a farmer telephoned the defendant who was a dealer in agricultural produce to
enquire whether he had any herbicide to kill wild oats in wheat fields. The defendant
recommended Commando, and this was duly ordered by the plaintiff. On the copy of
the instructions found on the cans, the product was to be applied only between
particular stages of crop growth and during particular weather conditions. It was
added that "damage may occur to crops sprayed after the recommended growth stage".
The plaintiff understood this to mean that, although damage to the crop might result,
the herbicide would nevertheless be effective to kill the wild oats. As the infestation of
wild oats was getting serious, the plaintiff was willing to run the risk of some loss to
his crop and Commando was applied later than normal. Although there was no
damage to the crop, the herbicide was ineffective to get rid of the wild oats. The
63 Ian Brown, "Liability for Labelling of Goods and Instructions for Use". Lloyd's Maritime and
Commercial Law Quarterly, 1988, p. 502.
64
[1986] 1 All ER 769.
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plaintiff sought damages from the defendants for breach of the implied terms under
section 14(2) and (3). At the first instance the decision was passed in favour of the
plaintiff, in that, there had been a breach of the implied term because the instructions
were ambigious and misleading. Those instructions on the can being part of the goods
was subject to the implied terms under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The "goods",
meaning the "Commando" in its container with its packing and instructions were not
merchantable. The defendant appealed and in allowing the appeal the Court of Appeal
held that the "Commando" had a clear warning that the contents should not be used
after a certain time and the plaintiff was given notice of that. He could not complain if
because of his own misunderstanding the herbicide was rendered unfit for its purpose.
Brown in his article suggested that the decision of the first instance was more
preferable because:-
(1) The court gave no consideration to the legal position of the instructions attached to
the goods, whereas this was a good opportunity to settle the law on this issue.
(2) While the concept ofbeing "put on notice" can be applied to the commercial buyer,
it should have minimum application in consumer sale of consumer goods.
(3) Even though the court decided that the warning was clear to the buyer, this should
not be taken as sufficient to exempt the seller from liability. If this is so, then sellers
would be encouraged to produce inferior goods and include a warning as an
exemption.
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(4) The court's decision was not in accordance with the views of the Law Commission,
which envisage imposing liability where instructions are defective or misleading.65
Tettenborn, who expressed a different view from Brown, opined that to expand the
seller's duty to encompass defective directions as well as bursting bottles is a huge leap
in the law. There is a great distinction between the two instances. The buyer in the
case of Gedling v. Marsh (1920)66 did not receive decent goods at all, while Wormell
did get what he wanted. His only complaint was that he was not being told of the
consequence of the improper use of the product. If this distinction is ignored, then
there would be a disharmony between subsections (2) and (3). Subsection (2) enables
the buyer to claim for defective goods, and subsection (3) give a claim for the buyer
who had relied on the seller's skill and judgement that the goods were fit for their
particular purpose. In the facts of Wormell's case, the buyer did not get defective
goods, but what he got was herbicide which did not answer his particular purpose. If,
defective instructions made the goods unmerchantable, then subsection (3) would be
made redundant. It would also cause injustice to the intentions of the parties and there
is a danger of over-generalisation.
The issue of seller's liability for inadequate instructions and labels was discussed by
the Law Commissions in their Working Papers.67 They suggested that goods sold
65 Ian Brown, op. cit. p. 512-513.
66
[1920] 1 KB 668.
67 Law Commissions Working Papers No. 85, para. 4:16.
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without adequate instructions would be unlikely to meet the standard of quality. This
suggestion was made in relation to the discussion on whether to include a specific
reference to the suitability for immediate use in the new definition of merchantable
quality. If its immediate use is prevented because there is no adequate instructions to
assemble the kit, then it would be likely that the goods are not of the required
standard. This is because, without adequate instructions the kit could not be
assembled or if assembled wrongly, the kit would not be fit for its purpose. However,
the suggestion (to include suitability for immediate use aspect) met with disapproval
because there are many cases where even though the goods are not suitable for
immediate use, the sales are quite proper.68 So, in their final report, the Law
Commissions dropped this aspect in the new definition of merchantable quality. This
recommendation was adopted in the 1994 Act, also without that provision.
The question now is, what is the status of instructions and how relevant is it in
deciding the fitness of the goods? The decision of the first instance in Wormell's case
echoed the view of the Law Commissions, i.e., instructions were considered part of the
goods, and therefore, would affect their quality. If they were ambigious or
complicated, and the goods could not be effectively used when applied in accordance
with such instructions, the goods were not fit for their purpose. But when the case
went on appeal to the Court ofAppeal, the decision was reversed, but nevertheless, the
court held that instructions were still relevant in deciding fitness for purpose. The
instructions in this case were clear as regards to the time for spraying. When the
68 Law Commissions' Joint Report No. 160, 1987, para 3.64.
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plaintiff used it after the recommended period, he ignored the warning and chose to
take his chance. He could not then turn around and say that the weedkiller was not fit
for its purpose.
Suppose that the instructions were, in actual fact, misleading, ambigious and
inadequate? Will it go to affect the quality of the goods? There has been no decided
case on the point, but its importance cannot be denied. The only thing to decide is
how much weight should be attached to it. This will depend on the circumstances of
the case. For example, where the buyer has the expertise or experience with the
goods, to him the instructions may be a mere notice. What is more relevant to him is
his expertise and experience rather than the instructions. On the other hand, if the
buyer is not an expert and this is the first time that he comes across the particular
thing, he will need as much information as possible regarding it. In this latter situation,
instructions would be given due weight because the buyer relies on them to enable that
the thing can be used for its purpose.
(ii) Second-hand Goods
The statutory provisions about quality are as applicable to second-hand goods as to
new goods. However, such goods, bought at a lower price, cannot be expected to be
in as perfect condition as new goods which are bought at a higher price. Thus, one
might expect to find that the acceptable level of fitness is lower as regards used goods.
There are many cases involving sale of second-hand goods and most of them concern
motor vehicles. From these cases it can be seen that there are various legal attitudes
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towards merchantability of second-hand vehicles. Starting with the case of Bartlett v.
SidneyMarcus Ltd (1965),69 here there was a sale of a used Jaguar car for £950. The
seller warned the buyer that the clutch might need a minor repair. After four weeks
and after having driven for some 300 miles, the buyer had to carry out the repair which
cost him £45. He claimed damages for breach of section 14 but his claim was
dismissed by the court on the ground that the car was "in usable condition even though
not perfect.... It was fit to be driven along the road safely." The court accepted the
fact that a second-hand car would be likely to require repair sooner than a new one
would. And the more valuable the car, the more expensive is the repair.
A more favourable result for the buyer is found in the case of Crowther v. Shannon
Motors Co. (1975).70 The buyer bought a Jaguar for £390 on the assurance by the
seller that it was in good condition. The car was an eight-year-old model and had run
over 80,000 miles. The buyer had driven the car for 2,354 miles over a period of three
weeks, after which the engine seized up. The engine was found to be in an extremely
bad condition, and a reconditioned engine had to be fitted. The buyer claimed
damages for the cost of the replacement engine and for the loss of use, totalling £460.
The Court of Appeal held for the buyer and awarded him the amount of damages
claimed. This case was distinguished from the earlier case of Bartlett on the ground
that a "clapped out" engine was something totally different from minor repairs.
69
[1965] 1 WLR 1013.
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The case of Lee v. York Coach and Marine (1977)71 also involved sale of a
second-hand vehicle. The car was found to be unmerchantable but the buyer was not
allowed to reject it because of lapse of time. The buyer bought a second-hand Morris
1100 for £355. Shortly after the purchase the car was off the road for repairs by the
seller, which were not too successful. Seven weeks after the sale, the buyer through
her solicitors sought to rescind the contract, but the seller offered to do some further
repairs. The car was found to have severe defects. Four months later the buyer
brought an action claiming for the return of the price. The Court of Appeal found that
the car was far from being merchantable. But nevertheless, the buyer could not reject
because it was too late and she was deemed to have accepted the car. She was only
awarded damages to the amount of £100.
In a more recent case, a further change in the attitude can be seen. In Business
Appliances Specialists Ltd. v. Nationwide Credit Corpn. Ltd, (1988)72 the buyer
bought a second-hand Mercedes car which had done some 37,000 miles for £14,850.
After a few months and after travelling for only 800 miles, some defects began to
appear. These defects were repaired costing £635. In the course of the trial expert
evidence was given to show that such defects were not usual on Mercedes cars of such
age and mileage. It was nevertheless held in this case that there was no breach of the
implied condition of merchantable quality. It must be expected of a second-hand






Guarantee Corp. Ltd. (1988)73 the court made a different finding. As already noted,
the car in this case had been submerged in water for some 24 hours and had been the
insurance company "write-off'. Although there were no specific allegation of defects,
the Court ofAppeal held that it was not merchantable.
(iii) Time and Durability
Section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides for the merchantability of the
goods but it does not specify at what time the goods must be merchantable, nor does it
give the buyer any assurance of the durability of the goods. Can the seller be said to
have fulfilled his obligations if he provides goods which, on delivery, are reasonably fit
for their purpose and are merchantable, but within a short period thereafter proved to
be defective? Put in another way, are the implied terms of fitness and merchantable
quality continuing warranties?
In the case of Crowther v. Shannon [(975)74, the issue before the court was
whether lack of reasonable durability at the time of the sale is to be accounted a breach
of the terms implied under the Act. The plaintiff bought a second-hand Jaguar of
which engine seized up after three weeks. He claimed against the seller for breach of
the implied condition of reasonable fitness. At the county court, the judge (Judge
Micheal Lee) held in favour of the buyer that fitness for purpose here meant that the






upheld but Lord Denning expressed his doubt as to the formulation of the issue by the
county court judge. According to him "the relevant time is the time of sale" and failure
within a "reasonable time" after sale was evidence which went to show that goods
were not reasonably fit for purpose at the time when they sold. What was said by Lord
Denning, that failure within "a reasonable time" of sale as being evidence of unfitness
for purpose at the time of the sale is true, but this did not imply the requirement that
the qualities in the goods are lasting.75 If there is no requirement of durability under
the implied terms, the "reasonable period" within which the defects occurred which
was evidence of unfitness and unmerchantability at the time of the sale may be shorter
than the normal life span expected of such goods.76
In the case of Mash & Murrell Ltd v. Joseph I. Emanuel Ltd (1961)77 the
plaintiff agreed to buy from the defendant 2,000 half-bags of Cyprus Spring potatoes
then aboard the SS. Ionian bound for Liverpool. The defendant knew that the
potatoes were for human consumption. On arrival the potatoes were found to be unfit
for human consumption. The plaintiff sued for breach of the implied terms as to fitness
and merchantable quality. Diplock J (as he then was) held that there had been a breach
of the undertaking, and said that the inevitable deterioration during transit which will
render the goods unmerchantable upon arrival is normally one for which the seller is
75






liable. He also said that when goods are sold under a contract such as a c.i.f contract,
or a f.o.b. contract, which involves transit before use, there is an implied warranty not
merely that they shall be merchantable at the time they are put on the vessel, but that
they shall be in such a state that they can endure the normal journey and be in
merchantable condition upon arrival.78 What he meant is that the goods must be
merchantable not only when shipped but on arrival in the United Kingdom and for a
reasonable time thereafter. The finding of Diplock J. was however, reversed on the
facts because there was no sufficient evidence to support it.
Twenty-one years later Lord Diplock was faced again with the issue of durability in
the case ofLambert v. Lewis (1982).79 He held that the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose is a "continuing warranty which will continue for a reasonable
time after delivery, so long as they remain in the same apparent state as that in which
the goods were delivered, apart from normal wear and tear". What is reasonable is a
question of fact depending on the nature of the goods. In this case there was a tragic
accident involving the plaintiffs and the employee of a farmer who was driving a Land
Rover while towing a trailer. The trailer got unhitched and slewed across the road into
the path of the plaintiffs' car. The coupling was found to be defective so as to cause
the trailer to be detached from the towing vehicle. The issue here is whether, at the
time of the accident, the dealer's warranty of fitness of the coupling was still
continuing. The defect in the locking mechanism of the coupling was discovered by




the farmer three to six months before the accident. Up to that time, the farmer could
have relied on the dealer's warranty of fitness to escape liability. But after the defect
had become apparent to him, it would be unreasonable to hold the dealer liable for its
continuous safety. For this reason it was held that the farmer was liable for negligence
towards the plaintiffs. The dealer cannot be expected to continuously warrant the
fitness of the goods because the farmer had already become aware of it. It became his
duty to remedy the defects in his vehicle.
As far as Scotland is concerned, authorities on the question of durability is very
limited.80 In the case of Knutsen v. Mauritzen (1918)81 it was held that the implied
term of fitness for purpose is of a continuing nature. In another case, Buchanan &
Carswell v. Eugene Ltd. (1936)82 the hair-drying machine which had been used for
nineteenth months had satisfied the durability requirement. If there had been any
structural defects, they would have become apparent sooner than that. As such the
reasonable time for the durability of the goods had been met.
Whatever the law was prior to the 1994 Act, regarding durability, it was not
satisfactory for the simple reason that it was unclear. Although quality was to be
satisfied at the time of delivery, and it should continue until a reasonable time
thereafter, there was no express reference in the old provision to the concept of
80 Ervine, "Durability, Consumers and the Sale of Goods Act", 1984, Juridical Review, 147.
81 1918 1 SLT 85.
82 1936 SC 160.
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durability. Also there was no reference to the time when the term as to quality must be
satisfied. The Law Commissions proposed to resolve three particular issues relating to
the requirement of durability: -
(1) Should the requirement be that the goods should last for a "reasonable" time, or
should it lay down a "specific" length of time for which goods should last?
(2) Should the requirement be broken at the time of supply or at the later time when
the goods are shown not to have lasted as long as they should have done?
(3) Should the requirement be part of the implied term as to quality or should it be a
separate implied term98'
As to the first issue, the Law Commissions agreed that durability should be for a
"reasonable" time so as to be applicable to all types of goods, irrespective of the
treatment given to it or their grades. Secondly, the requirement of durability should
bite at the time of supply and not later. Of course it is only later that the lack of
durability will be discovered, i.e. the time when the defects become apparent. But this
will be evidence that the goods were not sufficiently durable when they were supplied.
Thirdly, the requirement of durability is only to be an aspect of quality and not a
separate implied term.84
83 Law Commissions' Joint Report No. 160 para. 3.48.
84 id. para 3.51 -3.57.
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These recommendations by the Law Commissions had been included in the 1994
Act. In subsection 2B, the quality of goods includes their state and condition, and one
of the relevant aspects of quality is durability. The other aspects include appearance
and finish, freedom from minor defects and safety. With the new legislation it is hoped
that a buyer of a new car can be rest assured that his car will not only appears new,
without any blemish on its exterior paint work, but also is free from any minor defects
and is safe to drive. In short, the new legislation should guarantee a "perfect tender"
to the buyer. This is, however, subject to description and price of the goods.
(c) EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION 14(2)
Section 14(2) provides two exceptions in which the implied condition of merchantable
quality is dispensed with. First, there is no implied condition "as regard defects
specifically drawn to the buyer's attention before the contract is made". This provision
was added into the subsection by virtue of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act
1973. The proviso required the defects to be specifically drawn to the buyer's
attention. What this means is that, the seller should point out the particular defect to
the buyer. It is not sufficient if the defect is described in the general terms or if it is not
particularised.85 How much information to be communicated to the buyers depends on
the circumstances of the case. It suffices if the information generally draws the buyer's
attention to a defect, provided that the buyer is not misled as to the nature of the
83
Goode, Commercial Law, p. 259.
180
defect.86 It is irrelevant as to who points out the defect to the buyer. But the defect
must be drawn to the buyer by somebody. The proviso has no application if the buyer
himself discovers the defect.
The second proviso is that "if the buyer examines the goods before the contract is
made there is no implied condition as regards defects which that examination ought to
reveal". It is important to note that there is no obligation for the buyer to examine and
if he does examine, even cursorily, that will not affect his right to complain about the
defects which that examination could not be expected to reveal. Under the original
provision, if there had been an examination, the buyer would not be able to sue if the
defects were not discovered due to an examination hastily done. In Thornett & Fehr
v. Beers & Sons (1919),87 the buyer bought glue from the seller but being pressed for
time he only inspected the glue from the outside although full examination was offered.
It was held in this case that the implied condition ofmerchantable quality did not apply.
The wordings in the proviso referred to the "defects which such examination ought to
have revealed". This proviso was illogical and did not make sense because it penalised
a buyer who took the trouble actually to examine (but did so carelessly) and protected
a buyer who had ample opportunity to examine but refrained from doing so. To avoid
the same result as in this case, the proviso was amended; such examination" was
replaced with "that examination". In the case of Frank v. Grosvenor Motor Auctions
86 Ibid.
87
[1919] 1 KB 486.
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Pty. Ltd (I960)88 the proviso was thought to exclude those defects which ought to
have been discovered from the actual examination. If the examination was not a
reasonable one, those defects which could have been discovered only b a reasonable
examination will not be excluded.
In R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd v. United Dominion Trust (1988)89 the buyer
took delivery of the car before the contract was legally concluded, and discovered that
the roof was leaking and this was put right by the dealers. Despite various attempts
made to repair the leak, it was still unsatisfactorily mended. The buyer sought to reject
the car on the ground that it was not fit for its purpose and was not merchantable. The
Court of Appeal held in favour of the buyer on the ground that there was a breach of
section 14(3). As regards subsection (2), the court gave no opinion on the issue.
According to Dillon L.J. the statutory wording could pose as a trap to the buyer who
took delivery of the goods before concluding the contract, because if he examined the
goods and discovered the defects, the implied condition of merchantable quality will




[1988] 1 All ER 846.
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(Ill) MERCHANTABILITY UNDER OTHER STATUTES
(a) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code discrimates between a merchant seller and a casual
seller. On a merchant seller it imposes a higher standard compared to a non-merchant
seller. Who is a merchant? Under the Code a merchant is someone who deals in
goods of the kind in question or one who by his occupation represents himself as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction
or if he or she employs someone who qualifies as a merchant, under the first two
definitions, to act on his or her behalf.90
Article 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code creates an implied warranty of
merchantable quality. It provides:-
(1) Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to the goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value
of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:-
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
90
Dunfee, Business Law, p. 352.
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(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labelled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified other implied warranties may arise from
course of dealing and trade usage.
Under this Article, goods are merchantable if they are fit for the ordinary purposes
for which they are sold. In the case of Taterka v. Ford Motor Company (1978)91
Taterka bought a Ford Mustang from a Ford Dealer. After thirty-four months and
75,000 miles, he discovered that the tail light assembly gaskets on his car had been
installed in such a way as to enable water to enter the tail light and caused it to rush.
Taterka sued Ford for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The court
held that there was no breach and he appealed. On appeal, the decision of the lower
court was upheld. The Supreme Court held that, where automobiles are concerned,
the term "merchantable quality" has only been applied where a single defect poses a
substantial safety hazard or numerous defects classify the car as a "lemon". The rust
problem did not render the car unfit for its purpose.
91 271 N.W.2d 653 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1978)
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If such a case happens in the United Kingdom, would the court decide it the same
way? Under the new provision, it is likely that the court will not decide that the car is
merchantable, because quality also refers to appearance and finish. A new car does not
only serve as a mere "means of transport, but of doing so with comfort, ease of
handling and reliability and be of pride in its outward and interior appearance." 92 But
then again in the above case, the car had been driven for some 75,000 miles and had
been used without any problem for about thirty-four months. In this situation, it is
unlikely for the court to say that dealer's warranty should still continue.93 If the rust
became apparent within "reasonable time" after delivery, then maybe it would be
reasonable to hold the dealer liable for continuous warranty.
The Code provides a specific provision for sale of food and drink. It implies a
warranty that they should be fit for their ordinary purpose, i.e., for human
consumption. In deciding whether the food and drink are merchantable or not, there
are two alternative tests adopted by the courts. One is the "foreign-natural
distinction", where food is merchantable if it contains elements that are natural to the
product. For example, while eating a cherry pie, Z broke his teeth because he
accidentally chewed a cherry pit. The presence of the pit is not foreign to the food,
therefore, it would still be merchantable. It would be different if there was a piece of
metal in the pie. The other test is the "reasonable expectation test". The question
asked is, would it be reasonable to expect the defective element in the foods? If it is
92
Rogers v. Parish (Scarborough) Ltd. [1987] QB 923.
93 Lambert v. Lewis [1982] AC 225.
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reasonable, the goods are merchantable. This test is quite similar to the first one; one
would expect something which is natural as opposed to something which is foreign.94
In the case of Webster v. Blue Ship Tearoom, Inc. (1964)95 the plaintiff choked on fish
bone while eating fish chowder. Court held that since fish chowder is made from large
chunks of fish, it was reasonable to expect the presence of bones in the soup.
(b) VIENNA CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
The Convention provides in Article 35(2) that:-
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform
with the contract unless they:
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would
ordinarily be used;
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for
him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgment;
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a
sample or model;
91 Wren v. Holt [1903] 1 WLR 506, plaintiff recovered damages for breach of implied condition of
merchantability ofbeer which was contaminated by arsenic.
95 198 N.E. 2d 309 (Mass. 1964).
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(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where
there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the
goods.
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding
paragraph for the lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of the
conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of
such lack of conformity.
Article 35(2)(a) lays down the seller's responsibility for quality. The fundamental
idea underlying this responsibility is to imply things that go without saying.96 Things
are bought for use or consumption, therefore, they must be fit for their purposes. For
example, raw materials are bought for processing; machinery is bought for use in
production; commodities are bought for resale. It would be tedious to develop
detailed technical specification of the goods; hence, paragraph 2(a) asks, "are the
goods fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be
used?"
The Convention lays down a similar test ofmerchantability as in the American law
and the English law prior to the 1994 amendment. The test is, whether the goods are
"fit for the purposes for which such goods of the same description would ordinarily be
96 Honnold, Uniform Law of International Sales Under the 1980 UN Convention, 1982, p. 252.
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used". Thus, all the three statutes refer to the purposes of the goods, in order to
decide their merchantability.
(TV) CONCLUSION
The implied term ofmerchantability is the most important aspect of the law of sale and
it has undergone so many changes since the time it was recognised. The latest change
was made in the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994. The Law Commissions thought
that a change in the terminology was necessary because it is out-moded. It is relevant
to merchants' transaction and to natural produce rather than to consumer sales and
manufactured goods. Also, it was felt that the old definition stresses too much on the
issue of fitness for purpose/s, in relation to description and price, rather than other
aspects of quality, like, appearance, finish, freedom from minor defects, safety and
durability. The proposal for a change came as early as 1987, together with the change
in attitude of the courts, but it finally came to be a reality in 1994. The Act
incorporated the recommendations of the Law Commissions and at the same time
endorsed the decisions of the courts.
Are there any difference in the definition of merchantable quality under the English
law, American law and under the Convention? Under the English law, "merchantable
quality" has been replaced with "satisfactory quality" while in America the term
"merchantable quality" is still being used. Besides this difference in the term used,
there is basically no difference because,
(1) all the three laws implied that warranty,
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(2) they recognise that goods are merchantable if they are fit for their usual purposes,
(3) they extend merchantable quality to containers, packages and labels.
The other difference is that, the English law and American law impose this
responsibility on merchant sellers but exclude none-merchant sellers. The Convention,
however, has no such restriction because of the character of international sales and the
exclusion in Article 2(a) "of goods bought for personal, family or household use".
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CHAPTER FIVE
UNDERTAKING OF FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE
INTRODUCTION
Section 14(3) contains the last of the series of the graduated protections to the buyer in
a contract of sale of goods. In this chapter, I will discuss the background of the
implied term of fitness for particular purpose, to see what are the changes and the
reasons for the change. Reference will be made to the 1969 Law Commissions'
Report on the Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Part two will consist of
the discussion of the elements of the section, followed by part three, on the relationship
between section 14(3) and section 14(2). Part four will discuss fitness for a particular
purpose as found in other statutes. Part five will be the conclusion and an assessment
ofwhether section 14(3) is still necessary, given how wide section 14(2) now is.
(I) BACKGROUND TO FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE
The undertaking that the goods must be fit for the particular purpose required by the
buyer is provided for in section 14(3) of the Sale ofGoods Act 1979 which reads:-
"Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business and the buyer,
expressly or by implication, makes known - (a) to the seller, or (b)
where the purchase price or part of it is payable by instalments and the
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goods were previously sold by a credit-broker to the seller, to that
credit-broker, any particular purpose for which the goods are being
bought, there is an implied condition that the goods supplied under the
contract are reasonably fit for that purpose, whether or not that is a
purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied, except where
the circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or that it is
unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill or judgement of the seller or
credit-broker."
Like the implied warranty ofmerchantable quality in section 14(2), the provision of
section 14(3) was a substitution of the former section 14(1), made by the Supply of
Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. The further amendments to it were made by the
Consumer Credit Act 1974. This section remained unchanged until the present day
and the 1994 Act has not affected the provision of this section.
Originally section 14(1) read, "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to
show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgement, and the goods are of a
description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply (whether he be the
manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably
fit for such purpose, provided that in the case of a contract for the sale of a specified
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article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied condition as to its
fitness for any particular purpose."
Like the condition of merchantable quality, fitness for particular purpose was
originally implied into contracts where the buyer could not exercise his own judgment
because the goods were not in existence or because he had not the necessary special
skill. Where the goods were unascertained, the buyer would buy by mere description
of the quality the goods should have, and also by a specification of the purpose or
purposes for which the goods were required. The specification of the purpose by the
buyer would indicate that he was relying on the seller's skill or judgment to supply
goods fit for that particular purpose/s.
Under the old provision, section 14(1), the goods were fit for the buyer's particular
purpose if:-
(1) the buyer expressly or by implication makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which he requires the goods; and
(2) he relies on the seller's skill or judgment; and
(3) the goods are of a description which it is in the ordinary course of the
seller's business to supply (whether he is the manufacturer or not).
There was a proviso, i.e., that where goods were sold by patent or trade name, this
warranty would be excluded.
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Thus under this old section, the buyer need not inform the seller as to the usual or
the ordinary purpose of the goods. It would be implied even though the buyer did
nothing to indicate that he required the goods for that purpose. But if the purpose is
unusual, this must be expressly made known to the seller.1 The implied or expressed
communication of purpose will indicate whether there was reliance on the seller's skill
and judgment. Finally, it must be proven that the goods must be in the course of the
seller's business to supply. However, it was not necessary that the seller should deal in
goods of that description. It would be sufficient if the goods are of a similar type.2
In 1969, the Law Commissions together with the Scottish Law Commissions made
these suggestions:1
(1) The warranty should be implied in all sales where the seller sells in the
course of business. This was necessary to avoid the problem of proving that
the seller dealt with goods of the relevant description.
(2) To delete the proviso from the subsection because it was redundant. When
the buyer relied on the seller's skill and judgment, there could no longer be a
sale under trade or patent name.
1 Kendall & Sons v. Lillico & Sons [1968] 3 WLR 110.
2
Spencer Trading Co. Ltd v. Devon [1947] a All ER. 284.
3 Law Commissions Joint Report No. 24. 1969.
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(3) To shift the burden of proving reliance from the buyer to the seller. The
seller has to disprove reliance by showing that it was not reasonable to rely on
his skill or judgment. This meant that reliance would be implied, but the buyer
had to inform the seller of any unusual purpose to which the goods will be put
to.
Besides the above, another important change to section 14(3) was the reference to
credit-brokers which was introduced by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The section
thus covers also communications made by the buyer to a dealer who actually sells the
goods to the seller (usually finance company) who then sells them to the buyer on
credit.4
(II) ELEMENTS UNDER SECTION 14(3)
A buyer who wishes to sue the seller for breach of the implied term of fitness for
particular purpose, has to satisfy these elements: -
(a) Seller sells in the course ofbusiness.
(b) Goods are supplied under the contract.
(c) Expressly or impliedly made known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are required.
4
Benjamin's Sale of Goods, p. 472 - 473.
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(d) There was reliance on the seller's skill and judgment.
The first and second elements of the section also appear in section 14(2) and have
been discussed under that head in the earlier chapter.5
(a) KNOWLEDGE BY THE SELLER OF THE PARTICULAR PURPOSE
As we have seen earlier, if the buyer requires the goods for their usual or normal
purpose, then knowledge by the seller would be implied. It is not necessary for the
buyer to communicate the purpose expressly to the seller. For example, where food is
bought, its obvious purpose is for consumption, so it must be fit for that purpose. In
Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co. (1905)6 the seller supplied milk to the buyer for the
purpose ofhuman consumption. The milk was contaminated with typhoid germs. The
court held that the milk was not fit for human consumption. Sometimes the goods may
have only one ordinary purpose. In the case ofPriest v. Last (1903)7 a draper bought
a hot water bottle from a chemist. The indian-rubber hot water bottle proved defective
and caused injury to its user. Section 14(3) was used by the buyer but challenged on
the ground that it was not applicable: a hot water bottle had only one function, and the
mere ordering of the goods by name or description did not constitute "some distinct
5 See chapter six.
6
[1905] 1 KB 608.
7
[1903] 2 KB 148, see also Frost v. Aylesbury [1905] 1 KB 608.
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communication of the particular purpose for which the article was purchased". It was
held by Collins M R. that, in order to give rise to the implied condition of fitness, it
must be shown that, although the article sold was capable of general use for many
purposes, it was sold for a particular purpose. Where the description of the goods
points to one particular purpose only, it seems that the first requirement of the
subsection was met.8
If the buyer requires the goods for a particular purpose, which is one of the normal
purposes to which the goods are put to use, he must communicate this purpose to the
seller. There must be some sort of an express communication, but not necessarily in
the form of an express contractual agreement. It is sufficient if there is an extrinsic
communication, as in the case of Bristol Tramways, etc. Carriage Co. Ltd. v. Fiat
Motors Ltd (1910).9 Here, the sellers knew that the buses were required for carrying
passengers in Bristol, a city with steep hills. The buses proved unsuitable and the
sellers were liable.
8 Id. p. 153.
9
[1910] 2 KB 831.
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The particular purpose for which the goods were required can also be
communicated to the seller by virtue of previous transactions between the parties.10 In
Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. (1936)11 Lord Wright said:-
"There is no need to specify in terms the particular purpose for which
the buyer requires the goods, which is nonetheless the particular
purpose within the meaning of the section, because it is the only
purpose for which anyone would ordinarily want the goods."12
There is a qualification to this rule and that is where there is any special purpose or
circumstances of the buyer, of which the seller ought to have known before exercising
his skill or judgment. Without that knowledge the seller will not be liable. In Griffiths
v. Peter Conway Ltd (1939)13 the buyer bought a Harris Tweed coat from the seller
and after using it she contracted dermatitis. The coat was found to be harmless to an
ordinary person but the buyer suffered the disease, due to the sensitivity of her skin.
The court held that the seller was not liable for the unfitness of the coat. Lord Greene
M.R. said that if there is any particular abnormality suffered by the buyer, that must be
10 Manchester Liners v. Rea [1922] 2 AC 74.
11
[1936] AC 85.
12 Id. p. 99.
13
[1939] 1 All ER 685.
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brought to the seller's attention because only with that information could he exercise
his skill or judgement.
This case was distinguished from Manchester Liners Ltd. v. Rea (1922).14 The
seller supplied coal to the buyer for use by their ship, The Manchester Importer. There
was a limited supply of coal due to the strike, and the buyer knew that there was only
one source of supply. The coal was found not to be suitable for use and the seller was
held liable for breach of the implied condition of fitness. The point of distinction was
that there was a standard or normal type of ship from which the buyer's ship differed.
In other words, each ship is different from the other and if the seller undertook to
supply coal to a particular ship, then the coal supplied must be suitable for use by that
ship. On the other hand, in Griffiths v. Conway Ltd the buyer differed from the
ordinary person who would not have been affected by the coat. It was her abnormal
sensitivity that caused her to suffer.
In the case ofAshington Piggeries (1972),15 the animal food manufacturer claimed
against the supplier for supplying herring meals which were contaminated. The
suppliers knew that the manufacturer required the meal for compounding food for
animals and not for fertilisers. What they did not know was that the meal was for
14




compounding food for minks. The meal was poisonous to other animals but fatal to
mink. The court held that the supplier was in breach of the implied condition of
fitness. Even though the supplier did not know specifically the purpose for which the
meal was required, it was reasonably foreseeable to expect that the meal might be fed
to the mink. Similarly, in the case of Kendall v. Lillico (1969)16 the Brazilian
groundnut extraction was found to be unfit for the purpose of compounding into
feeding-stuff for cattle and poultry. Although only poultry, and not cattle, were
affected by the contamination, the court held that there was a breach of section 14(3).
(b) RELIANCE
Reliance is the very thing that gives rise to the liability of the seller. Under the former
provision it had to be shown that, either expressly or by implication, the buyer had
made known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods were required, so
as to show that he relied on the seller's skill or judgment. The onus of proof was on
him to show that there had been reliance. But reliance was almost always implied from
the facts, e.g. when a buyer goes to the shop to buy an item, he is confident that the
shopkeeper has selected his wares with skill and judgement.17 When the purpose was
not usual or special, the buyer had to make it known expressly to the seller to enable
him to exercise his skill or judgment.
16
[1969[ 2 AC 31.
17 See Lord Wright in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. [1936] AC 85 at p. 99.
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Because reliance is almost always implied, the new provision now presumes
reliance until it is positively disproved, or until the seller can show it to have been
unreasonable. The burden is on the seller to rebut the implication. Rebuttal is not
easy, especially when the buyer had indicated to him the particular purpose for which
the goods were bought. But there are some instances whereby the court will find that
there is no reliance and thus no implied condition of fitness for particular purpose.
Firstly, where the buyer selects the goods from the stock himself, he is relying on his
own skill or judgment.'8 Secondly, where the buyer knows that the seller only supplies
one particular commodity, he must be regarded to have taken as it is what he buys.19
Thirdly, the seller may expressly declare to the buyer that he is not purporting to
exercise his skill or judgment, but this might be caught by the Unfair Contract Terms
Act 1977.20
If there is reliance, but that reliance is unreasonable, a claim under section 14(3)
will not succeed. In what circumstances will reliance be held unreasonable? If the
18 H. Beecham & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Francis Howard & Co. Pty. Ltd._[ 1921] VLR 428 - buyers selected
timber themselves from the sellers' stock.
19 Wren v. Holt [1903] 1 KB 610. Buyer bought Holden beer from a public house which was
contaminated with arsenic. He knew that the seller only stock Holden beer and he went there in fact
to drink Holden beer which he likes. Claim under section 14(3) failed for there was no reliance.
20
Harlingdon & Leinster Ltd. v. Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd. [1990] 1 All ER. 737.
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parties to the contract of sale have equal expertise, or if the buyer has greater expertise
or knowledge than the seller, then it would be unreasonable to expect reliance. In
Teheran-Europe Co. Ltd. v. S.T. Bolton (Tractors) Ltd. (1968)21 the seller sold air
compressor machines to the buyer with the knowledge that it was meant for export to
Iran. The machines were alleged to be unfit for use in that country. It was held that
the buyer was presumed to have the necessary knowledge of the conditions in its
country, and was therefore relying on its own judgment rather than the seller's.
Diplock L.J said in his judgment that,
"Where a foreign merchant .... buys by description goods .... for resale
in his own country, of which he has no reason to suppose the English
seller has any special knowledge, it flies in the face of common sense to
suppose that he relies on anything but his own knowledge of the market
in his own country and his own commercial judgement as to what is
saleable there".22
What is the situation when both the parties are dealers in the type of goods sold?
Can there be said to be reliance by the buyer on the seller? In the case of Kendall v.
Lillico (1969)23 the buyer and the seller were both members of the London Cattle
21
[1968] 2 QB 545.
22 Lord Diplock at p. 560-561.
23
[1969] 2 AC 31.
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Food Trade Association. The seller argued that since they were of the same
association, there could be no reliance on their skill and judgment. It was held by the
majority of the House of Lords that this fact was not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of reliance by the buyer on the seller.
Reliance need not necessary be total. Accordingly, partial reliance may be sufficient
to give rise to liability. In Cammed Laird Ltd v. Manganese Bronze and Brass Ltd
(1934)24 the buyer instructed the seller to construct two propellers for a ship based on
certain specifications provided by the former. There were some aspects of it which
were left to be decided by the seller, for example, the thickness of the propellers.
When the propellers were ready they were found not to be fit for use because they
were not thick enough. It was held by the House of Lords that, since this matter was
not within the specifications, the buyer was therefore relying on the skill or judgment
of the seller. According to Lord Sumner in Medway Oil and Storage Co. v. Silica Gel
Corp. (1928),25 reliance is a question of fact to be answered by examining all that was
said or done with regard to the proposed transaction on either side from its first
inception to the conclusion of the contract. The reliance in question must be such as to




(1928) 33 Com. Cas. 195.
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(c) EXTENT OF SELLER'S LIABILITY
Section 14(3) imposes a duty on the seller to supply goods which were "reasonably fit
for the particular purpose" required by the buyer. He does not promise to sell
something which is absolutely suitable for the buyer's purpose, but something
reasonably fit for the purpose needed by the buyer. When cars are the subject-matter
of the sale, it must be accepted as "reasonably fit" if it goes "satisfactorily" as distinct
from "perfectly". But if new cars develop major defects which are very annoying, such
as the seizure of the engine every 100 miles or a broken throttle cable, that means that
the car is far from being reasonably fit for its purpose. As regards second-hand
vehicles, one might naturally expect a lower level of fitness because a used vehicle will
not be as fit as a new one. Thus, the concept of "reasonable fitness" is a subjective one
depending on the nature of the goods involved. In Bartlett v. Sidney Marcus Ltd,
(1965)26 a claim under section 14(3) was dismissed because the car was in usable
condition even though not perfect and it was fit to be driven along the road in safety.
Lord Denning said that "a buyer should realise that, when he buys a second-hand car
defects may appear sooner or later and in the absence of an express warranty, he has
no redress. Even when he buys from a dealer the most that he can require is that it
should be reasonably fit for that purpose of being driven along the road". If, however,
26
[1965] 1 WLR 1013.
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the condition of the vehicle is so defective so as to make it unfit to be driven on the
road, then the court will not hesitate to say that there is a breach of section 14(3).27
What if the defects are those which do not really affect its function as a car? Will
cosmetic defects entitle a claim under section 14(3)? It was suggested that factors
which affect the merchantability of the goods will also affect its fitness.28
Once the elements of the section have been established, the seller cannot disclaim
liablity by saying that he was not aware of the defects or had already taken reasonable
care to make sure the goods were fit. His duty is strict and this is seen in the case of
Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co. (1905).29 Here milk which was sold for family use was
contaminated with typhoid germs. This fact was not discoverable by the naked eye and
could only be detected by a scientific investigation. Despite this, the seller was held to
be responsible for the breach of the implied condition of fitness.
The strict obligation of the seller is extended to cover not only goods actually
bought by the buyer, but also containers and packages in which the goods were sold.
The implied condition is breached even if there is a minor defect which could be easily
2 See Crowther v. Shannon Motor Co. [1975] 1 All ER 139.
28
Atiyah, Sale of Goods, p. 187.
29
[1905] 1 KB 608.
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and cheaply rectified. In the case of Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley, Ingham &
Co. (1978)30 the seller supplied the buyer with an animal-food hopper for storing food
for pigs. When it was supplied the seller failed to provide for proper ventilation. This
had caused the food to be mouldy and when eaten by the pigs, they suffered intestinal
disease and many died. It was held that despite the trivial defect which could simply be
put right, there had been a breach of section 14(3).
In this case, the consequence of the breach was extensive because 254 pigs of the
value of £10,000 died. The buyer also lost sales and turnover resulting in big financial
loss. The total claim was £20,000 or £30,000. A question arises as to whether the
seller will be held liable if the consequence of the breach is beyond foresight. The
buyer was entitled to recover the actual loss but not loss of profits. In Vacwell
Engineering Co. Ltd v. B D H Chemical (1971 f1 the plaintiffs were manufacturers
of plant and the defendants were manufacturers of chemicals. The plaintiffs were
accustomed to getting supplies of chemicals from the defendants which usually contain
warnings of industrial hazards. The plaintiffs requested the supply of a certain
chemical to be used in manufacturing a plant and this was communicated to the
defendants. The defendants supplied the plaintiffs with the chemical contained in glass




[1971] 1 QB 88.
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was liable to explode in contact with water. The manufacture process required the
ampoules to be washed in water to get rid of the labels and while that was done, there
was a violent explosion, causing extensive damage to the plaintiffs' property. A claim
was made for the damage and loss of profit suffered. It was held that the goods were
not fit for the purpose for which they were bought. The defendants were liable to the
extent that they ought to have foreseen that the chemical would come in contact with
water, and they had not warned the plaintiffs of this fact.
(Ill) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTIONS 14(2) AND 14(3)
Lord Diplock in the case ofMash & Murrell Ltd v. Joseph I. Emanuel Ltd (1961)32
stated his opinion on the relationship between section 14(3) and section 14(2). He
said:-
"Subsections (3) and (2) of section 14 of the Act are really two sides of
the same coin. If a buyer makes known a particular purpose - those, of
course, are the words of the subsection - to the seller so as to show that
he relies on the seller's skill and judgement, then the suitability for that
particular purpose is a warranty and implied condition of the contract.
If he does not make known any particular purpose, then, the




which such goods are intended to be used, the implied condition is one
that they are fit for those ordinary purposes, that is to say, that they are
merchantable, and I venture to think that there is no other distinction
between subsection (3) and subsection (2)."
Between subsections (2) and (3) of section 14, there are some similarities, and to a
certain extent they overlap. There are also differences. First, subsection (2) applies to
the normal purposes of the goods and subsection (3) applies to a particular purpose
which was made known by the buyer to the seller. Where the goods have only one
purpose, and it is not fit for that purpose, that will amount to breach of both
subsections. If the goods have more than one normal purpose, and it is fit for only one
purpose, it is merchantable under subsection (2). But if it is fit for all the other
purposes but not fit for the buyer's particular purpose, subsection (3) is breached.
The standard of protection is higher in subsection (3) because the buyer has made
known to the seller the purpose for which the goods are bought and that he has relied
on the latter's skill or judgement. If the buyer can bring himself under subsection (3),
his chances of success are greater than if he claims under subsection (2). But, on the
other hand, if there is no reliance or reliance is unreasonable, subsection (2) will be
more appropriate.
33 See Ashinton Piggeries Ltd. Christopher Hill Ltd. [1972] AC 441; Kendall v. Lillico [1969] 1 AC
31; Aswan Engineering Establishment Co. v. Lupdine [1987] 1 WLR 1.
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This brings us to the second difference between the subsections. In subsection (3)
there must be reliance on the seller's skill or judgment, but this is not a requirement
under subsection (2). Reliance may be rebutted when the buyer selects his own goods
and examines them himself, or when reliance is unreasonable. So, when the buyer
carries out the examination, subsection (3) will be excluded. But if he makes it clear to
the seller that despite examining the goods himself, he still relies on the seller's skill or
judgement, that partial reliance will give rise to liability under subsection (3). On the
other hand, examination by the buyer will exclude subsection (2) because the proviso
to it will be invoked, i.e. if the buyer examines and he fails to notice any defect which
ought to have been revealed by that examination, subsection (2) will not be applicable.
In instances where the defect is brought to the buyer's attention, both the subsections
are excluded because their provisos become effective.'14 In subsection (3), knowledge
of the defect on the part of the buyer makes it unreasonable for him to rely on the
seller's skill or judgment.
34 Section 14(2)(a) ".... As regard defects specifically drawn to the buyer's attention before the
contract is made."
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(IV) FITNESS FOR PURPOSE UNDER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
AND VIENNA CONVENTION
Article 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that, implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose arises where: (1) the seller has reason to know a particular
purpose for which the buyer requires the goods; (2) the seller has reason to know that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select suitable goods; and (3)
the buyer in fact relies on the seller's skill or judgment in purchasing the goods. "3 The
seller must have reason to know of the buyer's particular purpose and the buyer's
reliance. There is no need to prove actual knowledge. Therefore, particular purpose
and reliance need not be explicit, but can be reasonably inferred from the
circumstances.36 In the case of Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1967)37, Vlases
purchased 2000 chickens from Montgomery Ward to start a chicken business. After
receiving the birds, Vlases discovered that they were afflicted with avian leukosis, a
bird cancer. Vlases sued Montgomery Ward for breaches of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Montgomery Ward claimed that
the disease was not detectable in baby chicks, and that the chicks could have become ill
after the sale. The court held that Montgomery Ward was responsible for breach of the
35
Metzger, et. al.Business Law and the Regulatory Environment, p. 834.
36 Ibid.
37 377 F. 2d 846 (3d Cir 1967).
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warranties. The reason is because, it is the purpose of the implied warranties to make
the seller responsible for selling inferior goods. That the defect was difficult to
discover is not an adequate defence. The law does not care what precaution the seller
took. The issue is merely the quality of the goods provided to the buyer. The quality
was inferior and there was no exclusion of the warranties, therefore the seller was
liable.
Article 2-315 is imposed on any seller (not just merchant), but requires 2 elements;
that the seller knew the particular purpose for which the goods were bought and the
buyer relied on the seller to select the goods. Actual knowledge of the particular
purpose is not required so long as the circumstances of the purchase are such that the
seller should have reason to know the purpose. In Catania v. Brown (1967)38, the
plaintiff entered the defendant's retail paint business and asked the defendant to
recommend a paint to cover the exterior stucco walls of the plaintiff's house. The
defendant was told that the stucco was in a "chalky" and "powdery" condition. The
defendant advised the plaintiff to "wire brush" any loose particles which were "flaky"
or "scaly" before applying any paint. The defendant recommended and sold to the
plaintiff a paint known as Pierce's shingle and shake paint and told him to mix 2-3
gallons of paint in a container and to add a thinner. The plaintiff" followed the
instruction and five months after the date of the purchase, the paint on the exterior
38 231 A.2d 668 1967.
210
walls of the plaintiffs house began to peel, flake and blister. The issue before the court
was whether an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose exist? The court
answered in the affirmative and said that in creating an implied warranty of fitness, the
court acknowledge that two requirements must be met; (1) the buyer must rely on the
seller's skill and judgment to select or furnish suitable goods and (2) the seller, at the
time of the contracting must have reason to know the buyer's purpose. In every case it
is a matter of fact whether these requirements are met. These facts exist in the case.
However, a claim would be unlikely to succeed if the buyer has more expertise than
the seller, or he has submitted the detailed specifications of the goods he wishes and he
actually selects the goods himself. In Lewis and Sims, Inc. v. Key Industries, Inc.
(1976)39 the plaintiff, a contracting corporation, was installing a water sewer system in
the town ofNorth Pole, Alaska. It ordered pipe stating only the size and quantity of
the pipe and that the pipe be "coal tar enamel lined". The pipe which were supplied
could not withstand the intense cold and before the pipelines could be constructed, the
enamel lining had pulled away from the pipe. Because of this it was rejected, and the
plaintiff had to purchase other pipe. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for
breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. In the first instance,
judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. The appeal
court reversed the decision of the trial judge and found that on the facts of the case,
there had been no reliance by the plaintiff on the skill and judgment of the defendant.
39 16 Wash App 619, 557 P2d 1318 (1976).
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The court found that the plaintiff had ordered a specific size and type of pipe and any
deviation from the coal tar enamel lined pipe that was manufactured would not have
been accepted. In short, neither was the defendant asked for its recommendations, nor
did it select the pipe or lining to be used. Reliance upon the seller's skill and judgment
had not been manifested.
As mentioned above, under the American law, the warranty of fitness, does not
require that the seller must be a merchant. When the seller warrants fitness, he
impliedly promises that the goods will be fit for the buyer's particular purpose, not the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.40 In this aspect the American law is
better compared to the English law which confines this implied warranty to a seller
who sells in the course ofbusiness, and that makes him a merchant.
Under the Vienna Convention, fitness for particular purpose is found in Article
35(2)(b). It states that goods do not conform with the contract unless they are fit for
any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of
the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer did
not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill or judgment.
This is similar to the American and English laws, where the buyer should inform the
40 ibid.
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seller the particular purpose for which the goods were required. The communication
should be made before the conclusion of the contract.
(V) CONCLUSION
Section 14(3) and section 14(2) overlap where goods are bought for their normal
purpose and they are not fit for this purpose. Both the conditions of quality and fitness
are broken and the buyer can plead breach ofboth conditions. In Aswan Engineering
Establishment Co. v. Lupdine Ltd (1987),41 the Court of Appeal held that goods
which have more than one normal purpose will be merchantable if they are fit for any
one of their normal purposes. But if the buyer wants the goods for a particular
purpose, he must make that known to the seller before he can rely on section 14(3).
With the passing of the 1994 Act, section 14(2) is given a wide interpretation.
Goods are merchantable if they are "fit for all the purposes for which goods of the kind
in question are commonly supplied". So, where a buyer buys for a particular purpose
but does not specify that purpose to the seller, he can rely on section 14(2) if the goods
are not fit for his purpose; provided that the particular purpose is one of the normal
purposes of the goods.
41
[1987] 1 All ER 135.
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Given the wide scope of section 14(2), can we do away with section 14(3)? The
answer is no, because these two subsections overlap only in cases where the buyer
buys for a normal purpose. But if he requires the goods for an unusual purpose,
section 14(2) has no application. He still has to fall back on to section 14(3). He has
to inform the seller of the unusual purpose to show reliance on the seller's skill and
judgment and rely on section 14(3). For this reason, the Law Commissions opined that
the overlap was immaterial.42 Different aspects of fitness are covered by the two
subsections.
42





It is a common practice for one of the parties to a contract to insert or introduce into
the contract clauses purporting to avoid, limit or restrict the legal rights, duties,
liabilities and remedies which might otherwise arise. Such clauses are introduced by
the proferens, the one who purports to rely on it, in order to exclude or limit his
liabilities or obligations that would otherwise accrue to him. An example is a clause
that excludes conditions, warranties or other undertakings which would usually be
implied in favour of the other party. In sale ofgoods, it would be the seller who would
insert an exemption clause to exclude the implied terms favouring the buyer. This
chapter consists of a discussion on the development, effectiveness and the limitations
on exemption clauses in sale of goods. A comparison will be made with the American
law as well as the Vienna Convention.
(I) DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON EXEMPTION CLAUSE
Under the Sale of Goods Act 1893, there was a wide freedom for the seller to contract
out of the implied terms contained in the Act. Sections 12 to 15 contained words that
had the effect that an express agreement could exclude the implied terms. There was
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also the general provision for contracting out in section 55. This unlimited right of
contracting out was one of the issues considered and reported by the Law
Commissions in their 1969 joint report on the amendments to the Sale of Goods Act
1893.1
Among the proposals of the Law Commissions were:-
(1) The contracting out of the implied term of title in section 12 should be
banned or prohibited in all sales because, if this was allowed, there would be no
sale. In every contract for the sale of goods, there is the transfer of title from
the seller to the buyer. The Law Commissions found that there was no
justification to exclude or vary the implied condition of title, except where it
was clear that the seller was purporting to sell only a limited title.
(2) In relation to the implied terms in sections 13 and 14, exclusions would be
banned in "consumer sales".
The meaning of a "consumer sale" was defined2 as a sale of goods (other than a sale
by auction) by a seller in the course of a business where the goods -
(a) Are of a type ordinarily bought for private use or consumption; and
1




(b) Are sold to a person who does not buy or hold himself out as buying them
in the course of a business for one of the purposes mentioned below.
The said purposes were:-
(a) Disposing of the goods by way of sale, hire or hire-purchase in the course
of the buyer's business;
(b) Consuming or processing them in the course of that business;
(c) Using them for providing a service which it is an object of that business to
provide.
A distinction was made between a private consumer and a business consumer.
Purchases by private consumers of goods of a type ordinarily bought for private use or
consumption would be protected. Business buyers of consumers goods were divided
into two types; (1) those who bought for the purposes listed in (a), (b) and (c) above,
and (2) those who were not in the business of dealing in or with the goods purchased/
To the first category of people, the proposed ban would not apply, while the second
would be, prima facie, entitled to the benefit of the proposed ban.
Since the proposed ban would not affect commercial sales, the Law Commissions
thought that there must be some form of more general control over the use of
3 Law Commissions' Report No. 24, p. 33.
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exemption clauses. The question before the Law Commissions was whether there
should be a general control of exemption clause in commercial sales. There were many
arguments against and for the general control in business sales. One of the arguments
against it was that the law should not interfere with the freedom to contract, which is
the fundamental principle of our commercial law, unless it has led to injustice and
unfairness.4 On the other hand, the argument for the general control was that, besides
protecting the private consumer, the law should also protect small retailers. They had
no strong trade associations to strengthen their bargaining power against the
established manufacturers or suppliers. Therefore, they were in the same position as
an individual consumer.5 The Law Commissions came to a conclusion and
recommended that an exemption clause would be allowed only if it is fair and
reasonable.
As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the recommendations made by the Law
Commissions were embodied in the Supply ofGoods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, which
applied to sale of goods and hire-purchase transaction. Besides re-modelling the
implied terms in sections 12 to 14, the Act amended section 55 of the Sale of Goods
Act 1893. It contained comprehensive provisions, prohibiting and limiting the power




excluding section 12 should be void in all sales. An exemption clause to exclude
sections 13 and 14 would be void in consumer sales, but not in commercial sales, if it is
reasonable.
In other types of transactions, like contracts of hire, contracts for work and
materials and contracts for exchange, the control was not applicable. The Law
Commissions in their 1975 Joint Report proposed to extend the control of exemption
clause to these types of contracts.6 Control should be extended because there was no
reason to treat these contracts differently. For example, A took a car on hire-purchase.
In the agreement, the owner excluded the implied terms of quality and fitness. After
using the car, it was found to be defective. A could sue the owner for breach of these
conditions and the exemption clause could not protect the owner because it was a
consumer sale. Presume that A hired the car. The exemption clause would be valid
because the law had no control over exemption clauses in contracts ofhire.
The Commissions recommended the same protection as the amended Sale of Goods
Act 1893, but with this definition of a consumer transaction:-
"It is a consumer transaction if:
(l)The person supplying the goods contracts in the course ofbusiness;
6 Law Commissions' Report No. 69, 1975.
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(2) The person for whom the goods are supplied is not contracting and does
not hold himself out as contracting in the course of a business; and
(3) The goods are of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption.
The onus of proving that a contract is not a consumer transaction should lie on the
party so contending.
Based on the 1975 Report, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 was passed. This
Act dealt with unfair exemption clauses rather than unfair impositions of liability.7
Under the 1973 Act, the question was whether it was fair and reasonable to rely on the
exemption clause. Under the 1977 Act, the question was whether the term itself was
fair and reasonable. By section 6(1) in England and Wales, and section 20(1) in
Scotland, liability in respect of breach of section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893
could not be excluded or restricted by any contract term. Any attempt to include such
clauses in order to exclude liability will be void.
Section 6(2) and (3) in England and Wales, and section 20(2) in Scotland, deal with
implied conditions of description, quality and sample. Section 6(2) provides that:-
"(2) As against a person dealing as a consumer, liability for breach of the
obligations arising from-
See Atiyah, Sale of Goods,p. 229.
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(a) section 13, 14 or 15 of the Sale of Goods Act (seller's implied undertakings
as to conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to their quality or
fitness for a particular purpose);
(b) section 9, 10 or 11 of the 1973 Act (the corresponding thing in relation to
hire-purchase)
cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term.
(3) As against a person dealing otherwise than as consumer, the liability
specified in subsection (2) above can be excluded or restricted by reference to a
contract term, but only insofar as the term satisfies the requirement of
reasonableness."
Section 20(2) provides: -
"Any term of a contract which purports to exclude or restrict liability for
breach of the obligation arising from -
(a) section 13, 14 or 15 of the Sale of Goods Act (seller's implied undertakings
as to conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to their quality or
fitness for a particular purpose);
(b) section 9, 10 or 11 of the 1973 Act (the corresponding provisions in
relation to hire-purchase),
shall
(i) in the case of a consumer contract, be void against the consumer;
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(ii) in any other case, have no effect if it was not fair and reasonable to
incorporate the term in the contract."
Thus, under section 6(2) and section 20(2), there could never be a contracting out
of seller's duties under sections 13-15 "against a person dealing as consumer". A
"consumer" is defined in section 12 and section 25(1) of the Act. In section 12, a
party to a contract "deals as consumer" in relation to another party if
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself
out as doing so; and
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a business; and
(c) in the case of a contract governed by the law of sale of goods or hire-
purchase, or by section 7 of this Act, the goods passing under or in pursuance
of the contract are of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption.
Section 25 in Scotland had a slightly different wording. It refers to "consumer
contract" rather than "dealing as a consumer". A "consumer contract" means a
contract (not being a contract of sale by auction or competitive tender) in which -
(a) one party to the contract deals, and the other party to the contract ("the
consumer") does not deal or hold himself out as dealing, in the course of a
business, and
(b) in the case of a contract such as mentioned in section 15(2) of this Act, the
goods are of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption."
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Therefore, a party "deals as a consumer" or effects a "consumer contract", where
three conditions are satisfied. First, he neither makes the contract in the course of a
business nor holds himself out as so doing. Second, the other party dealing with the
alleged consumer must have himself contracted in the course of business. And finally,
the goods, where the contract is one of sale, hire-purchase or covered by section 7 or
15(2) of the Act8 must be of a type "ordinarily supplied" for private use or
consumption.
Having given a definition to the word "consumer", did not mean that all problems
were solved. There were still some problems and sometimes odd results were arrived
at with this definition of "consumer".9 Firstly, a "consumer" can be a private company
purchasing goods for the use of its members. Even though the company is buying for a
business purpose, it is in actual fact a consumer sale. In the case ofR & B Customs
Brokers Co. Ltd. v. United Dominions Trust (1988)10 the plaintiff company bought a
car from the defendants for the use of one of its directors. In the contract there was a
clause which excluded the implied conditions that the car should be merchantable and
fit for the buyer's purpose. When the car turned out to be defective, the plaintiff
8 Section 7 and section 21 apply to all contracts under which. Or in pursuance of which, possession or
ownership of goods passes but where the law of sale of goods or hire-purchase is not applicable.
Therefore it applies to contracts for the hire or lease of goods.
9
Atiyah, op. cit., p. 219.
10
[1988] 1 All ER 847.
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company sought to reject it. The defendant purported to rely on the exemption clause
and argued that the plaintiffwas not dealing as a consumer, since the car was bought in
the course of the plaintiff company's business. The Court of Appeal held that the
plaintiff company was dealing as a consumer and not in the course of a business.
Therefore, the exemption clause was void. To qualify as dealing in the course of a
business, the transaction must form an integral part of the business or there was a
degree of regularity of similar transactions. On the facts of the case, the purchase of
the car was not an integral part of the business nor was there sufficient regularity. The
plaintiff had only bought two or three cars on similar terms.
This decision was criticised as being odd because it appears to open a gap between
the protection offered to consumers by section 5 and the other sections of the 1977
Act.11 Under section 5, a clause in a guarantee is not effective if the goods prove
defective whilst "in consumer use". "In consumer use" means use other than in the
course of a business. So, if the car in the above case had been used only for the
purposes of the company, it would not have been in "consumer use" for the purpose of
section 5, but the company would still have bought as a "consumer" for the purpose of
section 6.12 It was thought that it would be better if the company was held to be in the
11
Bradgate and Savage, Commercial Law, p. 47.
12 Ibid.
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course of a business, and to decide on the reasonableness of the clause. Factors like
the company's lack of expertise and bargaining power would be taken into account.1.
Secondly, if there are several buyers, the position of each buyer must be looked at
individually. Thirdly, if the party bought the goods as a consumer, then there was a
novation under which a business party takes over the consumer's rights under the
contract, the business succeeds to all the rights of the consumer.14 A novation is where
the contract between two parties is rescinded in consideration of a new contract being
entered into on the same terms between one of the parties and a third party. So, a
novation by a consumer entitles a business third party to all the benefits of the
consumer. In the case ofRasbora Ltd v. JCL Marine Ltd (1976)15 there was a sale
by the defendants of a power boat to one Mr. Atkinson, who owned all the shares in
the plaintiff company, i.e. Rasbora Ltd, which was incorporated in Jersey. It was
contemplated on both sides that the true purchaser of the boat would not be Mr.
Atkinson, but a buyer the sale to whom would not attract V.A.T. This meant that the
actual buyer had to be a non-U.K resident. It was mutually understood that Rasbora
was to be substituted for Mr. Atkinson as the buyer. After the boat was delivered,
within 27 hours of the delivery, it was totally destroyed in a fire due to electrical
13 ibid.
14
Atiyah. op. cit., p. 219.
15
[1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 645.
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defects. There was a clause in the agreement that excluded the implied conditions of
merchantability and fitness. Among the issues before the court were; (a) were
Rasbora Ltd. parties to the original contract by novation? (b) If so, was the contract
between Rasbora Ltd. and defendants subject to the exclusion clause? This involved
the question of whether it was a consumer sale or a non-consumer sale. The court
held that Rasbora Ltd. were parties by novation to the contract originally made
between Mr. Atkinson and the defendants. The exclusion clause was not effective
because the sale was a consumer sale and the implied condition that the boat should be
ofmerchantable quality could not be excluded.
The decision of Lawson J. was criticised on two points.16 First, when there is a
novation, a new contract is created. Therefore, there could not be the automatic shift
of the rights and duties of the parties. Secondly, the judge said that even if Rasbora
Ltd. were to be the original buyers, it would still be a consumer sale because the boat
was to be used by the majority shareholder and not to be chartered to third parties. It
was submitted that this was incorrect because under section 12 of the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977 both the purpose for which the goods are bought and the identity of
the persons using the goods are immaterial for a sale in the course of a business.17 It
16 Ian Brown, "Business and Consumer Contracts", 1988 Journal of Business Law, p. 386.
17 Id. p. 393.
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was, however, stated in obiter that even if the sale was not a consumer sale, the clause
would not have been a "fair and reasonable" one.
(II) EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROL OF EXEMPTION CLAUSE
Even though the provisions in the Act 1977 envisage no contracting out in
consumer cases, you can still contract out in other cases. According to Atiyah, the
framing of the Unfair Contract Terms Act did not prevent the intention of the parties to
control liability under these sections.18 For example, where specific good is sold by
description, it need not necessarily be sale by description under section 13 if the seller
intended it not to be so. Similar problems may arise with regard to the other implied
terms. Implied conditions of merchantable quality can be ousted despite the Unfair
Contract Terms Act if the seller draws the attention of the buyer to the defects or
requires him to inspect the goods. And as for the fitness term, it can be avoided by the
seller, even though the purpose has been made known to him and there has been
reliance, by him giving no guarantee that the thing sold would fit for the buyer's
particular purpose.19
18
Atiyah. op. cit., p. 220.
19 Id. p. 222.
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By virtue of sections 6 and section 20 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 in
England and Wales and Scotland, respectively, any provision in a consumer sale which
purports to exclude liability under the implied terms of the Sale of Goods Act is simply
void or effect. But the Act does make certain provisions in a non-consumer contract
effective if they are fair and reasonable. The basic test of reasonableness is set out in
section 11(1), which says that, "the term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be
included having regard to the circumstances which were or ought reasonably to have
been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made."
In Scotland, a similar provision is in section 24 which says that, "whether it was fair
and reasonable to incorporate a term in a contract, regard shall be had only to the
circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the
contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time the contract was made." The
circumstances which were referred to by both sections serve as guidelines in deciding
on the issue of reasonableness. These guidelines are found in Schedule 2 as follows:-
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties relative to each other,
taking into account (among other things) alternative means by which the
customer's requirements could have been met;
(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, or in
accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with other
persons, but without having to accept a similar term;
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(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the
existence and the extent of the term (having regards, among other things, to
any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing between the
parties);
(d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition
is not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to
expect that compliance with that condition would be practicable;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special
order of the customer.
Reasonableness is also a relevant consideration in determining the validity of other
terms expressed in the contract. In England and Wales, section 3(2) of the Unfair
Contract Terms Act provides that the person who deals with the consumer or on his
own written standard terms ofbusiness cannot by reference to any contract term:-
(a) when himself in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any liability of his in
respect of the breach; or
(b) claim to be entitled,
(i) to render a contractual performance substantially different from that which
was reasonably expected of him, or
(ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual obligation, to render
no performance at all,
unless the term satisfies the reasonableness test.
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In Scotland, a similar provision is found in section 17(1) which applies to any term
in a consumer contract and to standard form contracts. The section applies a fairness
and reasonableness test to clauses excluding liability to the consumer or customer in
respect of a breach of a contractual obligation.
There are many cases dealing with the issue of reasonableness of clauses. In R.W.
Green Ltd v. Cade Bros Farms (1978)20 there was a contract of sale of seed potatoes
by potato merchants and a farming business. In that contract terms were included
insisting that complaints be made within three, or sometimes seven, days and damages
were limited to the extent of the contract price only. It was held in this case that the
latter clause was reasonable on the ground that the form of contract had been in use
for many years with the approval of the trade associations representing both parties.
Also it was reasonable because the potatoes were cheaper for they were uncertified.
However, as regards the other clause which limited the time for claim, it was held to be
unreasonable because it was reckoned impractical to complain about a particular defect
which may be latent, within the prescribed time.
In George Mitchell v. Finney Lock Seeds (1983)21 the Cade case was
distinguished. In this case the plaintilfs were farmers and they ordered from the
20




defendants, who were seed merchants, late cabbage seed. The defendants supplied
them with inferior seed which were indeed not late cabbage seed. The plaintiffs
suffered considerable losses which were not purely economic losses. The losses
included wasted expenditure in planting and' clearing the land after the crop failure.
The contract stipulated that "In the event of any seeds sold .... by us not complying
with the express terms of the contract of sale .... or any seeds proving defective in
varietal purity we will.... refund all payments made to us by the buyer in respect of the
'seeds .... and this shall be the limit of our obligation. We hereby exclude all liability for
any loss or damage arising from the use of any seeds .... supplied by us and for any
consequencial loss or damage arising out of such use .... or any defect in any seeds
supplied by us or for any other loss or damage whatsoever save for the refund as
aforesaid." The House of Lords held that the clause was unreasonable. The House
balanced several factors, including the relative bargaining strength of both parties, the
opportunity to buy seeds without the limitation of liability, the ease and cheapness of
insurance available to the defendants, and the defendants' negligence.
In the case of R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd. v. United Dominions Trust
(1988),22 although it was held that the buyers were consumers, and therefore
reasonableness would not arise, the court was inclined to think that even if it was a
non-consumer sale, the clause would have been reasonable. The reason is because the
22
[1988] 1 All ER 847.
231
sellers were mere financiers who had never seen the car, and the buyers were
themselves business people who had commercial experience. If this was their view,
then it would mean that financier sellers in a credit sale could exempt themselves from
liability. This would have made nothing of the Hire-Purchase legislation which
intended to impose liability on financiers as though they were sellers.2"'
The question of whether the exemption clause is reasonable or not is a question of
fact depending on the circumstances of the case. In Howard Marine & Dredging Co.
Ltd v. A. Ogden & Sons Ltd{\91%f x Lord Denning considered the following factors
to be relevant: the parties were of equal bargaining power, the representation was
innocent and the plaintiffs could have discovered the truth themselves on further
inquiry. The majority of the court held that the clause was unreasonable but they did
not give their reasons. All that was said was that, the matter was one of discretion for
the trial judge, who was entitled to find the clause unreasonable. Similarly in the case
of Walker v. Boyle (1982),25 the clause was held to be unreasonable but no reasons
were offered.
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There are also many cases in Scotland on the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. In
Border Hari'esterd Ltd v. Edwards Engineering (Perth) Ltd (1983)26 the buyer had
bought a drying machine from the seller. In the sale agreement it was expressly
mentioned that the machine should be of a certain capacity. There was also an express
term limiting the liability of the seller for failure to supply equipment fit for the purpose
of drying (i.e. condition 18). The issue is whether section 20(2) could be relied upon
to negate the effect of condition 18. It was held by the court that section 20(2) would
not apply because these obligations had arisen from the express terms, as such they
would not be subjected to the protection under section 20(2) of the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977. As such, it is not necessary to prove that condition 18 is fair and
reasonable. If there had not been any express provision as to the description of the
goods or its quality, then these terms would be implied by the Sale of Goods Act and
may be section 20(2) would apply. On the facts of this case may be the buyer should
have relied on section 17 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act which applies to any term
in a consumer or a standard form contracts.
The question of fairness and reasonableness was considered in the case ofMacrae
& Dick Ltd v. Philip (1982).27 The pursuers sold a Rolls-Royce Silver Shadow
motor-car to the defender. The agreement was concluded in September 1978 but
26 1 983 SLT 128.
27 1982 SLT (Sh Ct) 3.
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delivery was made in March 1979. Upon payment of the price the defender signed an
undertaking to offer the car to the pursuers at a price not exceeding 90 percent of the
purchase price in the event that he decided to sell the car within twelve months of
purchase. Five days before the signing of the undertaking the defender had in fact
already resold the car to a third party. This action was brought by the pursuers to
claim damages for the resale by the defender. The cause of action was for breach of
contract, in particular, breach of the undertaking contained in the pre-emption clause.
The defender relied on section 17 contending that the pursuers were endeavouring to
render a performance of the contract substantially different from that which the
defender reasonably expected; therefore the pre-emption was of no effect. The court
held that section 17 purports to invalidate any condition of a consumer contract which
would enable "a party to the contract" to implement his performance by rendering
something substantially different from that which the other party (the consumer) could
reasonably have expected from the contract, unless it was fair and reasonable.
However on the facts of the case, the court found that the defender had an option
whether or not to sign the letter and further obligate himself. He could have refused to
accept this additional obligation and if the pursuers refused to deliver the car, he could
have held them in breach of contract and terminate the contract and sue them for
damages. But instead the defender chose to sign the letter and he was not able to
implement his undertaking because he had already re-sold the car. Given that the
defender had the option, it could not be said that it was not fair and reasonable for the
pursuers to introduce the obligation into the contract.
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The next thing to consider is who has the onus of proving that the clause is fair and
reasonable. In Landcatch Ltd. v. Marine Harvest Ltd (1985)28 the pursuers raised
section 20(2) when the fish bought by them from the suppliers turned out to be
unmerchantable. They sued the suppliers for damages for breach of contract. In their
defence the suppliers sought protection from clause 7 in the agreement, which
provided inter alia that "all warranties and conditions, express and implied, statutory or
otherwise, as to quality or fitness for any purpose of the goods are expressly
excluded " There was also the requirement that the buyers should notify the
supplier in writing of any defects within five days of delivery. The suppliers averred
that the pursuers failed to give the notice within the specified time, therefore failed in
their claim. In answer to this averment the pursuers averred that the provision was not
fair and reasonable and therefore not enforceable. The issue herein is who bears the
burden of proving the fairness and reasonableness of the clause. The court held that
the burden is on the suppliers to prove that the provision was fair and reasonable to be
incorporated in the contract.
When deciding whether the clause is fair and reasonable factors listed in Schedule 2
would be relevant. In Denholm Fishselling Ltd v. Anderson (1991),29 para (a) of
28 1985 SLT 478.
29 1991 SLT 24.
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Schedule 2 was relied upon by the buyer. Para (a) provides that the strength of the
bargaining positions of the parties relative to each other, taking into account, inter alia,
alternative means by which the customer's requirements could have been met. In this
case, the defender bought eleven boxes of cod from the pursuers. After the sale the
fish were found to be unfit for human consumption. The defender refused to pay the
price on the ground they were not merchantable. The pursuer on the other hand
alleged that the implied term under the Sale ofGoods Act had been excluded by clause
6 of the contract. This clause provides that "buyers shall be afforded reasonable
opportunity to examine all the fish exposed for sale and shall be held to have satisfied
themselves, before completion of the transaction, as to their condition, weight and
quantity, and in every other respect". The defender claimed that the clause is
ineffective because it was not fair and reasonable, taking into account these factors:-
(a) the pursuers had the monopoly, in the sense that they all contract on the standard
conditions of sale, i.e. there was an unequal bargaining power between the parties;
(b) it was not practical to make an exhaustive examination of the fish before the sale,
therefore it was not fair to deprive the buyer of this remedy under the Sale of Goods
Act.
The court disagreed with the defender's arguments and held that the pursuers did
not have the monopoly because the buyers are not forced to buy fish from a single fish
salesman. Secondly, due to the nature of the business and fish being perishable item,
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the transaction has to be carried speedily. If items are found to be defective thereafter
it may be difficult to prove when does the defect exist. It is equally difficult to prove
whether the consignment in question was bought in a particular transaction. To
eliminate such difficulty would make clause 6 a fair and reasonable one to be included.
This decision was criticised by Stewart who said that even though there was no
monopoly as such, being a cartel the sellers were in a better position than the buyer.
He also said that the fear of the difficulties expressed by the judge is not necessarily a
realistic fear. And even if there is such a difficulty, that could not justify an unfair and
unreasonable provision/0
In the most recent case ofKnight Machinery (Holdings) Ltd, v. Rennie (1995)31
the court was again called to decide on the fairness and reasonableness of a clause in a
contract of sale. The subject-matter of sale was a printing machine, bought by the
buyer, Rennie, from the seller, Knight Machinery. Rennie failed to pay for the price
whereupon this action was brought against him. Rennie counterclaimed that the
machine was not merchantableand was entitled to damages. In the sheriffs court it
was held that the goods were not merchantable, but Rennie was excluded from
rejecting them by virtue of clause 5 in the agreement. That clause imposed an
30
Stewart, "15 Years ofFair Contracts in Scotland", 1993 SLT (News) 15.
31 1995 SLT 166.
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obligation on the buyer to inspect the goods within seven days from his receipt of them
and unless the buyer gives notice in writing within that time, he shall be deemed to
have accepted the goods and to have lost the right to reject them for any reason
including any condition implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Rennie appealed to
the sheriff principal who held that clause 5 was not operative because it was not fair
and reasonable. The term "notice" means notice that the goods were "defective which
would entitled them to reject and this kind of notice could have been discovered within
seven days". The appeal was allowed. Knight Machinery appealed to the Sessions
Court. The issue on appeal was whether clause 5 was reasonable and fair. The judge
held that the clause was ambiguous and that it is not clear what kind of notice should it
be. To a certain extend the judge was in agreement with the sheriff principal that the
notice should be of the defects which would give the rights to the buyer to reject the
goods on the ground of unmerchantability. Such defects could not have been
discovered within the short period of seven days. Although minor problems were
encountered within this period, they were not uncommon bearing in mind that it is a
new machine to be handled by the buyer. So based on the guidelines found in Schedule
2 and on sections 20(2) and 24 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the appeal was
dismissed.
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In 1993 there was a Directive from the Council of the European Communities on
unfair terms in consumer contracts.32 The purpose of the Directive was to
approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states
relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a
consumer. '3 This is aimed at protecting consumers against continued use of unfair
terms in contracts between consumers and sellers or suppliers. What is meant by an
"unfair term" is defined in Article 3 as a contractual term which has not been
individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. A term which has been drafted in
advance and included in the seller's standard form agreement will be regarded as not
individually negotiated because the consumer has no opportunity to influence the
substance of the term/'4 What can be included under the heading of "unfair term" is
the exemption clause because of these reasons:-
(1) It is more in favour of the seller, who purports to rely on it, but detrimental
to the consumer, thus creating an imbalance of rights and obligations of the
parties.




(2) An exemption clause is usually not individually negotiated because it is
always included in the seller's standard form contract.
(3) Because it has already been included in the standard form, the buyer has no
opportunity to influence the way the clause is drafted.
Article 6 provides that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a
seller or supplier shall not be binding on the consumer. But the contract shall continue
to be binding on the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence
without the unfair terms.
The EEC Directive had been adopted in the United Kingdom by virtue of the Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994. This statute came into effect on 1st.
July 1995. The Regulation applies to "any term in a contract concluded between a
seller or supplier and a consumer where the said term has not been individually
negotiated".15 Regulation 2 defines a "seller", a "supplier" and a "consumer". A
"seller" is a person who sells goods and who, in making a contract to which these
Regulations apply, is acting for purposes relating to his business. A "supplier" is a
person who supplies goods or services and who, in making a contract to which these
Regulations apply, is acting for purposes relating to his business. A "consumer" is




apply, is acting for purposes which are outside his business. The word "business"
includes a trade or profession and the activities of any government department or local
or public authority.
The Regulations do not have the effect of amending or abrogating the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977. They co-exist with each other with some differences
between them. These differences are:-
(a) The Regulations apply to terms in a contract with consumer, but the 1977
Act applies to both consumer and non-consumer (or commercial) contracts.
(b) The word "consumer" as defined in Regulation 2 is confined to natural
person, but under the 1977 Act the word includes a company or firm which
does not deal in the course of a business. (See Rasboro Ltd v. J.C.L Marine
Ltd (1977).36
(c) Under the Unfair Contract Terms Act an exemption or limitation of liability
clause would be automatically void in respect of consumer transaction. In non-
consumer sale its validity is subject to the fair and reasonable test. Under the
Regulations this does not happen because the term would be subject to the
unfairness term.
(d) The Unfair Contract Terms Act is largely concerned with the exclusion or
limitation of liability in contracts for sale or transfer of goods, of services and
36
[1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 645.
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for services. The Regulations on the other hand apply to a wider scope with a
few exceptions in Schedule 1.
(e) The Unfair Contract Terms Act strikes at exemption or limitation of liability
clauses which are not fair and reasonable. The Regulations however, strikes at
any term which is unfair. An "unfair term" means any term which contrary to
the requirement of good faith causes a significant imbalance in the parties'
rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the
consumer.(Regulation 4(1)). Assessment of good faith takes into account
factors listed in Schedule 2, namely:-
- the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties;
- whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term;
- whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of
the consumer; and
- the extend to which the seller or supplier has dealt fairly and equitably with
the consumer.
The first three factors can be found in Schedule 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act.
These factors are not exclusive or exhaustive. They are mere guidelines.
Whether a term is unfair or not is subject to taking into account the nature of the
goods or services for which the contract was concluded and referring to all
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circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the
contract or of another contract on which it is dependent. (Regulation 4(2)).
(HI) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND UN CONVENTION
At this point in the chapter, we turn to discuss the exemption clauses under the
Uniform Commercial Code in the United States of America. American texts refer to
exemption clause as liability disclaimer clauses. A product liability disclaimer is the
seller's attempt to avoid liability for defective goods by including a term to that effect
in the sales contract. "7 The basic argument for enforcing disclaimers and allowing the
seller to escape liability is freedom of contract. This is however illusionary in
purchases by ordinary consumers. In such cases, the disclaimer appears in the seller's
standard form and the consumers either "take it or leave it". There is in actual fact
little bargaining equality between the parties.
Article 2-316(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code allows disclaimers for the
implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Article 2-316
provides:-
"(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and
37
Metzger, et. at., Business Law and the Regulatory Environment, p. 843.
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in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be in writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond description on the
face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion ofwarranties
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty."
From the provision quoted above, to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability is ineffective unless it (1) mentions the word merchantability and (2) is
in a conspicuous writing. To exclude or modify the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, the seller must (1) use a writing and (2) make the disclaimer
conspicuous. To satisfy the conspicuous requirement, it is sufficient if the seller uses
capital letters, larger type, contrasting type or contrasting colours.
These restrictions, however, do not apply if under paragraph (3), the contract uses
"language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty." The seller can
244
disclaim by using words like "as is", "with all faults" and "as they stand". Since these
terms are usually used in reference to second-hand goods, they may be ineffective as
disclaimers if new goods are sold and where products are sold to an ordinary
38
consumer.
At a glance it seems that American law allows a seller to disclaim liability for the
implied warranty of quality and fitness. Is there no control over this right of the seller?
There is such a control and it is found under Article 2-302 of the Code. The Article
provides:-
"(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of the
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
In the case of FMC Finance Co. v. Murphree (1980)39 FMC Finance leased six
buses to a company, of which the Murphrees were the stockholders. They acted as
guarantors under the lease agreement and undertook to pay if the company defaulted
under the lease. In the lease agreement there was a liability disclaimer clause. The
38 Id. p. 844.
39 632 F. 2d. 413 (5th. Cir. 1980).
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buses were later found to be defective and the company returned them to FMC Co.
FMC re-sold the buses and claimed from the Murphrees the difference between the
amount due under the lease and the amount realised after the sale. In their defence, the
Murphrees argued that FMC Co. was in breach of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness. But FMC Co., on the other hand, said that these
warranties had been excluded in the lease. At the first instance in the district court it
was held that the disclaimer was valid. Murphrees appealed. On appeal, the decision
of the lower court was affirmed. The judge found that the liability disclaimer clause
was conspicuous enough to catch the attention of the Murphrees and they, being
business persons themselves, ought to have notice of this. It was further held that the
clause was not unconscionable because the Murphrees should have noticed it. They
were protected from unexpected and unbargained for disclaimers. The fact that they
did not actually read the lease did not render the disclaimer invalid.
In the case of express warranty of description, liability is not easily disclaimed. This
is because it would be unreasonable that the seller would exclude with one hand what
he had freely and openly promised with the other. When you have an express warranty
on one hand and a disclaimer on the other, they should be read consistently if possible.
Article 2-316(1) provides that an express warranty and contract language seeming to
disclaim it should be read consistently if possible, but the disclaimer must give way if
such a reading is unreasonable.
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Under the Vienna Convention, the parties' freedom of contract is given a wide
support. Article 6 of the Convention states that the parties may exclude the
application of this Convention or derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions. Article 35 provides that the implied obligations in paragraph (2) do not
apply "where the parties have agreed otherwise."40 If there is a clause in the contract
which expressly excludes the implied conditions as to quality and fitness, is it valid?
Does the Convention concern itselfwith the validity of such clauses?
There are two important things to note about the Convention. First, it has no
application to sales of goods bought for personal, family and household use, unless the
seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought
to have known that the goods were bought for any such use.41 Therefore, there is no
problem of having to deal with liability disclaimer clause in consumer sales because the
Convention is only concerned with commercial sales. Second, the Convention is
concerned with only the formation of the contract and the rights and obligations of the
parties.42 Back to the question of whether the Convention deals with the validity of
disclaimer clause the answer is no. Article 4(a) says that the Convention is not
concerned with the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage.




So, if there is such a clause in the contract, what should the unfortunate buyer do?
Should the buyer should on the domestic law? He could do so since the Convention is
silent on the question of validity. But Article 4 should not be read broadly as that
would import domestic rules that would supersede the Convention.41 What can be
done is to refer to Article 8(2) of the Convention which says that the statements of a
party (including contract terms he has drafted) "are to be interpreted according to the
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party (the buyer)
would have had in the same circumstance". What this means is that a statement by the
seller is to be interpreted according to the understanding of a reasonable person of the
same kind as the buyer. This Article addresses the same issue as Article 2-316(3) of
the Uniform Commercial Code which gives effect to a clause which in "common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty." So, if the language is vague and ambiguous so that
a reasonable buyer could not understand it to mean an exclusion of the implied
warranty, the clause would be held to be ineffective. The underlying principle is,
therefore, the reasonableness of an understanding of the disclaimer rather than
reasonableness of the clause as under the English law.
43 Honnold. Uniform Law for International Sales, Under the 1980 UN Convention, p. 259.
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(IV) CONCLUSION
From the above discussion on the issue of exemption clauses or disclaimer clauses, we
can see that there are some differences in their treatment under English law, American
law and under Convention. In the United Kingdom, the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977 prohibits the exclusion of the implied terms under the Sale of Goods Act in
relation to consumer sales. In America, in relation to consumer sales, there is the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 1975 which aimed at providing a minimum warranty
protection for consumers. It applies to sales of consumer products that cost more than
$10 per item and that are made to a consumer. "Consumer product" is defined in
section 101(1) as tangible personal property normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes. A "consumer" is defined in section 101(3) as a buyer (other than
for purpose of resale) of any consumer product. Where there is a sale of a consumer
product to a consumer, the seller can either give a full or a limited written warranty.
When he gives a written warranty, he may not disclaim or modify any implied warranty
is respect of such consumer product.44
44 This is provided in section 103 of the Magnuson-Moss Waranty Act 1975. The implied warranty
means implied warranty arising under the state law. These are the same as under the Uniform
Commercial Code because the state law has adopted the Code.
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In commercial sales, the laws in the United Kingdom and America are quite similar.
In the United Kingdom, an exemption clause is effective only if it is fair or reasonable.
In America, the validity of a liability disclaimer clause depends on the reasonableness
of its understanding by the buyer. If the clause is not reasonably understood, then it
may be held not to be effective. In commercial sales, the parties are usually of equal
bargaining power, and the courts would be reluctant to interfere with their freedom to




IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD
INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers the treatment of contracts for the sale of goods under the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States of America and under the Australian and New
Zealand legislation. Located in the 'Pacific rim' economies like Malaysia, it is
relevant to consider the problems encountered by these systems in developing their
law of sales and to see how they deal with these problems. Would they be a better
example to follow rather than the English legislation?
(I) THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(a) BACKGROUND OF THE CODE
Prior to 1906, United States commercial law was basically governed by the common
law derived from the English common law where the principles were derived from the
cases decided by the courts. This system had injected some element of elasticity in
the law. However, in so far as there existed elasticity, there was also an element of
uncertainty and obscurity in the law. With fifty states in the United States ofAmerica,
it is not difficult to imagine how diverse the laws might be on a particular issue, as
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different states might deal differently with a similar matter. Because of this, it was
felt that there was a need for a codification of the commercial law. Furthermore, the
diversity in the law posed as an obstacle to inter-state trade that had increased
tremendously due to improvements in communication and transport.
Secondly, a change in the law was felt necessary because, while the common law
of sales was reasonably adequate for the period during which it developed, industrial
and technological changes had rendered its framework out of date. Methods of
production and distribution of goods had become increasingly complex, so much so
that the common law rule of caveat emptor became inapplicable. Goods sold in
sealed containers could not be readily inspected even where inspection before
purchase was permitted.1
Finally, a code on commercial law was felt to be necessary as an easy reference
tool on the subject, serving a function for economic and social enterprises. By having
a uniform commercial code applicable throughout the states in America, it was hoped
that the law could be harmonised and the existing common law replaced. So, in 1906,
the Uniform Sales Act, drafted by Professor Samuel Williston, was passed.
The Uniform Sales Act was the first attempt at codifying the commercial law.
However, it was not successful because fifteen years on, only twenty-three states had
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adopted the Act2 The reason for such a failure was that the Act was based on the
English Sale of Goods Act 1893, which was basically a restatement of the common
law, reflecting the nineteenth-century English sales law where the typical transaction
was the face-to-face sale. Therefore, the provisions of the Act did not cater for the
reality of contemporary sales transactions. The Uniform Sales Act was once
described as 'codification' in the traditional Anglo-American manner, a mere
collection of the current concepts as gleaned from the latest expressions of judicial
opinion, grouped and arranged with proper respect for tradition and history."3 The
failure ofmore than half of the jurisdictions to adopt the Act was a signal that the Act
was obsolete and there was still lack ofuniformity.4
In 1940, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law jointly undertook the considerable project of
preparing a comprehensive Commercial Code that would take the place of the various
acts already the field and also cover some other matter that had not been codified.
1
Gilmore, "On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law", Yale Law Journal, vol. 57, 1948,
p.1341.
2
Morrow, "Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey I," Tulane Law Review, vol. 14, 1940,
p. 327.
3 id. p. 338.
4
Wiseman, "The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules", Harvard Law Review,
vol.100, 1987, p.465.
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The man who took the lead in engineering the project was Karl Llewellyn. Together
with other judges and lawyers, he performed the monumental task of drafting the
Uniform Commercial Code. Llewellyn was a realist legal thinker, who viewed law as
a means to social ends, and he recognised the need to re-examine it constantly to
ensure that it would fit the society it aimed to serve. His vision when drafting the
Code was to propose a law that was more in line with merchant reality, reflecting the
better standards, practices, understandings and needs of the merchants. He believed
that the law should encourage better practices and control abuses of the market. He
proposed different standards to be applicable to merchants and to individuals who
lacked knowledge and expertise of these standards. He also proposed that there
should be a manufacturer's warranty of freedom from dangerous product defects to
both dealers and ultimate consumers.5 Llewellyn took ten years to complete the first
edition, working, that is, from 1942 to 1952. Two later editions followed in 1958 and
1962 6 When the Code finally came into existence, Article 2 on Sales did not secure
much of his realist vision and his conception of merchant rules had been imperfectly
achieved. However, his ideas and approach dominated the final product.7
5 id p. 492.
6
Understanding The Uniform Commercial Code, David Lloyd P-2
7 Commercial Law, R.E.SpeideI, et. al., p.423.
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The Code is divided into nine substantive articles. The first is the general provision
that provides for the application of the Code, subject matter and general definitions.
Article 2 covers the sale of goods and lease of goods (Article 2A). Article 3 is on
commercial paper or negotiable instruments, such as promissory notes and bank
cheques. Article 4 deals with bank deposits and collections, which covers the
relationship between bank cheques, deposits and credits between them. Article 4A is
about fund transfers, including modern electronic fund transfers. Article 5 covers
letters of credit issued by banks, usually used by business people to guarantee
payment of obligation. Article 6 deals with bulk transfers and concerns bulk of all of
a business inventory. Article 7 is about warehouse receipts, bills of lading and other
documents of title. It covers these documents used in large wholesale transactions
concerning the ownership and risk of loss of goods. Article 8 concerns investment
securities, i.e. the regulations of investment securities. Finally in Article 9 it deals
with secured transactions which covers security interest in all types of personal
property, including account receivable, equipment and inventory.
The Uniform Commercial Code is a model that has now been adopted by all the
states in the United States of America. However, it is not entirely uniform in all the
states because they may have made revisions to the Code to satisfy the states' own
commercial needs and circumstances. Furthermore, the courts in each state can reach
at different result when interpreting the provisions in the Code. As a result, there
cannot be a presumption that the law will be the same in each state. But nevertheless,
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the Uniform Commercial Code has facilitated much greater uniformity of the
commercial laws in the United States. It also allows commercial practices to develop
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.8
(b) SALE OF GOODS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(i) Nature and Characteristics ofArticle 2
Article 2 is basically a codification of the existing common law and covers all aspects
of the sale of goods that may have a legal consequence. It applies to transactions in
goods. Transaction in goods covers a 'sale', where title passes from the seller to the
buyer for a price and also a 'contract for sale', which includes both present and future
sales. In a present sale, the making of the contract and the completion of the sale
(passing of property) occur at the same time. In a future sale, the making of the
contract and the completion of the sale occur at different times.9
In order to understand how the contract of sale ofgoods is dealt with under Article
2, it is necessary first to understand some basic concepts found in the provisions.
First is the concept of good faith. Good faith is the significant or the main feature of
8 ibid.
9 Modern Business Law, Thomas W.Dunfee. et. al., p. 358.
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the Code. In Article 2 this requirement is made explicit in thirteen sections, and
nineteen sections include comments which also use the phrase.10 In Article 1-203
good faith is to be observed "in the performance and enforcement of every contract".
But sometimes it may be necessary and relevant at the formation stage, for example,
when the parties agreed that the price is to be fixed by the seller or the buyer. This
means the price is to be fixed in good faith.
The good faith obligation can be related to the "merchant rules" concept, whereby
good faith in respect ofmerchants is much higher than for a private individual. There
are fourteen provisions in which the term "merchant" appears. These provisions
include the warranty of title, and the implied warranty of merchantability. The
draftsman invented these "merchant rules" in order to make "commercial law and
practice clear, sane and safe".11 He wanted simpler, clearer and better adjusted rules
which would make sense and protect good faith. Merchants could expect more
predictable and more satisfactory results both in and out of court.12 These are
functional rules that could guide businessmen in conducting their business affairs and
to assist them in solving their problems and planning for the future.
10 Commercial Law, R.E.Speidel, et. al., p. 442.
11 Id. p. 428.
12
Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True,
The Beautiful in Commercial Law. 73 Geo.L.J. 1141.
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Another important concept found in Article 2 is the concept of the unconscionable
contract. A contract can be declared unconscionable by the court if it contravenes
public policy, the terms are unfair, good faith is not observed, it contains exculpatory
clauses and for various other reasons. Article 2-302 of the Code provides that if the
court as a matter law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made, it may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result. Under subsection (2) the court can hear evidence in order to
determine this issue. Factors relevant for consideration would be the relative
bargaining power between the parties, whether one party is economically stronger
than the other, whether the parties have options, and the reasonableness of the clause
that is alleged to be unconscionable. The basic test is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.13 If, looking at the
circumstances of the case, they are unconscionable then the court can simply refuse to
enforce it.
13 Thomas, W. Dunfree, op. cit. p. 261.
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In the case of Zapatha v Dairy Mart Inc. (1980)14 the issue of unconscionability
was raised. The Zapathas enterered into a franchise agreement with Dairy Mart Inc.
under which there was a clause giving the latter the power to terminate the agreement
without cause. When the agreement was terminated, the Zapathas brought an action
against Dairy Mart Inc. claiming, among other things, that the termination clause was
unconscionable. The judge held, in the first instance, that the clause was indeed
unconscionable as it gave the right to terminate the agreement without cause and the
termination was against good faith. The case went on appeal and the decision of the
lower court was confirmed. It went on for further appeal to the Supreme Judicial
Court ofMassachusetts which held that, based on the facts of the case, the termination
clause was not unconscionable. Mr. Zapatha was a graduate and had been employed
by a company involved in business for more than ten years, so there could not be said
to be an unfair surprise for him. Furthermore the clause was neither obscurely
worded nor buried in the fine print of the contract. The term was straightforward and
there had been no necessity to consult a lawyer. The Zapathas also had had ample
time to consider the agreement. The court was also satisfied that Dairy Mart Inc. had
acted in good faith in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in terminating the agreement.
14 381 Mass. 294(1980)
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Another concept found in Article 2 is the concept of agreement. Agreement as
defined in the Code means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language
or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance. Article 2 is based on the concept of agreement rather
than on the concept of promise because the scope of the obligations of the parties to
the contract goes beyond promises. Firstly, when a seller affirms a certain fact, this
becomes an express warranty, a form of an obligation rather than a mere promise.
Secondly, many obligations in the law of sales are implied by virtue of tacit
assumptions, customs, usage, course of dealings and course of performance. These
are implied undertakings and not merely promises. Finally, even if the obligations are
not expressed or implied, they may be imposed by reason of the doctrine of good faith
and fair dealing.
Last but not least is the concept of title that has been modified under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Under previous law, title had been used as a determining factor to
the rights and liabilities of the parties, for example, allocation of risk of loss, rights
against third parties and insurability. Before these rights can be determined, it must
first be resolved who has the title to the goods. The law is no longer so under the
Code as it has separate sections dealing with the rights and obligations of the parties
which will apply irrespective of title except where there is a specific provision which
refers to title. Generally, the parties are free to arrange by express agreement for the
transfer of title in any manner and on any conditions.
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Thus, from the above discussion, it can be seen that Article 2 is aimed at
simplifying commercial matters by giving it a more practical and realistic approach.
The parties are not strictly bound by the Code but are rather allowed to agree upon
their own terms, with the law giving greater effect to their intention. By having
flexible rules, the Code ensures that the agreement between the parties will not be
frustrated for some technical reason. In short, the law of sale of goods under the
Uniform Commercial Code is clear, simple, practical and flexible.
(ii) Scope ofArticle 2
Article 2, although it "applies to transactions in goods" (Article 2-102), is only
concerned with sale of goods and "goods" is defined in Article 2-105 as all things
which are movable at the time of identification for the contract for sale. Goods must
therefore have these two characteristics: (1) they must be tangible or have physical
existence and (2) they must be movable. Goods can also include things that are
attached to the land but later to be severed or removed from the land, for example
stone, sand, or timber as well as agricultural crops like corn, wheat etc. The Code
does not apply to any transaction to buy or sell land or real estate. It also does not
apply to any contract for service; for example an employment contract, where labour
or service is a significant part of the contract. Sometimes contracts involve service or
labour and goods. This is typical in most construction contracts, where it is hard to
tell whether the Code is applicable or not. A contract for sale of timber is definitely a
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contract for sale of goods. But a contract for carpentry labour only is definitely a
service contract where the Code would not be applicable.
It is important to determine whether a contract is a contract for the sale of goods
within the scope of Article 2 because, if does, then there is a relevant issue of
warranty which needs to be considered. When the seller of goods makes a
representation to the buyer as to the character, quality or title to the goods, as part of
the contract of sale, that constitutes a warranty. A warranty can either be express or
implied. Express warranty is made through words or action of the seller for example
statement describing the goods is an express warranty. Implied warranty is one that
arises by operation of law, for example, the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose. The law of warranty is aimed at providing a certain
amount of commercial reliability in business dealings and protecting the buyer's
(merchant or non-merchant) expectations by imposing liability on the seller who is in
breach of the express or implied undertaking.15
The law of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code is in some respects
different from the law of warranty under the Sale of Goods Act 1893. The most
striking difference can be seen in respect of the warranty of description. Under the
15
Warranty under the UCC is dealt with in greater detail below in chapters 4, 5 and 6 where the
contents of the Code will be found.
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Code, Article 2-313 (b) provides that any description of the goods which is made part
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description. Section 13 of the Sale ofGoods Act 1893, on the other hand, implied
this warranty into the contract of sale. It is quite obvious and logical that whatever is
said about the goods which form the basis of the contract should be regarded as an
express term rather than an implied term.
In the case of Interco. Inc. v. Randustrial Corp (1976)16 the plaintiff brought an
action against the defendant for breach of an express warranty of description under
Article 2-313 of the Code. The plaintiff purchased from the defendant a product
known as "Syclox" which was designed as a floor covering to smooth rough surfaces.
The product was satisfactorily used the first time and more was purchased for use on
other rough areas of the plaintiffs building. But this time, instead of remedying the
problem, it simply made it worse. The catalogue described the product as "a hard yet
malleable material which bonds firm to wood floors for smooth and easy hand-
trucking. Syclox will also absorb considerable flex without cracking and is not
softened by spillage of oil, grease or solvents".
16 1976 533 S.W.2d 257.
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The issues raised in this case were whether the catalogue amounted to an express
warranty and whether there was a breach of that warranty by the defendant. As to the
first issue, the court held that the catalogue or the advertisement might constitute an
express warranty provided that it formed a basis of the bargain, and that it must be
read by the plaintiff. As to the second issue, the court held that it was a question of
fact whether or not there was a breach. In the circumstances of the case, the court was
satisfied that there was no breach because the problem was more than considerable
and more than what Syclox was designed to accommodate.
To qualify as an express warranty, there must be some form of reliance by the
plaintiff on the advertisement or catalogue. This means that it must form the basis of
the bargain between the parties for any warranties to arise based on whatever is found
in the advertisement or catalogue. On this point, it is similar to the requirement under
the Sale of Goods Act 1893. In the sale of future or unascertained goods, reliance
would be easy to presume as the buyer had not seen the goods. However, in sale of
specific goods which are present before the buyer, it would be quite a burden on the
him to prove that he bought the goods because he relied on the advertisement rather
than on his own judgment after seeing the goods.
The second distinction between the Uniform Commercial Code and the Sale of
Goods Act 1893 pertains to the implied warranty of merchantable quality. Under the
Code this warranty is not confined to sale by description only as in the 1893 Act. So,
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its application is wider. But what is more important is that, in Article 2-314(2), the
Code spells out the minimum standard of merchantability. Goods must be such as>
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair and average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, and
(d) run, with the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) are conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
The issue of merchantable quality was discussed in the case of Delano Growers'
Cooperative Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., Inc. (1985).17 The plaintiff filed a suit
against the defendant seeking US$25,823.25 for wine sold and delivered. In its
defence, the defendant asserted that it did not owe the plaintiff as the wine was not
merchantable. The defendant then counterclaimed for breach of contract alleging
that the earlier shipment of wine, for which price had been paid, was spoiled due to
the presence of lactobacillus trichodes (Fresno mold). The defendant operated a wine
17
(1985) 393 Mass. 666, 473 N.E.2d 1066.
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bottling plant in Boston and it bought wine, ready for bottling, from the plaintiff in
California. The wine was shipped in tank cars and was then pumped into storage
tanks from which it was later filtered into bottles for delivery. After five years of
business, the defendant began receiving returns of the wine from their customers. The
wine was producing sediment, cloudy and contained hairy substance.
The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was in breach of the implied
term of merchantable quality. The plaintiff raised two arguments: (1) that when it
delivered wine that appeared good and which could be bottled, its obligation was
satisfied, and (2) all Californian sweet wine contained Fresno mold, therefore, the
presence of such mold could not cause the wine to be unmerchantable. The court
rejected the plaintiffs arguments and held that no other Californian wine had bacterial
problem. There were evidence to show that mold was found in sample taken from the
tank cars in which the plaintiffs wine was transported. The presence of the mold had
caused the wine to be unfit for the ordinary purpose for which finished wine was used
and therefore was not merchantable.
The minimum standard of merchantable quality is also applicable to used or
second-hand goods, but of course less can be expected of it in quality than if the item
is bought new. Whether the goods are significantly discounted may help in
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determining what standard of quality should apply to the transaction. This means that
the element of price is relevant in determining quality. In International Petroleum
Services, Inc. v. S & N Well Service, Inc. (1982),18 two units of used oil well
servicing equipment were sold to the defendant by the plaintiff. One of the units had
problems with its diesel engine; its fourth gear kept slipping out, the air compressor
was not connected properly and the motor threw a connecting rod. The unit was
returned to the plaintiff and a new connecting rod was installed and the oil line was
properly connected. No charges were made for these repairs. The unit then worked
fine for ninety days at which time the engine began to misfire and it became
overheated. Close examination revealed that a head gasket was blown, the engine
head was cracked and the pistons were cupped out. In effect the engine was worn out
and needed a complete rebuilt. Despite all these problems, the court held that, since
there was no evidence as to the extent of the discount in the price of this used
machinery, it was therefore difficult to decide what standards of quality should apply.
Furthermore, the unit did operate satisfactorily for ninety days after the initial
adjustments and repairs were made without charge. The court found that the machine
was fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are generally used, and even
after the diesel engine wore out, it still could be and was rebuilt and was then put back
in service.
18
(1982) 230 Kan. 452, 639 P.2d 29.
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Thirdly, the Uniform Commercial Code is distinct from the Sale of Goods Act
1893 in respect of the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. Under
Article 2-315, where the seller has reason to know any particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment,
there is an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. Under the 1893 Act the
buyer had to satisfy the court that he had expressly or by implication made known to
the seller the particular purpose for which the goods were required so as to show that
he relied on the seller's skill or judgment. The courts however had held that, if the
seller knew the purpose for which the buyer wanted the goods, the buyer would be
taken to have relied on the seller's skill or judgment.19 The difference between the
two provisions lies in the fact that, under the Code, the seller "must have reason so
know" the particular purpose the goods are required and thus there is no need to prove
actual knowledge. Under the Act the buyer had to show that he had made known to
the seller that the particular purpose for which the goods are required. Reliance will
then be presumed.
In Gates v. Abernathy (1972)20 the plaintiff went to the defendant's shop with the
intention to buy some clothes for his wife who had frequently shopped there. The
1
Ashington Piggeries IML v. ChristopherHill Ltd. [1972] AC 441.
20 1972 11 UCC 491.
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plaintiff did not know the size his wife wore, but spoke to the store manager and
explained his intention to her. She showed him some items of clothing and said that
she was certain they would be proper for his wife. The plaintiff selected a few in the
size recommended by the store manager. It was understood that they would be
returnable if they did not fit. The clothes were found to be too big for his wife and
since there was nothing in her size, she demanded a refund. The defendant refused.
This action was brought for the return of the money paid on the basis that there was a
breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The court held that
the defendant was liable because the plaintiff was relying on the judgment of the
seller to furnish the kind of goods he wanted. Furthermore, there was no doubt that
the seller was aware that the buyer was relying on her expertise.
This case can be compared with the English case of Griffiths v. Peter Conway Ltd.
(1939)21 where the plaintiff contracted dermatitis from a Harris tweed coat purchased
from the defendant. The plaintiff was proven to have had an abnormally sensitive
skin. She argued that her case came within the scope of the implied warranty as the
coat was not fit for her particular purpose. The court rejected the plaintiffs argument
because her special condition had not been disclosed to the defendant, as such the
defendant could not be held responsible for her condition. Upon close analysis of this
21
[1939] 1 All ER 685.
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case, it can be concluded that the requirements for the implied warranty of fitness for
purpose under the Uniform Commercial Code and under the Sale of Goods Act 1893
are the same. If the plaintiff in Griffiths case had informed the defendant of her
special condition, then the latter would be aware of this fact and the plaintiff could
successfully argue that she had relied on the defendant's skill and judgment to supply
goods suitable for her purpose. The result would then be the same as in the case of
Gates v. Abernathy.
As regards the exclusion or the modification of warranties, the Code has made it
difficult for the seller to exclude the warranties, especially the express warranty.
Article 2-316(1) provides that words or conduct relevant to the creation of the express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit the warranty shall be
construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other and the negation or
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable. The
implied warranties may be excluded but this must be done in a certain manner
prescribed by the Code itself. For merchantable quality, the disclaimer must mention
the word "merchantability" and for fitness for purpose, the exclusion must be in
writing and conspicuous. Under the Sale of Goods Act 1893, by contrast, by virtue of
section 55, implied terms and conditions could simply be negatived or varied by
express agreement, or by course of dealing between the parties or by usage. The law
had placed so much weight on the freedom to contract without taking into
consideration the bargaining powers of the parties.
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Thus, it can be said that the reformulation of the Uniform Commercial Code had
resolved some of the problems brought about by the Uniform Sales Act, which was
which borrowed heavily from the Sale of Goods Act 1893.
(II) AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION ON SALE OF
GOODS
Due to the historical fact of colonial occupation by the English, the legacy of English
law has been bequeathed to many countries, including Australia and New Zealand. In
these countries the legislation on sale of goods is based on English law, in particular
the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Australia is comprised of states and territories and each
of them has its own sale of goods legislation, namely, the Sale of Goods Act 1954
(Australian Capital Territory), the Sale of Goods Act 1923 (New South Wales), the
Sale of Goods Act 1972 (Northern Territory), the Sale of Goods Act 1896
(Queensland), the Sale of Goods Act 1895 (South Australia), the Sale of Goods Act
1896 (Tasmania), the Goods Act 1958 (Victoria) and the Sale of Goods Act 1895
(Western Australia). All these Acts have some degree of uniformity between them
because they are all based on the same parent Act of 1893. However, some
jurisdictions have amended or repealed some of the provisions in the parent Act.
Furthermore, since the Sale of Goods Act is not a complete code, there are other
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relevant statutes that have been passed by the states and territories and that can be
referred to, especially when dealing with protection of consumers.
Since the above Acts are all based on the 1893 Act, the problems identified in the
United Kingdom have also arisen in Australia. The gist of the problem lies in the
concept of "merchantable quality", which is out-dated and not defined in the Act. The
definition of the term has been left to the courts and in the Australian case of Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. (1933)22 the court held that goods are merchantable if
it " should be in such a state that a buyer, fully acquainted with the facts
would buy them without abatement of the price obtainable for such goods if in
reasonably sound condition and without special terms." Price is an important
consideration in this definition. Goods cannot be said to be unmerchantable just
because they cannot be sold at the contract price but only at a slightly lower price.
Goods will be unmerchantable only if they are sold at a substantially low price. This
can be seen in the case ofH. Beecham & Co. Pty Ltd. v. Francis Howard & Co. Pty.
Ltd. (1921 )23 where the buyer had bought spruce timber from the seller for purpose of
making pianos, but later it was found to be affected by dry rot. The seller argued that
the timber was merchantable because it was still saleable for making boxes. But the






boxes was worth only 30 shillings. The court held that because of the substantial
difference between the price, the timber was not merchantable as "no business man,
having a contract to buy spruce timber whether for resale or for purposes of
manufacture, would think for a moment of accepting this timber, its condition being
known, without a very large reduction upon current market prices."
As for the implied warranty of fitness for purpose, some difficulty has arisen
where the specified purpose for which the buyer wants the goods is made known to
the seller but there is some peculiarity about the purpose of which the seller is not
aware. Should the seller be liable if he supplied goods which are not fit for use
because of such peculiarity? It was held that the requirement of fitness does not
extend to protect a buyer who suffers from some abnormality, unless the seller is
made aware of the special circumstances.24
The disclosure of the particular purpose would be evidence of reliance on the
seller's skill and judgment and actual reliance is one of the elements to be proven by
the buyer. In the case of Ashford Shire Council v. Dependable Motors Pty. Ltd.
(I960)25 the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for breach of the implied
term of fitness for a particular purpose. The council required a tractor for use in
~4 Levi v. Colgate-Palmolive Pty. Ltd. (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48.
25 1960 104 CLR 139.
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roadworks. The defendant company had such a machine in their showroom. The
council instructed its engineer to inspect the machine and see whether it was suitable
for the proposed work. The engineer went to the company's showroom and informed
the managing director that the machine was required for roadwork and asked whether
it could perform such work which he described. Following the discussion, the
engineer reported to the council that the machine seemed to have plenty of
horsepower and was big enough to do the work. The machine was purchased, relying
on the report. It was however not able to function. The court held in this case that the
engineer having disclosed the proposed purpose for which the machine was required,
had acted on the skill and judgment of the managing director of the company. And as
his assurances had induced the engineer's report to the council which had in turn
induced the purchase of the machine, the council had relied on the company's skill
and judgment. Consequently, as the machine was unsuitable for roadwork, the
council was entitled to damages.
If the buyer orders goods under their patent or other trade name so as to show that
he is satisfied that they will answer his purpose and that he is not relying on the
seller" skill and judgment, the condition is not applicable. But the mere fact that
goods are described in the contract by such a name will not necessarily make the
proviso applicable. In Martin v. McNamara (1951),26 it was provided in a building
26
[1951] Qd SR 225.
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contract that a certain class of roof should be used. However, the builder informed the
owner that the tiles specified would not be available for a long time. The owner asked
what would be the best to use and the builder suggested Cornish tiles. The owner
informed the contractor that he would rely on the latter's skill and expertise and the
contractor assured him that Cornish tiles were "quite all right". The owner then
instructed him "to go ahead with Cornish tiles". They were used but proved not fit for
purpose. It was held that the fact that the owner asked for the Cornish tiles did not
exclude the implied condition as to fitness as he had indicated that he was relying on
the skill and judgment of the contractor.
In the foregoing case, the fact of reliance prevailed over the mere circumstance
that a trade name was used. Since reliance is the key element in the application of this
implied warranty, it will cease to apply if the buyer buys the goods relying on its trade
or patent name. This is an indication that he is not relying on the seller's skill and
• i 27 ..... • •
judgment. This proviso in the section is actually redundant because the criterion for
the operation of the section is whether there is reliance on the part of the buyer, there
21 Sale ofGoods Act 1954 (ACT), s. 19(2); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s. 19(1); Sale of Goods Act
1972 (NT), s. 19(a); Sale of Goods Act (Qld.), s. 17(1); Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA), s. 14(1); Sale of
Goods Act 1896 (tas), s. 19(a); Sale of Goods Act 1958 (Vic.), s. 19(a); Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA),
s. 14®.
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is no need for the proviso. The trade name should only be a factor to be taken into
account in deciding whether or not there has been actual reliance.28
Besides the above mentioned problems, the Australian Sale of Goods Acts
preserve the distinction between "conditions" and "warranties" and this distinction
determines the kind of remedies available to the innocent party. Sometimes, even
though the breach may not be serious, if the term breached is a "condition", the
remedy is repudiation. As such, in New South Wales, section 4(5) has introduced the
concept of "intermediate stipulation". The section provides that nothing in the Act is
to be construed "as excluding a right to treat a contract of sale as repudiated for a
sufficiently serious breach of a stipulation that is neither a condition nor a warranty
but is an intermediate stipulation". This means that the classification of the terms into
"conditions" and "warranties" is not exhaustive. The remedy available is dependent
upon the seriousness of the breach.
It is provided by the Australian Sale of Goods Acts, following the original 1893
Act, that the implied terms may be negatived, excluded or varied by express




agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties or by usage. Such
exclusion clauses in standard form contracts between parties of equal bargaining
power would give rise to no problem. But if the parties were suppliers on the one
hand, and consumers on the other, such clauses would provide no protection to the
consumer buyers. This has resulted in many states and territories in Australia
enacting statutes designed to protect consumers. In New South Wales the Sale of
Goods Act 1923 now provides that the implied conditions as to correspondence with
description, merchantable quality, fitness for purpose, and the conditions implied in a
contract for sale by sample, cannot be excluded or modified in the case of a
"consumer sale".30 A "consumer sale" means a sale of goods (other than a sale by
auction) by a seller in the course of a business where the goods:
(1) are of a kind commonly bought for private use or consumption; and
(2) are sold to a person who does not buy or hold himself or herself out as
buying them in the course of a business.
In Victoria, the Goods (Sales and Leases) Act 1981 inserted into the Goods Act
1958 a new Part IV entitled "Implied Conditions and Warranties in Certain Sales and
Leases", ranging from sections 84 - 119, which essentially applies to consumer
29
N.S.W, Sale of Goods Act, s.57; Vic., s.61; Qld., s.56; S.A, s.54; W.A, s.54; Tas., s.59; A.C.T.,
s.58; N.T., s.57.
30 This provision is included in the Sale of Goods Act 1923 by virtue of an amendment made by the
Commercial Transaction (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1974, s.7.
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transactions. Where a contract falls within the scope of Part IV, the implied terms in
the Goods Act are no longer applicable but are replaced with analogous non¬
excludable implied terms. In South Australia, section 8 of the Consumer Transactions
Act 1972 implies in every "consumer contract" for the sale or supply of goods,
conditions as to correspondence with description, merchantable quality and fitness for
purpose analogous to those implied in contracts of sale by the Sale of Goods Act
1895. But this Act does not make it a requirement for the condition of
merchantability to be applicable in cases of sale by description and it is also not
applicable to latent defects. Section 8(5) provides that goods are of merchantable
quality if they are as fit for the purpose for which goods of that description are
ordinarily used as is reasonable to expect having regard to the price and the terms and
conditions of the relevant consumer contract and the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract and the apparent condition of the goods.
Besides the states' legislation, there is also Commonwealth legislation, the Trade
Practices Act 1974, which is aimed at protecting consumers. Sections 69 - 72 imply
in contracts for the supply of goods by a corporation to a consumer the same
conditions corresponding to those found in contracts of sale under the various states'
Sale of Goods legislation. These conditions cannot be excluded or restricted by the
parties, at least where the goods are of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal,
domestic or household use or consumption.
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In New Zealand, the law of sale is found in the Sale of Goods Act 1908, also based
on the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Therefore, similar problems arise in this country.
However, some of the issues are resolved differently by the New Zealand courts from
the English courts. For example, in the case of Taylor v. Combined Buyers Ltd.
(1924)31 Salmond J took a wide view of what constitutes description in the case of
unascertained goods, based on the fact that in such case the description is not a
statement but a promise. According to him, every description and every part of the
description is material, whether it relates to kind or quality, or to essential or
unessential attributes. On the other hand, in the case of specific goods, he thought
that the description meant a statement of the kind, class or species to which the article
belongs. This contrasts with the view of the House of Lords in the case ofAshington
Piggeries Ltd v. Christopher Hill Ltd (1972)32 the distinction lies between identity
and quality and not between specific or unascertained goods. Only a statement about
the identity of the goods would constitute description, and nothing else.
Besides the Sale of Goods Act, there are other relevant statutes that deal with
consumer protection, namely the Fair Trading Act 1986 and Consumer Guarantees
Act 1993. As in Australia, the state of the law is far from being satisfactory. The






been amended, thus giving the parties the freedom to contract out of the right, duty or
liability implied under the contract of sale. However, there is a provision in the
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (section 4) which allows the court to interfere with
any provision in the contract which tends to exclude the implied terms. This section
provides that
"if a statement as to quality or fitness is made by the seller during negotiations
for a contract, any provision in the contract purporting to exclude a Court from
determining the question (a) whether the statement was made or given, (b)
whether if it was made or given, it constituted a representation or term of the
contract or (c) whether, if it was a representation, it was relied on, does not
preclude the Court from determining any such question unless the Court
considers it fair and reasonable that the provision should be conclusive
between the parties, having regard to all the circumstances."
The issue of contracting out is also dealt with under the Consumer Guarantees Act
1993, which came into force on 1st April 1994. This Act covers, amongst other
things, implied guarantees for goods and services, compensation for consumers and
contracting out. By virtue of this Act, the use of exclusion clauses in contracts for the
supply of goods and services could be an expensive exercise. This is because a
supplier or a manufacturer who excludes or attempts to contract out of the Act can be
liable for a fine of up to NZ$30,000 if an individual, and NZ$100,000 in case of a
corporation. This Act is applicable to any contract for the supply of goods and
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services to a consumer. As such, the Act covers goods that people generally buy for
personal, domestic or household use, such as washing machines, cars etc.; and
services would include those generally done for personal, domestic or household use,
such as car repairs, dry cleaning, hair cuts and the like. For these transactions the Act
imposes a wide range of obligations on the suppliers and manufacturers of the goods
and services.
In the contract for the supply of goods, the Act implies these guarantees, which
may be invoked against suppliers of goods:-
(i) guarantee as to title
(ii) guarantee as to acceptable quality
(iii) guarantee as to fitness for particular purpose
(iv) guarantee that goods supplied by description correspond with that
description
(v) guarantee that goods supplied by sample correspond with that sample
(vi) guarantee, where the price is not set by contract, that the consumer will
not be liable to pay more than a reasonable price for the goods.
"Acceptable quality" is a new concept which is to be distinguished from the concept
of "merchantable quality" in the Sale of Goods Act. Since it was thought that
"merchantable quality" was inappropriate in the consumer context, a new term was
coined following the 1987 Report of the United Kingdom Law Commissions. Goods
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would be of "acceptable quality" if, having regard to all relevant circumstances of the
supply (including the nature of goods, their price and any statements made), a
reasonable and informed consumer would regard the goods as acceptable in relation to
their:-
- fitness for the purpose for which these goods are commonly supplied
- acceptability in appearance and finish
- freedom from minor defects
- safety and
- durability.
This Act also implies guarantees that may be invoked against manufacturers of the
goods. These are:-
- a guarantee as to acceptable quality
- a guarantee that goods supplied by description correspond with that
description
- a guarantee that repair facilities and spare parts are reasonably available for a
reasonable period after supply.
The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 is an attempt to reform the law of sale in New
Zealand but there are still many loopholes in it. Firstly, the Act is drafted using the
broadest possible statutory provisions with few or no de minimis provisions. For
example, the Act is said to apply to the supply of goods and services "of a kind
282
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption". The
problem is, how to determine whether or not the goods or the service fall within this
classification? For example, a television set would come within the Act, but would
the supply of 100 television sets be covered by the Act because 100 television sets
would never be purchased for personal, household or domestic consumption? It could
be argued that the Act applies because, irrespective of the number of the items
purchased, the product remains one that is ordinarily acquired for personal, household
or domestic use. An equivalent Australian statute33 generally applies to goods or
services priced at A$40,000 or less, and to goods or services priced at more than
A$40,000 which are "of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or
household use or consumption". For this reason, it can be said that there is a
guideline for consideration in deciding whether the goods or service comes within the
category for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. In New Zealand it
would be extremely difficult to decide whether or not the goods or services fall within
this classification.
Secondly, the Act creates no independent body to enforce the statutory guarantees
on behalfof the consumers. It is basically self-help legislation based on the belief that
the setting out of the guarantees and remedies in the Act will assist suppliers and
consumers to resolve their own disputes. If there is any dispute that arises, the
33 Trade Practices Act 1974.
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consumer can bring his case to the Disputes Tribunal or proceed through the courts.
But in many cases it will not be worthwhile for him to take such action as the value of
the goods or services will not be that high.34
Thirdly, by virtue of section 43 of the Act, the guarantees may be excluded if the
agreement is in writing between a supplier and a consumer who acquires (or holds
himself out as acquiring) goods or services for the purposes of a business. This
provision specifically allows a supplier, who is a person directly involved in
supplying goods to the consumer, to contract out of the Act. The manufacturer
however, has no such right. The problem arises because a consumer has rights both
against the supplier and the manufacturer. As such, the manufacturer could be
exposed to considerable liability, since he is unfortunately constrained in his ability to
contract out of the Act. Accordingly, what the manufacturer could do is to have an
undertaking from the supplier to contract out of the Act whenever supplying to a
business consumer. Also the manufacturer could seek indemnity from the supplier in
case of breach of any guarantee.
Finally, this Act is not a code. The rights and remedies provided therein are in
addition to any other rights or remedies that a consumer may have. The provisions in
34Dean, M and Jew, B., "Consumer Guarantees Act: More Than Just Liability for Defective Products",
Consumer Law, 1994, p.98.
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the Sale of Goods Act 1908 will continue to apply to the sale of goods which do not
fall under the ambit of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. The problem thus arises
as to making sure which of the two Acts would be applicable in a particular situation.
*
Because of the shared heritage between the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand, changes in the law in the United Kingdom, i.e. the passing of the Sale and
Supply of Goods Act 1994, would be of interest to these countries. Having the Sale
of Goods Act of 1893 as the parent Act, Australia and New Zealand are facing the
same problems once faced by the United Kingdom and was discussed in chapter two
above. The question that has been persistently asked is; how to reform their law of
sale?
It has been suggested that the reform to the Sale of Goods legislation in the United
Kingdom is merely superficial rather than revolutionary. Changes were made only
where necessary, and that is in respect of the implied term of quality. This kind of
reform solves one problem by creating another. There are more general problems with
the underlying concepts and structure of the Act itself.35 Three possible approaches
were proposed in revising the present state of law.36 First, retain the essential structure
35 Lambiris. M., "Reform of the Law of Sale in Australia", vol. 20, Melbourne University Law
Review, 1996, p.690.
36 id p. 699. Proposal is based on the Ontario Law Reform Commission report on the Sale of Goods.
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and framework of the existing legislation, amending it where necessary. Second,
adopt Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code in its current form without change.
Third, to draft an entirely new Act, but borrow heavily from Article 2 in doing so.
The first approach is less likely to work because, even though there has been an
ongoing process of amending the law where it appears necessary, without radically
altering the foundations of the original codification the whole process becomes
worthless. Take for example, section 14 (1) of the English Sale of Goods Act which
provides that,
"Except as provided by this section and by section 15 below, and subject to
any other enactment, there is no implied condition or warranty about the
quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract
of sale."
From the reading of this section, one can understand that the English law continues
to reflect the old common law maxim of caveat emptor. However, this general rule
has been eaten up by the exception because in almost every case the seller has an
implied obligation to furnish goods that are of merchantable quality and fit for their
purpose. The second approach is also not favourable because to import Article 2
without changes would be to adopt something which may be inappropriate, obsolete,
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rigid or unsuitable to local circumstances. As such, the third alternative would seem
to be the best option.
(Ill) CONCLUSION
From the above discussion of the law of sale of goods in United States of America,
Australia and New Zealand, the following conclusions can be reached:-
(i) The Sale of Goods Act 1893 was the model for the sale of goods legislation in
many countries. This Act, which was basically the restatement of the common law
position on the subject matter, reflected nineteenth-century concepts that are no longer
suitable to present commercial situations.
(ii) Because of the inadequacy, complexity and rigidity of the common law of sale,
there was a revolutionary change in the law of the United States of America as
embodied in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. To a certain extent this
provision maintains the key concepts of the Sale of Goods legislation regarding the
implied warranties of merchantable quality and fitness for purpose. However, the
meaning of the term "merchantable quality" under the Code is different from that in
the English Act.
(iii) Australia and New Zealand are at a crossroads as to which approach to adopt in
trying to reform their Sale of Goods legislation. There has been much support given
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to codifying the law along the same line as the United States of America while
modifying it to suit the local circumstances.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SALE OF GOODS IN MALAYSIA
INTRODUCTION
Currently in Malaysia there are two sets of laws governing sales, one for Peninsular
Malaysia and the other for Sabah and Sarawak. In the Peninsula the applicable law is
the Sale ofGoods Act 1957 (Revised 1989). This Act is a revision of the former Sale
of Goods (Malay States) Ordinance 1957 which was based on the Indian Sale of
Goods Act 1930, which in turn was based on the English Sale of Goods Act 1893. As
such, in the Peninsula, India and England, to the extent that the provisions in the 1893
Act had not been changed, the provisions are in pari materia.
The former Sale of Goods (Malay States) Ordinance 1957, as the name suggests,
was only applicable to the "Malay States" and these were defined to include the states
ofKelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Johore, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Kedah and Perlis.
Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak were not included in this definition. By the Sale
of Goods (Amendment and Extension) Act 1990, the 1957 Act was extended to
Penang and Malacca. Thus, all states in the Peninsula are governed by the same Act.
But Sabah and Sarawak are still not included. What is applicable in these two states is
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the "English law administered in England in the like case at the corresponding period."1
Why the Malaysian Sale of Goods Act 1957 was not made applicable to Sabah and
Sarawak is not known.
Having two laws of sale governing the Peninsula and Sabah and Sarawak has
caused some problems. Firstly, there is a lack of uniformity in the area of commercial
law, and this retards the growth of nationhood and uniformity between the Peninsula
and Sabah and Sarawak.2 Secondly, the discrepancy between the two regions in the
law relating to the sale of goods may give rise to a potential conflict of laws within the
country. Parties to trade between the two regions may have to decide on the
jurisdiction and the choice of law to govern their transactions. 3 But ifwe were to look
at England and Scotland before 1856, in actual fact no practical difficulties seem to
have been encountered by businessmen as a result of the differences in the laws of the
two countries,4 nor since, given that there have been and continue to be differences
between the two laws up to the present day. Maybe it would be the same in Malaysia.
But if there is such a problem, it would not be a major one, because not many cases
have come before the courts and when they do, our courts tend to follow the English
1 Section 5(2) Civil Law Act 1956. What is meant by this phrase will be dealt with below.
"Wu Min Aun, Legal Aspects of Sale of Goods, p. 2 - 3.
3ibid.
4Rodger, "The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain", Law Quarterly Review,
1992, p. 570, at p. 575.
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judicial authorities. There is no guarantee, however, that the problem will not arise.
And when it does arise there will be unnecessary legal problems for businesses between
the two regions.
(I) BRIEF HISTORY OF MALAYSIA
(a) THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS
Malaya, as it was known before the Independence of 1957, has a history which dates
back to the seventh century when the archipelago was "Indianized" via trade. Indian
ideas flourished throughout the Peninsula for centuries but began to decline during the
fourteenth century when Islam penetrated into South East Asia. Around the fifteenth
century, a Malay prince by the name of Parameswara escaped from Tumasek (now
Singapore) and took refuge in Malacca, where he set up a Sultanate. The
establishment of Malacca facilitated the growth of trade and Islam. From the date of
its founding till 1511, when it was occupied by the Portugese, Malacca was
transformed from a small fishing village into an important port, well known
internationally.
The first Europeans to appear in the Malayan scene were the Portugese. They
were attracted by the wealth of Malacca and came as friends, but later they turned
hostile. In 1511 Alfonso d'Albuquerque captured Malacca. The Portugese ruled until
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1641 whereupon Malacca was taken over by the Dutch. The Dutch, (unlike the
Portugese who were more interested in crushing the religion of Islam and faced enmity
from the people), were more concerned with trade than anything else. The Dutch
occupied Malacca until 1795, when the British briefly occupied it. But it was restored
to the Dutch in 1801.
The British in the meantime were concentrating on trade in India and for this
purpose they set up the East India Company. In the course of trade, British ships
sailed from India to China. They would stop at the British port of call in Bencoolen
(Sumatra), but it was situated in a bad location. The British needed a port upon their
trade route, and this meant that a port along the Straits of Malacca. Since Malacca
was already occupied by the Dutch, the British were offered the island ofPenang. The
offer was made by the Sultan of Kedah in return for British protection against the
Siamese. In the year 1786, Captain Francis Light, on behalf of the East India
Company, obtained cession of the island, and the British flag was hoisted on the island
of Penang which was renamed Prince ofWales' Island. In 1807 a Charter of Justice
was granted to Penang, and this is believed to have introduced the law of England into
the colony.5 It also established the Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales' Island with
"....jurisdiction and authority as our Court of King's Bench, and our justices thereof,
5 Ahmad Ibrahim. Malaysian Legal History, University ofMalaya Mimeograph, p. 22.
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and also as our High Court of Chancery and our Courts of Common Pleas and
Exchequer respectively, and the several justices, judges and barons thereof respectively
have and may lawfully exercise within that part of our United Kingdom called England,
in all civil and criminal actions and suits, and matters concerning the revenue, and in
the control of all inferior courts and jurisdictions, as far as circumstances will admit."
The British invasion and interest in the region did not end there, for they were now
eyeing the island of Singapore. By a political manouvre, Stamford Raffles managed to
possess Singapore, much to the annoyance of the Dutch, who claimed that Singapore
was a part of Johore of which they were an ally. The hostility between the Dutch and
the British was settled by the Treaty of Holland in 1824, whereby the British gave up
their rights in Sumatra to the Dutch and in return the Dutch released Malacca and
Singapore to the British. The British now occupied and controlled three strategic
ports, i.e. Penang, Malacca and Singapore, along the Straits ofMalacca. These three
settlements were incorporated into what is called the Straits Settlements in the year
1826 with Penang as its capital.
Upon the establishment of the Straits Settlements, a new charter was granted in
1826 which extended the jurisdiction of the Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales'
Island to Singapore and Malacca. In 1855 a third charter was granted to re-organise
the existing courts in the region. The Straits Settlements were administered as a
Presidency, but it was too expensive and so it was downgraded to a Residency in 1830
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and came under the administrative control of the Governor of Bengal. In the
meantime, Singapore was developing fast as a trading port, and its growth was far
beyond what was expected. In 1851 the jurisdiction over the Straits Settlements was
removed from the Governor of Bengal to the Governor-General of India. Even this
change did not solve the administrative problems, and it was felt that the Straits
Settlements would be better administered direct from the Colonial Office in London.
Eventually, after a lot of lobbying, in 1867 the Straits Settlements were separated from
India and were administered direct from the Colonial Office in London.
(b) THE MALAY STATES
By the late nineteenth century British intervention in Malaya, direct or indirect, was
greatly felt. Direct intervention took place in the states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang
and Negri Sembilan whereby in 1895 they loosely formed themselves into a federation
called the Federated Malay States. By virtue of a series of treaties each state accepted
a British Resident who acted as an Advisor on matters affecting administration of the
state and revenue, leaving only matters of religion and customs to the Sultan.6 The
running of the state was therefore in the hands of the British. Fearing total British
control, the other five Malay states did not join the federation and they formed the
6Clause 4 of the Treaty of Federation 1895 contained this clause.-
"They [the Rulers] undertake to provide him [British officer] with suitable
accomodation, with such salary as is determined by HM's Government, and to
follow his advice in all matters other than those touching the Mohammadan
religion". Quoted from Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagement affecting
Malay States and Borneo, Jas Truscott & Son Ltd. (1924) p. 71.
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Unfederated Malay States. These states were Johore, Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah
and Perlis. Even though they did not accept a British Resident, they nevertheless
accepted British protection.
The British began to control all the states in Malaya when they managed to
persuade all the nine Sultans to surrender their legal sovereignty to the British Crown.
In 1946, by virtue of the Malayan Union Order in Council, the federation of Malaya
was extended to constitute the nine states plus the colonies of Malacca and Penang.7
The move to establish a Malayan Union under lull British control met with vehement
protests from the Malays. The establishment was dismantled and displaced by the
Federation of Malaya in 1948.8 The federation became independent on 31st August
1957 after 171 years under the British control. In 1963 the federation was further
extended when Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore joined and it was renamed Malaysia.
Two years later, in 1965, Singapore left to become an independent republic.
(c) SABAH AND SARAWAK
Sabah (formerly known as North Borneo) and Sarawak have their own history, and
they were formerly the territories of Borneo. In the nineteenth century Sabah and
Sarawak were claimed by the Sultan of Brunei, but in 1839 there was a revolt in




Sarawak against the ruler. This event paved the way for the intervention by James
Brooke who established three generations of "White Rajahs" in Sarawak. In the
course of his travels, James Brooke arrived in Sarawak just at the right time to offer
his assistance in return for a Governorship.
Upon his appointment as Governor, Brooke made many changes which were to
restore law and order and to provide for a better administration of Sarawak. He was
also eager to suppress piracy in the region. His effort was much appreciated by the
British because suppressing piracy in the region created a safe passage for British ships
which were carrying on trade with China. In 1847 there was an armed conflict with
the Sultan of Brunei and the British stepped in to aid James Brooke by making the
Sultan sign a Treaty ofFriendship and Commerce. James Brooke was made the British
Consul-General for Brunei and Borneo. By 1888 Britain had established a
Protectorate over North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei, which lasted until the Japanese
Occupation in 1942. But these territories were freed from Japanese hands by the
British after three years.
(d) RECEPTION OF ENGLISH LAW INTO MALAYSIA
From this history, there can be little doubt that English law was introduced into
Malaysia by virtue of the royal Charters granted in 1807 and 1826. The first Charter in
1807 was to establish the Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales' Island which was to
be made up of the Governor, three Councillors and one other Judge, to be called the
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Recorder.9 The Court had the jurisdiction and powers of the Superior Courts in
England, but this jurisdiction was limited in that it had no power to try any suit against
any person who had never been resident in the Settlement, nor against any person then
resident in Great Britain or Ireland.10
The effect of the first Charter was to introduce English law into Penang. The
second Charter of 1826 extended the first Charter to Malacca and Singapore and
introduced uniformity in the law to the colony. In the case of Rodyk v. Williamson
(1834)11 it was held by Sir Benjamin Malkin, R. that he was:-
"Bound by the uniform course of authority to hold that the
introduction of the King's Charter into these Settlements had
introduced the existing law of England also, except in some cases
where it was modified by express provision, and had abrogated any
law previously existing."
In 1878 the Civil Law Ordinance was passed, bringing further into operation in the
Colony a considerable body of English law. This Ordinance has since been repealed
and replaced by what is now the Civil Law Act 1956. By means of sections 3 and 5 of
the Act the courts are allowed to apply English law in certain circumstances. As far as
9Braddell, Law of the Straits Settlements, 1982, p. 12.
I °ibid.
II
[1834] 2 Ky. Ec. p. 9.
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commercial law is concerned, the appropriate section is section 5 whereby it is
provided that:-
(1) In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided
in the States ofWest Malaysia other than Malacca and Penang
with respect to the law of partnerships, corporations, banks and
banking, principals and agents, carriers by air, land and sea,
marine insurance, average, life and fire insurance, and with
respect to mercantile law generally, the law to be administered
shall be the same as would be administered in England in the like
case at the date of the coming into force of this Act, if such
question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England,
unless in any case other provision is or shall be made by any
written law.
(2) In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be
decided in the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah and Sarawak
with respect to the law concerning any of the matters referred to
in the subsection (1), the law to be administered shall be the
same as would be administered in England in the like case at the
corresponding period, if such question or issue had arisen or had
to be decided in England, unless in any case other provision is or
shall be made by any written law.
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Until 1932 there was no local legislation on the subject of sale of goods. It was in
that year that the first legislation was enacted and it was initially for the Federated
Malay States ofPerak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan. This was copied by two
other states of Johore and Trengganu. In the states of Kedah, Pedis and Kelantan,
there was no legislation until the passing of the Sale of Goods (Malay States)
Ordinance 1957. The Attorney-General told the Federal Council during the second
reading of the Bill:-
"It may be said that if it is desirable that the law should be uniform,
why should this Bill be confined only to the Malay States? The
reason to that is that in the Straits Settlements as is provided in the
Civil Law Ordinance we passed last year, the commercial law is
based upon the law prevailing in the United Kingdom, and the Sale
of Goods is, of course, a branch of commercial law. It is not
therefore necessary to legislate in regard to the Settlements. But the
law, as far as I know, is exactly the same in the Settlements as it is
here for the reason that the law as embodied in this Bill is the same
as the law in the United Kingdom."12
12
Proceedings of the Federal Council 1957, p. 2528. Quoted in P. Balan, "The Warranty of Quiet
Possession in Sale ofGoods", Journal of Malaysian Comparative Law, 1976, p. 49.
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It was said that the words of the Attorney-General had to be taken with a pinch of salt
as there were significant differences between the law embodied in the Bill and the law
applicable in the United Kingdom in 1957.13
The Sale of Goods (Malay States) Ordinance 1957 was applicable to all states in
the Peninsula except Penang and Malacca. In these two states and in Sabah and
Sarawak the English Sale ofGoods Act was applicable. But the question is whether it
is the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979 or the 1893 Act that is applicable by virtue of
section 5(2) of the Civil Law Act 1956? In the case of Tan Chong Motors v. Alan
McKnight (1983)14 the court had the opportunity to decide this matter but it was not
utilised. The case involved a member of the personnel of the Royal Australian Air
Force, who was based in Penang and bought a car there to take back to his own
country. He was entitled to purchase a car duty free in Malaysia and take it back to
Australia. But the car had to conform to the Australian Design Regulation. The
appellant's salesman made a representation that the car conformed to the ADR, when
in actual fact it did not and as a result the respondent sufferred a loss. He claimed
damages for breach of a warranty. It was held that the appellant was liable in damages
to the respondent. On the issue of whether the 1893 or the 1979 Sale of Goods Act
was applicable in Penang the Judge held that the 1979 Act had completely replaced the
13 Sections 2, 4, 11 (b), 21 (2), 22, 24, 26, 49 (3), 50 (2), 50 (3), 53 (2), 53 (3), 53 (5), 57, 58, 59,
61 (1) of the 1893 Act were omitted. And there were some sections which were not present in that
Act but were included in the Bill.
14[1983] 1 MLJ220.
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1893 one and that the provision in section 14(3) is not new, it being a re-enactment of
section 14(1) though not in precisely identical terms. Thus, according to him,
whatever Act it is, the buyer is entitled to rely on the implied condition. But he went
further, to say that since in this case it was agreed that there was an express warranty
given by the salesman, therefore there was no need to rely on the implied condition
provision of the Act.
In a more recent case from Sarawak, Teck Ngee Co. Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan Han Lai
Sago Mill (1990),15 the High Court of Borneo also refused to be decisive about the
issue. The plaintiff, who was a judgment creditor, seized a motor vessel belonging to
the defendant. The vessel was about to be put up for sale by public auction when there
was an intervention by Tokyo Trading Co., who obtained a stay of the auction. The
intervener contended that they had title to the engine that was fixed to the motor
vessel. The claim was based on an agreement for sale of the said engine between the
intervener and the defendant. Among the clauses of the agreement, it was agreed that
property in the said engine should not pass to the defendant until the final payment had
been made. The defendant had defaulted in the payment of instalments and therefore
the property remained with the intervener. The judge referred to the provisions ofboth
the 1893 and 1979 Acts relating to the passing of property, and held in agreement with
15[1990] 2 CLJ 302.
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the intervener. The judge did not however say which Act is the law applicable in
Sarawak.
In the case ofHeng Leong Motor Trading Co. v. Osman bin Abdullah (1994),16
which will be looked at again later, it was held per curiam that by virtue of section 5
(2) of the Civil Law Act 1956, the law applicable in Sarawak for the purpose of this
case was the United Kingdom Sale of Goods Act 1979 and not section 12 of the 1893
Act or section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957. The court took this view because
the transaction took place in 1983 therefore, the law applicable was the United
Kingdom Sale ofGoods Act 1979.
In yet another case, Low Hock Jee v. Mayban Finance Bhd. (1996)17, the High
Court of Sabah and Sarawak held that by reason of section 5(2) of the Civil Law Act
1956, the law applicable in Sabah and Sarawak is not the Malaysian Sale of Goods Act
1957 but the English Sale of Goods Act 1979. In this case, the plaintiff bought a car
from the defendant which was later seized by the Customs and Excise Department
under section 128 of the Customs Act 1967, apparently for an offence under section
135(l)(d) of the same Act. The plaintiff in his action alleged that, in the
circumstances, consideration for the car had failed and so he claimed for the refund of
16
[1994] 2 MLJ 456.
17
[1996] 2 CLJ 479.
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the price money. He argued that the defendant had breached the implied condition that
he (the seller) had the right to sell the car and also that he should have a quiet
possession of the car. The preliminary issue for the court to consider was what was
the law applicable in the case. The judge, Suleiman Hashim J., held that by virtue of
section 5(2) of the Civil Law Act 1957, the law applicable is the English Sale ofGoods
Act 1979 and not the Malaysian Sale ofGoods Act 1957.
From the above cases it is clear that the phrase " in the like case at the
corresponding period "in section 5(2) of the Civil Law Act 1956 refer to the law
applicable in England at the time of the dispute. According to Bartholomew, under
section 5(2), English law may be received at any time up to the corresponding period,
and this constitutes the principal difference between the commercial law of the Malay
states (West Malaysia) and Sabah and Sarawak.18 Since the wordings in both the
provisions are different, therefore the difference is intended by the legislature.
Subsection (1) refers to the law in England at the time the Civil Law Act 1956 came
into force and subsection (2) refers to the law of England applicable at the time the
dispute arises.
In short, the legal position in Malaysia can be summarised as follows:-
18 G.W. Bartholomew, The Commercial Law in Malaysia : A Study in the Reception of English
Law, 1965, p. 100.
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(1) for all the states in West Malaysia the law applicable is the Sale of Goods Act
1957.
(2) For Sabah and Sarawak the law applicable is the English law, presently the Sale of
Goods Act 1979, as amended by the Sale and Supply of Goods 1994. Thus,
Sabah and Sarawak are still bound by the statutory provision to apply principles
ofEnglish law relating to sale of goods.
(II) IMPLIED TERMS UNDER SALE OF GOODS ACT 1957
(a) IMPLIED CONDITION OF TITLE
The implied terms under the Sale ofGoods Act 1957 are those terms implied originally
under the Sale of Goods Act 1893. As an example, under section 14 (a), which is
equivalent to section 12 of the 1893 Act, unless a different intention is shown in the
contract, there is an implied condition on the part of the seller, that in the case of a sale
he has a right to sell the goods, and that in the case of an agreement to sell, he will
have a right to sell the goods at the time when the property is to pass. There are two
limbs to this section. The first one is on sale where the seller is to have title at the time
of the contract. The second limb concerns an agreement to sell. In that situation the
seller need not necessarily have title at the moment of the contract but rather at the
time when property is to pass. In the English case ofButterworth v. Kingsway Motors
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Ltd (1954)19 the seller, who was actually the hirer of a car under a hire-purchase
contract, sold it to A who resold it to B. B then resold the car to the defendants. The
car was bought from the defendants by the plaintiff, who had used it for several months
before being told that it was the property of the finance company which let the car on
hire-purchase to the hirer. The plaintiff repudiated the contract and claimed for the
return of the purchase price on the ground that there had been a total failure of
consideration. A week later the hirer paid the finance company the outstanding
amount. The court held that the plaintiff had the right to the return of the purchase
price because the hirer had no title to the car. But insofar as the intermediate buyers
were concerned, they had not rescinded the contract and the acquisition of title by the
hirer had served to feed back their title.
This principle of "feeding the title" was accepted in the Malaysian case ofNg Ngat
Siang v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd & Anor. (1988).20 The plaintiff agreed to
buy a car from the second defendant who had not yet gained title to it as it was claimed
by MUI Finance, the company which helped finance the purchase of the car by the
second defendant. Because of this, ownership in the car could only be transferred to
the plaintiff once the whole amount due under the hire-purchase contract was paid.
This money was to come from the sale of the car to the plaintiff". The plaintiff paid the
19[1954] 2 All ER 694.
20[1988] 3 MLJ319.
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full price and all that was left to do was for the second defendant to transfer ownership
to the plaintiff. He instead sold the car to A, who was financed by the first defendant.
In this case the plaintiff applied to court for a determination as to who had a better title
to the car. The court held that after the full payment by the second defendant to MUI
Finance, ownership vested in him and the title so acquired enured to the benefit of the
plaintiff as the purchaser of the car. In this case the judge considered two instances in
the transaction: one before the pay-off and the other after the pay-off. In the former
situation, the second defendant as hirer had no title to the car because it was claimed
by MUI Finance. But after he had paid off MUI Finance, the endorsement of
ownership claim by the finance company was cancelled. Title is vested in the second
defendant. In turn, he should deliver the car to the plaintiff instead ofA.
Mere suspicion that the goods are stolen does not mean that section 14 (a) is
breached. In Ahmad Ismail v. Malayan Motors (1973)21, which is actually a hire-
purchase case, the plaintiff bought a car from the first defendants who were dealers in
second-hand cars. Unable to pay the whole purchase price, he obtained help from the
first defendants who were the finance company. After fourteen months, the car was
detained by the police on the suspicion that it was stolen property. The plaintiff
thereupon terminated the hire-purchase agreement on the ground that the first
defendants had no title to pass and therefore were in breach of the implied condition
21
[1973] 1 MLJ 117
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under section 6(1 )(b) of the Hire-Purchase Act, 1967. (This provision is equivalent to
section 14(a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1957). It was held by the court that since as a
matter of fact the car was not a stolen car, therefore there could be no question of the
owner not being able to transfer good title to the plaintiff at the time when the property
was to pass. As such, the plaintiffs claim for damages for breach of the implied
condition must fail.
In contrast to the above case is the case of Heng Leong Motor Trading Co. v.
Osman bin Abdullah (1994)22 an issue inter-related with that of title was discussed,
i.e. the warranty of quiet possession. What happened in this case was that the
respondent bought a van from the appellant (dealer) and paid RM5,500 as deposit.
The balance of RM8,000 was financed by Affin Credit (M) Sdn. Bhd. whereupon a
hire-purchase agreement was entered between this finance company and the
respondent. After the payment of the amount due under the agreement, the
registration card was returned to the respondent. Subsequently, the van was seized by
the Royal Customs and Excise Department on the ground that it was material evidence
in a customs case under investigation regarding its import. The respondent brought an
action against the appellant (dealer) for breach of the implied condition of the dealer's
right to sell, and to give possession and sole and exclusive use and benefit of the van.
22[ 1994] 2 MLJ456.
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At first instance judgement was given in favour of the respondent and there was an
appeal against that decision. Dismissing the appeal, the court held that there was a
clear breach of the implied warranty of quiet possession of the van under section
12(2)(b) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 due to the lawful seizure of the van by the
Customs and Excise Department. The warranty protects the buyer against the act of
the seller as well as that of the third party. If the buyer's possession of the goods is in
any way disturbed, he is entitled to hold the seller liable and to be indemnified by him.
(b) SALE BY DESCRIPTION
By virtue of section 15, where there is a contract for sale of goods by description,
there is an implied condition that the goods shall correspond with the description; and,
if the sale is by sample as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the
goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with the
description. Like its English counterpart, sale by description includes all contracts for
sale ofunascertained goods whereby the buyer has not seen the goods but relied on the
description of it by the seller. In Nagurdas Purshotumdas & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan
Kaisa Ltd (1911 )23 the parties had conducted previous dealings for the sale of flour in
bags bearing a well-known trade mark. A further order of the flour, described as "the
same as our previous contracts", was made. Flour of the same quality was delivered




breach of the implied condition of description. Where goods were unascertained and
sold by mere description of them, when delivered they should conform to their
description.
In a Singapore case, Harrisons & Crosfield (N.Z) Ltd. v. Lian Aik Hang (Sued as
a Firm) (1987)24, the plaintiffs and the defendants entered into two written contracts
for the sale of 314 metric tons of peanut kernels of 60/70 pieces per ounce TBS (Thai
Brown Skin) to be packed in new jute bags C & F Auckland. The peanut kernels were
to be from the "1980 Thailand Crop". When the goods arrived in Auckland, the
plaintiffs rejected them on the grounds that (a) they did not correspond with the
sample; (b) that they were not from the "1980 Thailand Crop" but from an older crop
and therefore were not in compliance with description; and (c) that they were not fit
for human consumption by reason of mould aflatoxin25 and infestation by insect and
therefore were not merchantable. The court held in favour of the plaintiffs in that there
was a breach of section 15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The court was not satisfied
that there had been a satisfactory and adequate sampling of the goods. Neither was the
court convinced that the peanuts were from the 1980 harvest. The defendants had
bought the peanut kernels from a Thai company, and from the evidence given at the
24[1987] 2MLJ286.
:5In his judgement the judge explained the nature of aflatoxin i.e. they are toxins produced mainly
by mould known as Aspergillus Flavus. The mould, which are found on peanut kernels, is a living
organism and it proliferates and produces toxins in moisture and under favourable physical,
chemical and biological conditions. ( p. 288)
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trial, it seemed that the 1980 harvest was still in the process of being harvested and
dried when the peanuts were delivered from Bangkok to the defendants. Therefore it
would be impossible that the crops consigned by the defendants to the plaintiffs were
of the 1980 harvest. Finally on the question of the presence of aflatoxin and infestion
of the peanut kernels, the court found that it was far above the permitted limits.
(c) FITNESS FOR PURPOSE
Section 16 (1) of the Sale ofGoods Act 1957, like its predecessor, expressly preserved
the common law principle of caveat emptor. The opening words of the section state
that "there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale", and it goes on to
prescribe the circumstances in which there will be an implied condition that the goods
are fit for a particular purpose and also of merchantable quality. This section actually
provides for the exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor. Section 16 (1) (a) implies
that goods must be fit for a particular purpose for which they are bought provided that
certain conditions are satisfied. These conditions are:-
(1) The buyer must have made known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are bought.
(2) There must be reliance by the buyer on the seller's skill and judgment.
(3) The goods must be of the description which it is in the course of the
seller's business to supply, and this would exclude a private sale.
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(4) The goods must not be sold under a trade or patent name, for this would
negate reliance on the seller.
In Khong Seng v. Ng Teong Kiat Biscuit Factory Ltd. (1963)26 the plaintiff
claimed for the price of 219 tins of tallow supplied to the defendants at the request of
the latter. The defendants denied the claim, stating among other things that the tallow
supplied was of an inferior quality and was not fit for the purposes for which it was
supplied. The plaintiff orally warranted that the tallow would be of a quality fit for the
manufacture of biscuits and free from defects and faults. The defendants alleged that
they had used 15 tins to manufacture over 22 tins of biscuits, of which none were
saleable and for this the defendants counter-claimed. The court held that the plaintiffs
claim must fail and that there was a breach of the implied condition under section 16
(1) (a) which entitled the defendants to repudiate the contract. There had been
previous dealings between the parties and the plaintiff knew that the defendants
required the tallow for the manufacture of biscuits. The plaintiff contended that he was
not in the business of supplying goods of that description because he was a meat seller.
The court however said that even though the parties described the goods as tallow, in
reality it was melted beef fat and the plaintiff" himself admitted that he extracted the fat
from the beef and turned it into tallow and sold it separately. Therefore, tallow was
goods of a description which it was in the course of the plaintiffs business to supply.
26
(1963) 29 MLJ 388
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If a presumption can be made in the above case that the plaintiff was actually a
vegetable seller, could it be said that the tallow was goods of a description which it
was in the course of his business to supply? If the goods were of a similar kind, then
the provision will cover it27. Under English law, this problem is eliminated because the
buyer need only prove that the seller is in the course of a business. It is no longer
neessary to show that the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the
seller's business to supply.
Under the subsection it must also be shown that the buyer relied on the seller's skill
and judgement. Reliance will be implied if the buyer made known to the seller the
purpose for which the goods are required. In Deutz Far East (Pte) Ltd, v. Pacific
Navigation Co. Pte. Ltd [1990]28 the plaintiffs were manufacturers and suppliers of
Deutz marine engines and spare parts. They sold to the defendants a new top part of
the injector pump (NTP) to be used on the main engine of the defendants' ship. This
action was for the recovery of the price. The defendants counterclaimed that the
goods supplied were defective and that it had caused extensive damage to the ship,
which resulted in the defendants suffering a great loss in repairing it. It was contended
that the long and thicker springs and the shorter retaining nuts installed in the NTP
2




supplied by the plaintiffs were the cause of the breakdown of the engine in the ship.
After considering all the evidence, the court decided that the long springs and the short
retaining nuts were the cause of the engine failure. The court was also satisfied that
the defendants relied entirely on the plaintiffs to supply a NTP which could be used
with the engine which was on the defendants' ship. The wrong combination of the
springs and nuts was a hidden and latent defect. The plaintiffs were therefore liable for
the breach of the implied condition that the goods must be fit for their particular
purpose.
In Associated Metal Smelters Ltd v. Tham Cheow Toh [1972]29, the plaintiffs
bought from the defendants a metal melting furnace and they had given an undertaking
that the furnace would have a temperature of not lower than 2,600 degrees F. The
furnace supplied by the defendants did not however meet the required temperature. It
was argued that they had built the furnace according to the specification given by the
plaintiffs. Therefore, if it could not produce the kind of temperature required, the
defendants were not at fault. The court held that the defendants had given an
assurance that the furnace was capable of producing a temperature of not lower than
2,600 degrees F. This amounted to a breach of the condition of the contract.
Furthermore, being manufacturers of furnaces, they should know that to produce a
furnace capable of producing the specific temperature they could not only rely on the
29[1972] 1 MLJ 171.
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specifications but also on their skill and knowledge. Judgment was given for the
plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that
the trial judge was correct in finding that the breach amounted to a breach of
condition. The plaintiffs in this case waived their right to treat the contract as
repudiated and instead claimed damages.
The issue of fitness was once again raised in the recent case of Union Alloy (M)
Sdn. Bhd, v. Syarikat Pembinaan Yeoh liong Lay Sdn. Bhd (1993)30. The plaintiff
and the defendant entered into a contract for the sale of an ACE Skyrak
Passenger/Material Hoist Model MK 25. While being used to transport two workmen
to the twenty-first storey of the building under construction, the machine crashed to
the ground, killing one of the workmen and seriously injuring the other. In this action
the plaintiff sued the defendant for the balance of the price and in its defence the
defendant contended that the plaintiffwas in breach of the conditions as to description,
fitness and merchantability implied under sections 15 and 16 (1) (a) and (b) of the Sale
of Goods Act 1957. It was argued that the accident was due to the fact that the
machine was not fit to be used for the particular purpose of carrying people and
construction materials. The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was in
breach of these terms as alleged by the defendant. The court was satisfied that there
30[1993] 2 AMR 2021.
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was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the machine did not conform to the
contract description and the brochure. Therefore there was no breach of section 15.
With regard to the warranty of fitness, the court found that the machine, which had
only one purpose, i.e. transportation of men and materials at a construction worksite,
was able to be used for that particular purpose. From the evidence given by witnesses,
the court was satisfied that the accident had occurred not because the machine was
unfit, but for other reasons. Firstly, it had not been properly installed in that it was
supposed to be installed to reach a height of 30 metres, but had been installed to reach
55 metres. Secondly, once installed the machine required to be properly maintained
and this had not been done by the defendant. Finally, the installation and the use of the
machine was not reported to the Factories and Machinery Department and as such no
certificate of fitness was issued for the use of the machine. These were requirements
under section 19 (1) of the Factories and Machinery Act 1967 and Regulation 10 of
the Factories and Machinery (Notification, Certificate of Fitness and Inspection)
Regulations 1970.
(d) MERCHANTABLE QUALITY
The implied condition of merchantable quality is provided for in section 16 (1) (b) of
the Sale ofGoods Act 1957. It provides that "where goods are bought by description
from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he is the manufacturer or
producer or not) there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable
quality; provided that if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall be no implied
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condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed." In this
particular section it is not a requirement that the buyer made known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods were bought. For so long as the goods are
bought by description and the seller is someone who deals in goods of that description,
thus excluding a private sale, there is the implied condition that the goods must be
merchantable. In the United Kingdom, by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act
1973 this section has been changed to read "where the seller sells goods in the course
of a business " This change meant that the implied term does not apply only to
sale by description, but would also include a sale by a seller who has never sold goods
of that kind before31.
As to what is meant by merchantable quality, the local Act has not given it any
definition. Therefore, to decide whether goods are merchantable or otherwise, factors
like price, description and fitness for purpose have to be considered. According to
Halsbury's Laws of England,
"In relation to pre-1973 contracts i.e. under the Sale of Goods 1893,
as a general rule, goods were ofmerchantable quality if in the form in
which they were tendered they would be used by a reasonable man
for some purpose for which goods of the same quality and same
general character and designation would normally be used, so as to
31Beatrix Vohrah & Wu Min Aun, The Commercial Law ofMalaysia, p. 206.
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be saleable under the description by which they were sold at a price
not substantially less than the contract price."32
In the case of Seng Hin v. Arathoon Sons Ltd (1968)33 the defendants sold
tapioca flour to the plaintiffs for shipment to buyers in Germany. Prior to the delivery,
the defendants had marked these bags on both sides with their own distinguishing
mark, consisting of Chinese lettering in red ink, using a red dye on stencil on the outer
cover of the jute bags. This had been their practice for the past seventeen years in
selling tapioca flour. It should also be noted that for the preceding eight years the
plaintiffs had been buying tapioca flour from the defendants and on five occasions had
sold it to the same German buyers without complaint. Upon arrival in Germany the
tapioca flour was found to be discoloured, due to the fact that the red dye had
penetrated the jute and come in contact with the tapioca flour. Upon examination, it
was found that the red coloured dye was prohibited in Germany and the court of first
instance held that the tapioca flour was not fit for human consumption and therefore
was not merchantable. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed
on the following grounds:-
(1) that the trial judge erred in fact and in law in holding that the
tapioca flour was of unmerchantable quality because it was not
32Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 41, 4th. ed. 1983, para. 694, note 3.
33[1968] 2 MLJ 123.
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saleable as tapioca flour to be used for human consumption and
starch. There was no evidence that the tapioca flour was unsaleable
as starch.
(2) that the trial judge paid little attention to the fact that only the part
that came in contact with the red dye became discoloured. There
was no evidence that the discoloration occurred to the rest of the
flour in the bags.
The Federal Court opined that the appellants' contention was well-founded and held
that in order to show that the goods were not of merchantable quality it had to be
demonstrated that the goods were of no use for any purpose for which such goods
would normally be used and were therefore not saleable under that description. In this
case the plaintiffs had failed to show that the tapioca flour was of unmerchantable
quality under English law. Although the flour may not have been in perfect condition it
was, on the evidence, at least saleable as starch. Furthermore it was not found to be
unfit for human consumption under the law of Singapore except in Germany because
the red dye was of a prohibited kind. The defendants' appeal was therefore allowed.
In this case, the plaintiffs also raised the implied condition of fitness for a particular
purpose, but the court held that since sale was by trade name, the proviso applied and
the implied term was ousted. In arriving at his decision, the judge found that the
tapioca flour was condemned as unfit for human consumption and prohibited for sale
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purely under German law. There was nothing in evidence to show that it was
unmerchantable under English law. But if the above case were to happen in England
now, the decision would probably be different following the 1994 Act. Under the new
Act, merchantability of the goods also includes its appearance. Since the tapioca flour
had become discoloured after coming in contact with the red dye, it could be said that
it was no longer merchantable because it did not appear as tapioca flour should look.
In Lian Huat & Co. (Pte) Ltd. v. Megah Commercial Co. (1978)34 by two
separate written contracts, the defendants agreed to purchase from the plaintiffs 10
metric tons of Singapore nutmegs BWP (contract 1) and 40 metric tons of Papua
nutmegs BWP and 10 metric tons of Papua nutmegs ABCD (contract 2). Contract 1
was a sale by sample whereby the defendants were shown a sample of the Singapore
nutmegs before the contract was signed. There was no sample in contract 2. There
was a provision in the contract that "buyers shall nominate their own representative to
supervise the quality and weight at seller's store before taking delivery". Subsequently,
when the plaintiffs were ready to deliver, the defendants refused to accept the goods
on the grounds that under contract 1 the nutmegs were not of quality, and under
contract 2 the nutmegs were not up to "international quality". The court held that the
allegation that the nutmegs were not of international quality was not true. Under
contract 2 the defendants agreed to buy Papua nutmegs ABCD and not nutmegs of
34[1978] 2MLJ51.
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"international quality". What was delivered was Papua nutmegs ABCD, and they were
saleable as Papua nutmegs ABCD; therefore there was no breach of the contract. Had
the defendants contemplated buying nutmegs which were internationally saleable, this
should have been made known to the plaintiffs. Even though this case involved a
contract for sale of goods, the Sale ofGoods Act was not raised because the plaintiffs'
claim was based on the breach of an express term of the written contract.
(e) SALE BY SAMPLE
A contract of sale is a contract for sale by sample if, either expressly or impliedly, it
was agreed between the parties or intended by them to be so'5. Without agreement or
intention a sale is not a sale by sample, even though a sample is provided for
examination by the buyer. Samples are usually used in the sale ofbulk goods like rice,
wheat, flour, or in household goods like tiles, carpets, etc. They are usually a small
fraction of the thing offered for sale shown to the buyer in order to describe the thing
to him. In the classic statement ofLord MacNaghten:-
"the office of a sample is to present to the eye the real meaning and
intention of the parties with regard to the subject-matter of the
contract which, owing to the imperfection of the language, it may be
35Section 17 (1).
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difficult or impossible to express in words. The sample speaks for
itself."36
Section 17 (2) provides that where there is a contract of sale by sample there is an
implied condition that (a) the bulk shall correspond with the sample in quality; (b) the
buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample; and
(c) the goods shall be free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable which
would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample. These are
independent conditions and breach of any one of them will entitle the buyer to reject
the goods and treat the contract as repudiated.
Under subsection (2) (a) the bulk of the goods must correspond with the sample in
quality. If the bulk has got to undergo some minor process in order to make them
comply with the sample, that would mean that the above provision is breached. In the
case of E.S. Ruben Ltd. v. Faire Bros Ltd (1949)37 the judge said that there is no
compliance with the contractual obligation if the article delivered is not in accordance
with the sample but which can by some simple process be turned into an article which
is in accordance with the sample'"8.
36Drummond v. Van Ingen [1887] 12 AC 284, at p. 297.
37
[1949] 1 KB 254.
3Sid. p. 260.
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In the case of Lau Yaw Seng v. Cooperative Ceramica D'Imola (1991 )39 the
plaintiff ordered from the defendant a quantity of tiles after he had seen the sample
exhibited at a ceramic fair in Spain. Agreement was entered into and the payment was
by way of an irrevocable letter of credit. When the goods were delivered, the plaintiff
found that they were not of the same quality as the sample and they were not fit for
their purpose and nobody would buy them. The plaintiff required the defendant to take
back the tiles but they delayed in their response. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had been fraudulent and the delay was deliberate in order to wait for the
maturing of the letter of credit. The plaintiff applied for an interim injunction to stop
the bank from paying against the letter of credit and this was served on the bank. The
court held that the plaintiff, when alleging that there was fraud, had to prove it and in
this instance that burden had not been discharged. The court opined that on the facts
of the case what was in dispute was the performance of the contract, i.e. the quality of
the goods shipped by the defendant to the plaintiff. What was shipped was tiles,
though not of the quality or standard the plaintiff alleged that he saw in Spain.
What the plaintiff should have done in this case was to base his claim on section 17
(2) (a) rather than on fraud. Had he relied on that section he need only have shown
that the sale was sale by sample and the bulk of the goods delivered was not of the
same quality as the sample. If this could be proved, then the defendant was in breach
39[1991] 1 MLJ393.
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of an implied condition which would give the right to the plaintiff to reject the goods
tendered.
The buyer has the right to compare the bulk of the goods with the sample and for
the purpose of such comparison, he has the opportunity to inspect the goods.
Opportunity of inspection or examination is also given with regard to the sample and
any defects which could not be discovered upon reasonable inspection of the sample
will render the goods unmerchantable if the defect later becomes apparent.
(Ill) WEAKNESSES IN THE LAW
As we have seen above, sale of goods in Malaysia is still governed by the Sale of
Goods Act 1957, which is basically the 1893 English Act. It is, therefore, not
surprising to see that Malaysia is now facing the same problems that England once had.
These problems concern mainly the implied terms and related issues, i.e., the right of
contracting out by the seller. Among the problems of the implied terms are:-
(1) Section 15 (sale by description), which, although it appears to be simple,
conceals a real difficulty. The development of case law in Malaysia and in
England and other common law countries generally, seems to be expanding
this concept to the extent that it has become difficult to reconcile it with the
exact words of the section. It originally started as applicable only to the
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sale of future or unascertained goods which the buyer had not seen40. Then
it extended to sale of goods displayed before the buyer for so long as it was
bought relying on the description41. As such, every sale could be a sale by
description just because the buys the goods relying on the description given
by the seller.
(2) Section 16(l)(a) (fitness for a particular purpose) has a proviso which is
similar to the old section 14(1) of the 1893 Act. This proviso excludes the
application of implied condition of fitness for purpose if the goods are sold
under a trade or patent name. Present day commerce is very much
promoted through advertisements and this is the most effective way of
reaching consumers. Goods are almost ifnot always sold and bought under
their trade or patent name. Pursuant to this proviso, it would follow that
the implied term will almost never be applicable.
(3) The defects found in section 16(l)(b) (merchantable quality) are numerous.
It only applies where goods are sold by description; the seller must deal in
goods of that description; and an opportunity to inspect will exclude the
implied term with regard to defects which such examination ought to have
40See chapter 4.
11 Grant v. Australian KnittingMill [1936] AC 85.
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revealed42. But the major problem raised by this section is that there is still
no definition of the term "merchantable quality". If we refer back to the
case of Seng Hin v. Arathoon Sons Ltd (1968),43 the court held that
tapioca flour was still merchantable despite the fact that it was discoloured
and not resaleable in Germany for human consumption. Because it was still
fit for use as starch, the fact that it was not fit for human consumption did
not make it unmerchantable. The court placed too much emphasis on
purpose rather than anything else.
(4) Section 62 of the Malaysian Act gives the seller the right to exclude the
implied terms provided for in the Act. This section as such takes away with
the left hand what was given by the right hand with regard to the implied
term provided for in sections 14 - 17. Section 62 is equivalent to the old
section 55, which in the United Kingdom was amended by the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977. This section preserves the laissez faire tradition
whereby the parties are free to contract on whatever terms they desire,
provided that such terms are not unlawful or prohibited by law. This theory
represents the free market economy and the spirit of competition44. This
42See chapter 5.
43[1968] 2 MLJ 123. See above, at note 33.
44Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (1989), p. 289 - 92; Rise and Fall of
Freedom of Contract (1979). p. 402 - 403.
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attitude is also reflected in the opening words of section 14(a) of the 1957
Act and section 11, on stipulation as to time, whereby it begins with the
phrase "unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract".
From the viewpoint of a consumer, who does not have the equal bargaining
power with the seller, the Act does not actually provide much protection to
him. The seller usually has greater bargaining power in negotiating with the
individual buyer, and will usually try to safeguard his interest by excluding
liability in relation to the goods sold.
Despite the antiquity and the inadequacies of the Sale of Goods Act 1957, the
decisions of the Malaysian have not been unjust nor are they odd from the
commercial point of view. The reason why the cases are "justly" decided is because
the Malaysian courts have been relying on the English cases. For example in the case
ofSeng Hin v. Arathoon Sons Ltd (1968), the English cases of Cammell Laird &
Co. v. Manganese Bronze (1934)45 and Bartlett v. Sydney Marcus Ltd (1965)46 were
referred to. This practice has given rise to another more general problem where
English authorities will override the written law of the country. To take an example, in
a case involving the issue of merchantable quality of the goods, the court will be








Bernstein v. Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd. (1987).48 We know, following
these cases, that "merchantability" brings into consideration many external factors. So,
when the Malaysian court decides based on these authorities, then the term
"merchantability' will be expanded beyond the scope of the Sale ofGoods Act 1957.
Nevertheless, knowing and understanding the problems with the Sale ofGoods Act
1957, the important question that arises now is, what should be the approach to reform
of the law of sale in Malaysia? The same three options open to other jurisdictions are
also open to Malaysia, that is, should we retain the present structure and amend where
necessary; or should we adopt Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code; or should
we have a new Act but borrow heavily from Article 2?
Ifwe adopt the first approach, it means that we are retaining the present structure
of the law, that is in the form of an Act. If the second approach is taken, it means that
we will be changing the whole structure of our law into a Code. Sale of goods
legislation in Malaysia, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand is in the form of
an Act, unlike the USA law. Which is a Code. There are some differences between an
Act and a Code. Although both are promulgated by the legislature, typically they
differ greatly in their preparation, scrutiny, style and content. A Code is designed to
cover all leading rules in a particular field and to express these with great degree of
48
[1987] 1 All ER 220.
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generality and a tighter integration than an ordinary statute. Secondly, an Act is
prepared by legislative draftsman who are highly skilled at a technical level but are
unlikely to have any prior conversance with the field. A Code is drafted by experts,
whose mastery of the subject over many years study gives them a complete picture of
the field as a whole and of major weaknesses in the structure and content of the law.
Finally, before the text of a Code is turned into law, the draft is submitted to stringent
scrutiny of many individuals and organisations drawn from a wide range of expertise
and undergoes long and continual process of testing and re-testing, shaping and re¬
shaping and drafting and re-drafting.49
(IV) PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Of the three alternative approaches presented above, the third one seems to be most
attractive for adoption in Malaysia; that is, to have a new Act but to borrow not only
from Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code but also from the reformed English
law. Article 2 traces its origin in many respects to the Sale of Goods 1893; as such,
despite important differences, one can still be easily familiar with it. This approach
will, therefore, also reflect continuity in the law. However, the adaptation of Article 2
will not be in toto. These will be some of the proposals for reform.
49 Goode. "The Codification of Commercial Law", 1988, Monash University Law Review, p. 135 at
p. 139.
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(1) Do away with the implied terms of description and fitness for a particular purpose
and fall back on the ordinary concepts of express and implied terms under the
general contract law. It is not necessary to have terms implied by law when they
are already expressly stated or can be implied from the circumstances and from
trade usage. For example, if the seller described certain goods as having certain
attributes or qualities, it is expected that the goods should comply with whatever
that have been said about them. There is no need to imply that the goods will
correspond with the description because that description has become an express
term of the contract of sale. Similarly, if a buyer requires goods for a particular
purpose, it would be obvious that he should communicate that purpose to the
seller, and that this can amount to an express term. Communication can be
evidence of reliance on the seller's skill and judgment. If the goods cannot be
used for that purpose, the seller, who is in the business of selling such goods, is in
breach of the contract of sale. By doing this, effect is given to section 31 of the
1957 Act, which provides that it is the duty of the seller to deliver the goods and
for the buyer to accept and pay for them in accordance with the terms of the
contract of sale.
(2) Repeal the provision on "merchantable quality" and replace it with the concept of
"satisfactory quality" or "acceptable quality". The United Kingdom Law
Commissions in their 1987 report used the term "acceptable quality" in place of
"merchantable quality", but the Sale and Supply ofGoods Act 1994 uses the word
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"satisfactory quality". The reason is because the term "acceptability" is bound to
cause trouble. If a reasonable person would not accept goods with minor defects
or blemishes in appearance and finish, having regard to the price and other
circumstances, the goods will be rendered unacceptable. But in a sale of a
second-hand car, such blemishes are almost certainly present and no reasonable
person would regard it as making the car of unacceptable quality. There can even
be an instant where there is a non-complaining buyer who might decide that goods
were of acceptable quality even if by objective standards, they were not satisfied.
For this reason, the Act prefers the phrase "satisfactory quality" to "acceptable
quality". In New Zealand, however, the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 uses the
term "acceptable quality", which is determined by having regard to the fitness for
the purpose for which the goods are commonly supplied, acceptability in
appearance and finish, freedom from minor defects, safety and durability. Except
for the first factor, the rest are similar with the factors mentioned in the 1994
English Act. The difference in the English Act is that, it must be fitness for all the
purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied. It
seems that in the United Kingdom, it refers to the kind of goods which may have
more than one common purpose; and they must be fit for all these purposes before
they can be considered as having a satisfactory quality. Under the New Zealand
provision, it refers to the purpose which the goods are commonly supplied. Thus,
the old formula of fitness for purpose is still of great relevance to be considered
together with other factors mentioned therein.
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(3) Strike out the distinction between "condition" and "warranty" and maintain the
concept of terms of the contract as understood in the ordinary contract law. After
all sale of goods is basically a form of contract entered into with the consensus of
the parties. The remedies available will not be dependent on whether the breach is
of a "condition" or a "warranty" but rather whether the breach is material or not.
On this point, Scottish law can be referred to. In Scotland it is provided in the
1994 Act that:
Section 5 - 15B (1) Where in a contract of sale the seller is in breach of
any term of the contract (express or implied), the buyer shall be entitled
(a) to claim damages, and
(b) if the breach is material, to reject any goods delivered under the
contract and treat it as repudiated.
A breach is material under the Act -
Where a contract of sale is a consumer contract, then, for the purposes
of subsection (l)(b) above, breach by the seller of any term (express or
implied) -
(a) as to the quality of the goods or their fitness for a purpose,
(b) if the goods are, or are to be, sold by description, that the
goods will correspond with the description,
(c) if the goods are, or are to be, sold by reference to a sample,
that the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality,
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It is important to note that the above position applies only to consumer
contracts because a consumer requires greater protection than non-consumers. A
consumer almost always buys goods for domestic use or consumption and not for
purpose of making profits. As such, he will not be happy with defective goods.
When he buys perfect goods he expects perfect goods. A consumer is not in a
position to easily dispose of defective goods, as such he has no choice but to keep
it and claim damages. However, damages in monetary term will be difficult to
assess if the defect is minor. A seller is in a stronger bargaining position than the
consumer so much so that the latter may have to drop his claim or accept less than
his due.
(4) As for exemption clauses, there must be legislation along the same lines as the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, as well as the rules laid down in the EC Unfair
Terms Directive. This will help to control the insertion of exemption clauses.
Besides that, section 62 of the 1957 Act must be amended to conform with
section 55 of the Sale ofGoods Act 1979.
(V) CONCLUSION
It is a fact that the Sale of Goods Act 1957 is an archaic piece of legislation flavoured
by nineteenth-century social, economic, political and philosophical influences on
English judicial thinking of that time. There has been a rapid development in commerce
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in Malaysia since 1957 and this means that new transactions must be controlled by a
new business regime. There has been some effort by the government in Malaysia to
move towards greater protection of consumers. The Direct Sales Act 1993 regulates
door-to-door and mail order sales. The main provisions of this Act are that the
consumer can only be approached during specific times and he has the right to void a
purchase within a "cooling-ofl" period. This is to protect the consumer from being
pressurised by salesman into buying something which he does not need. Pressure sales
tactics are common in this kind of merchandising. Other relevant legislation for
consumer protection includes the Trade Description Regulations (Cheap Sales)
(Amendment) 1993, under the Trade Description Act 1972 which requires retailers to
obtain a licence before running a cheap sale. The Price Control (Indication of Price by
Retailers) Order 1993 under the Price Control Act 1946 requires that all retailed goods
are price-tagged so that a consumer can check out the price for himself without any
commitment to the sales person. By this it is hoped that consumers will not suffer at
the hands of the sellers whose only interest is to make a profit. It is hoped that more
laws will be passed in the near future to further safeguard the interest of consumers.50
50
Recently the Parliament passed the Consumer Ptotection Act 1999, which is based on the New
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